God and Reason 



lectures 



UPON THE PRIMARY TRUTHS OF NATURAL RELIGION. 



BY THE 

Rt. Rkv. Monsignor T. S. PRESTON, Y.G., LL.D., 
Domestic Prelate to His Holiness Leo XI LI. 




New York: 

ROBERT CODDINGTON, 246 FOURTH AVENUE. 

1884. 




Copyright, 1883, 
By ROBERT CODDINGTON. 



H. J. HEWITT, PRINTER, 27 ROSE STREET, NEW YORK. 




December 8, 1883. 
Feast of the Immaculate Conception of the 
Blessed Virgin Mary. 



DEDICATION. 



TO HIS EMINENCE 

3obn, Car&fnal /ifccGlosfceE, Srcbbfsbop of mew J^orft, 

MOST AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED 

in remembrance of tbe Tktnoness of mans sears, ano in oevout tbanfesgiving to 
tbe bicsseo providence of (Sod, wbicb bas spare© bim to tbe Cburcb 
and bis Diocese for tbe Golden Subilee of bis priestbood. 



SIT MEMORIA EJUS /ETERNA. 



PEEF ACE. 



Following the needs of the times, and to avert 
in some degree the dangers of our day, I pro- 
posed to lecture at St. Ann's Church, this Ad- 
vent, upon the truths of natural religion, the 
existence of God, the creation of the world, and 
the immortality of the human soul. When I be- 
gan seriously to prepare the matter for such lec- 
tures I found that in a spoken discourse I could 
do no justice to my subject ; that there was argu- 
ment too abstruse to be presented to the ear alone ; 
and that the time allowed for an ordinary sermon 
would be wholly insufficient. I resolved, therefore, 
to write the lectures, and then to content myself 
with preaching a condensation of them in a more 
popular form. My hope is that some who hear 
the spoken discourses, and many more who do 
not, will read this brief demonstration of the pri- 
mary truths which reason teaches. I have often 
felt the need of some such unpretentious work, 



8 Preface. 

which in a brief space would present to intelli- 
gent inquirers the proofs which they would not 
be likely to see in the, larger philosophical trea- 
tises. So, with the divine blessing, some good 
may be accomplished, and to some minds exposed 
to the dangers of infidelity the true light may 
come. 

It will appear at once that these lectures make 
no claim to be in any way perfect or complete. 
They are a simple outline of a grand argument 
which ought to be better known. I have in all 
cases followed the received Catholic philosophy, 
and in no case is there any pretence of originality. 
I have also tried to be clear and to avoid all need- 
less subtlety, by never touching questions which 
do not enter directly into the essential argument. 
All truth is sanctifying, as all truth leads to Him 
who is the source of all reality and all knowledge. 
If His great mercy will pardon the imperfection 
of this book, and deign to use it to His greater 
glory in any w r ay, my humble and earnest prayer 
will have been accepted. T. S. P. 



St. Ann's Church, New York, 
Feast of the Immaculate Conception, 1883. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

LECTURE FIRST. 

The Existence of God, 13 

LECTURE SECOND. 

The Divine Attributes, 69 

LECTURE THIRD. 

The Creation of the World, . ... 125 

LECTURE FOURTH. 

The Immortality of the Soul, . . . . .171 



First Lecture. 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, 



First Lecture. 



THE EXISTENCE OF GOB. 



"The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God."— Psalm xiii. 1. 

In the Advent seasons, now of many years, we 
have occupied ourselves in presenting and demon- 
strating the truths of revealed religion. The doc- 
trines of Catholic faith have been, one after an- 
other, the theme of our discourse, as they have 
been denied by those who still profess to believe 
in some form of Christianity, and call themselves, 
under some name, the disciples of Jesus Christ. It 
has not been difficult to show the absurdity and con- 
tradictions of Protestantism considered either theo- 
retically or practically. A system which contains 
within itself the forces of self-destruction cannot 
long commend itself to the reason. In two ways 
we have endeavored to prove the divinity of the 
Catholic religion : by showing how its extrinsic 
credibility appeals to honest reason, and by demon- 

13 



14 



First Lecture. 



s (rating that the whole of revelation, and the reign 
even of Christ the Redeemer, depend upon the 
Church and her infallible head. While the realm 
of faith is above reason, there is no contradiction 
between revelation and the light of nature. On 
the contrary, the Catholic alone is at peace with 
the facts of history, the conclusions of his reason, 
and the demands of his higher nature. In the 
Church alone are found the harmonies of reason 
and faith, the true answers to the problems of life 
and the earnest aspirations of the soul. They who 
live in her light are already the citizens of the 
celestial city, and the partakers of a life above na- 
ture. 

But the sad apostasy of the sixteenth century 
has run its natural course. It began by destroying 
the foundations of Christian faith, and it has ended 
by restoring a worse infidelity than that of pagan- 
ism. Xot only do we hear the denial of the truths 
which are essential to Christianity, but also the re- 
jection of the testimony of reason. The atheist of 
this century has outrivalled the pagan, and men 
are universal sceptics, freely denying the doctrines 
of natural religion. Thus man is without a God, 
without a law, without a future, only one of the 
many species of beasts, but more hopeless than his 
fellows. Such are the words of the Holy Vatican 



The Existence of God. 



15 



Council, speaking to the needs of this unbelieving 
generation: " Then arose and spread too widely 
through the world that doctrine of rationalism, or 
naturalism, which, attacking Christianity at every 
point, as being a supernatural institution, labors 
with all its might to exclude Christ, who is our 
Lord and Saviour, from the minds of men, and 
from the life and the morals of the nations ; and 
so to establish, instead, the reign of mere reason, 
as they call it, or of nature. And thus having for- 
saken and cast away the Christian religion, having 
denied the true God and His Christ, the minds of 
many have at last fallen into the abyss of panthe- 
ism, materialism, and atheism ; so that now, repu- 
diating the reasoning nature of man, and every 
rule of right and wrong, they are laboring to over- 
throw the very foundations of human society." *■ 

There are certain truths to which reason bears tes- 
timony, and which are beyond controversy. They 
have been accepted by the common belief of all 
mankind, under various forms, and even beneath 
many errors. They cannot be denied without as- 
sailing, the first principles of reason, and doing 
violence to the higher nature which is in every 
man. The advanced thinker may try to make him- 
self a brute or a clod of the earth, but there is a 

♦Dogmatic Decree on Catholic Faith. 



16 



First Lecture. 



rebellion within him at such degradation, and his 
lond professions of infidelity are unreal. These 
truths to which reason testifies form the creed of 
natural religion, or the complex of doctrines which 
nature proclaims. 

These truths are now no more sacred to the mod- 
ern philosopher than are the verities of the faith 
revealed by our Lord Jesus Christ. Cultured pa- 
ganism was higher in the scale of thought than the 
atheism of our day. Yet are these truths of natu- 
ral religion certain and infallible. They are placed 
in stronger light, and illumined by the revelation 
which has manifested so much of the divine na- 
ture and the divine love. Still, the so-called philo- 
sophers who profess to make a god of reason are 
the inconsistent crowd who would destroy reason 
and utterly extinguish its light. We meet them 
wherever they are found, and fight them on the 
battle-ground of their own choosing. With reason 
we confute them, and, in the words of the inspired 
Scripture, we show how he who denies the exis- 
tence of God is a fool. 

Before we proceed to the demonstration proposed 
in this lecture, it will be w^ell to exhibit the fea- 
tures of what is called modern philosophy from 
the testimony of its leaders. There is a crowd of 
vapid talkers who question everything proposed, 



The Existence of God. 



17 



and who love to seem wise by tlie utterance of 
phrases which are unintelligible. The more unin- 
telligible their opinions are, the deeper thinkers 
they count themselves to be. We pass by the scof- 
fer who prides himself upon the denial of all things 
sacred, and answers all just arguments by ridicule. 
It is easy for a fool to deny every proposition, and 
it is no effort of mind to laugh. With such adver- 
saries there is no useful contest, since they make no 
pretension to the weapons of true logic. Mr. John 
Fiske tells us that the term atheist has lost its op- 
probrious character in the minds of the new philo- 
sophers. "Dr. Buchner would regard it as a slur 
upon his mental fitness for philosophizing if we 
were to refuse him the title of atheist ; and mate- 
rialism is the name of that which is as dear to 
him as liberty was to the followers of Danton and 
Mirabeau." "To Dr. Buchner' s mind the criticism 
of the various historic conceptions of godhead has 
not only stripped these terms of their anthropomor- 
phic vestments, but has left them destitute of any 
validity or solid content whatever ; and in similar- 
wise he is satisfied with describing the operations 
of nature, alike in the physical and psychical 
worlds, as merely the redistributions of matter and 
motion, without seeking to answer the inquiry as 
to what matter and motion are, or how they can 



18 



First Lecture. 



be supposed to exist at all, save in reference to 
the mind by which they are cognized. Starting, 
then, upon this twofold basis, that the notion of 
God is a. figment, and that matter in motion is the 
only real existence, he seeks to interpret the facts 
disclosed by scientific induction concerning the ori- 
gin, nature, history, and destiny of man." * 

"What need," argues Chauncey Wright, " to im- 
agine a supernatural agency in order to get rid of 
primeval chaos, w-hen we have no reason to believe 
that the primeval chaos ever had an existence save 
as a figment of the metaphysician? To assume 
that the present orderly system of relations among 
things ever emerged from an antecedent state of dis- 
order is, as he justly maintained, a wholly arbitrary 
and unwarrantable proceeding. No one could ask 
for a simpler and more incisive criticism upon that 
crude species of theism which represents the Deity 
as a power outside the universe which coerces it 
into orderly behavior." f 

The " Rational theology" of Kant attempts to 
invalidate the proofs of the being of God, so that 
on grounds of pure reason, in relation to our high- 
est ideas, we are left in the position of being un- 

* " Darwinism, and other Essays," by John Fiske, M.A., LL.B., 
pp. 49, 51. 
t Ibid. p. 103. 



The Existence of God. 



19 



able to demonstrate tlieir objective validity. We 
can neither prove tliem nor disprove them, and 
theoretically we can neither admit nor deny them. 
The positivism of Comte, which has many follow- 
ers, sees the universal unity of all existences in 
one great being which is called Humanity. This 
alone is the genuine end or object of all worship. 

Mr. Herbert Spencer has a singular way of recon- 
ciling what he calls religion with science. All 
knowledge of the Supreme Being is resolved into 
a vague conception of an Absolute which cannot 
be known nor demonstrated. This Absolute is real- 
ly unknowable. "Those," says he, "who cannot 
conceive a self-existent universe, and who there- 
fore assume a creator as the source of the uni- 
verse, take for granted that they can conceive a 
self-existent creator. The mystery which they re- 
cognize in this great fact surrounding them on 
every side they transfer to an alleged source of 
this great fact, and then suppose that they have 
solved the mystery. But they delude themselves. 
As was proved at the outset of the argument, self- 
existence is rigorously inconceivable ; and this holds 
true whatever be the nature of the object of which 
it is predicated. "Whoever agrees that the atheis- 
tic hypothesis is untenable because it involves the 
impossible idea of self-existence, must perforce ad- 



20 



First Lecture. 



mit that the theistic hypothesis is untenable if it 
contains the same impossible idea/' * 

"The Absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, 
neither can it be conceived as unconscious ; it can- 
not be conceived as complex, neither can it be con- 
ceived as simple ; it cannot be conceived by differ- 
ence, neither can it be conceived by the absence 
of difference ; it cannot be identified with the uni- 
verse, neither can it be distinguished from it. The 
One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of 
existence, are thus alike incomprehensible." f "The 
analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not 
simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no 
hypothesis is even tliinTcable" 

"After it has been shown that every supposi- 
tion respecting the genesis of the universe com- 
mits us to alternative impossibilities of thought ; 
after it has been shown that each attempt to con- 
ceive real existence ends in an intellectual sui- 
cide ; after it has been shown why, by the very 
constitution of our minds, we are debarred from 
thinking of the Absolute, it is still asserted that 
we ought to think of the Absolute thus and thus. 
In all imaginable w r ays we find thrust upon us 
the truth that we are not permitted to know, 
nay, are not even permitted to conceive, that Real- 

* Herbert Spencer, " First Principles," p. 35. f Ibid. p. 41. 



The Existence of God. 



21 



ity which is behind the veil of appearance ; and 
yet it is said to be our duty to believe that this 
Reality exists in a certain defined manner." 

"An immense majority will refuse, with more 
or less of indignation, a belief seeming to them 
so shadowy and indefinite. Having always em- 
bodied the Ultimate Cause so far as was need- 
ful to its mental realization, they must necessari- 
ly resent the substitution of an Ultimate Cause 
which cannot be mentally realized at all. ' You 
offer us,' they say, 'an unthinkable abstraction 
in place of a Being towards whom we may en- 
tertain definite feelings. Though Ave are told that 
the Absolute is real, yet, since we are not allow- 
ed to conceive it, it might as well be a pure ne- 
gation. Instead of a power which we can regard 
as having some sympathy with us, you would 
have us contemplate a power to which no emotion 
whatever can be ascribed. And so we are to be 
deprived of the very substance of our faith.' This 
kind of protest accompanies every change from a 
lower creed to a higher. . . . No mental revolu- 
tion can be accomplished without more or less of 
laceration. . . . That which is relatively well known 
has to be given up for that which is relatively 
unknown and ideal." * 

* Spencer, " First Principles, " pp ; 41, 46, 110, 114. 



22 



Fibst Lecture. 



Now, the Catholic dpc trine in regard to the ex- 
istence of God is briefly summed up in the de- 
crees of the Vatican Council. It will be well to 
r give the exact language of this infallible authority 
before we proceed to the demonstrations of reason : 
"The Holy, Catholic, Apostolic, Roman Church 
believes and confesses that there is one true and 
living God, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, 
almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, in- 
finite in understanding and will and in all perfec- 
tion, who, being a spiritual substance, one, single, 
absolutely simple and unchangeable, must be held 
to be, in reality and in essence, distinct from the 
world, in Himself and of Himself perfectly happy, 
and unspeakably exalted above all things that are 
or can be conceived besides Himself." 

"The same holy mother Church holds and teach- 
es that God, the beginning and end of all things, 
can be known with certainty through created things 
by the natural light of human reason. For 4 the 
invisible things of Him, from the creation of the 
world, are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made' (Romans i. 20)." "Moreover, 
the Catholic Church holds, and has ever held, that 
there exists a twofold order of knowledge, each of 
which is distinct from the other both as to its 
principle and object. As to its principle, because 



The Existexce of God. 



23 



in the one we know by natural reason, in the 
other by divine faith ; as to its object, because, be- 
sides those things to which natural reason can at- 
tain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries 
hidden in God which, unless by Him revealed, can- 
not come to our knowledge." 

"But although faith be above reason, there never 
can be a real disagreement between them, since the 
same God who reveals mysteries and infuses faith 
has given to man's soul the light of reason ; and 
God cannot deny Himself, nor can one truth ever 
contradict another." 

"If any one shall deny the one true God, Crea- 
tor and Lord of all things visible and invisible, let 
him be anathema." 

44 If any one shall unblushingly affirm that be- 
sides matter nothing else exists, let him be an- 
athema." 

"If any one shall say that the substance or es- 
sence of God, and of all things, is one and the 
same, let him be anathema." 

"If any one shall say that finite things, both 
corporeal and spiritual, or at least spiritual things, 
are emanations of the divine substance ; or that 
the divine essence by manifestation or develop- 
ment of itself becomes all things ; or, finally, that 
God is universal or indefinite being, which in de- 



24 



First Lecture. 



termining itself constitutes all things, divided into 
genera, species, and individuals, let him be anath- 
ema." 

"If any one shall say that certain knowledge 
of the one true God, our Creator and Lord, can- 
not be attained by the natural light of human 
reason through the things that are made, let him 
be anathema." * 

Nothing can be plainer than these words of the 
Catholic Church, which is the only divine autho- 
rity upon earth. In accordance, therefore, with the 
truth so clearly proclaimed, we will proceed to 
show how the human reason testifies to the ex- 
istence of God. We shall endeavor to make our 
argument in simple words and to divest it of all 
needless subtlety. The demonstration is so clear 
that no honest mind can refuse its assent and 
conviction. There are those who stifle reason and 
are not open to its appeals, and such are the 
objects of pity rather than of argument. 

The proofs of God's existence are drawn from 
the metaphysical, the physical, and the moral 
order. 

* Dogmatic Decrees of the Vatican Council on Faith and Reason. 



The Existence of God. 



25 



L 

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE METAPHYSICAL ORDER. 

1. Philosophers are accustomed to draw a de- 
monstration from the idea of God which all have ; 
and it seems to us that there is great strength 
in this argument. Thus, we have an idea of God 
as of a being infinitely perfect and entirely dis- 
tinct from the universe ; but if there were no God 
it would be impossible for us to have this idea, 
therefore God exists. 

It can hardly be denied that men have natu- 
rally some idea of the Supreme Being. Even the 
materialist or pantheist speaks of a God, of which 
he forms some conception. The atheist, who de- 
nies the existence of God, must have some idea 
of the thing he denies. And this conception of 
God, in any manner, is distinct from all other 
conceptions, and involves to a greater or less de- 
gree the perfections of an infinite Being, never 
to be confounded with matter. For even the pan- 
theist, who would make matter God, is forced to 
• abstract from the lower order and to construct 
a species of generality to which he gives divine 
characters. It is not necessary to suppose an 
adequate conception of God in the minds of all 



26 



First Lecture. 



men ; but ib is sufficient that everywhere we find 
among all tribes the belief in a Supreme and in- 
telligent Existence. 

This, indeed, is an argument to be drawn in 
the moral order and upon another basis ; yet it 
seems certain and undeniable that the idea of the 
divine Being exists universally in the light of our 
reason. 

Now, if there were no God we could have no 
idea of such an Existence. 

Every idea is the perception of some object, and 
there is no idea without an object ; but if God 
did not exist the idea of God would have no ob- 
ject. For God, infinitely perfect and distinct from 
the universe, cannot be confounded with the uni- 
verse itself nor with our own minds. The very 
notion which we conceive excludes matter and 
the universe of things from the conception of the 
Absolute. It is, then, against reason to say that 
we could have this idea of the Supreme Being, 
if such a Being did not exist.* 

And the human mind could not form to itself 
such an idea from things sensible, nor, indeed, 
from its own activity. Things sensible surround 
us on every side. They form a world to attract 
and astonish us. But they never for one instant 

* Rothenflue, " Theodicea." 



The Existexce of God. 



27 



appear to ns with the qualities of the Infinite. 
"Nature," says Lacordaire, "is a grand spectacle 
which easily exhausts our vision and our imagi- 
nation ; but does it bear the stamp of a being 
without cause, of a being existing of itself ? Can 
nature say, like God through Moses, ' I am who 
am ' ? Infinity is the first mark of the being with- 
out cause. Does nature bear this sign % All that 
we see there is limited ; all is form and move- 
ment — form determined, movement calculated ; all 
falls under the straitened empire of measure, 
even the distances which remain unknown to our 
instruments, but are by no means unknown to 
our conceptions. We feel the limit even where 
our ey e does not perceive it ; it is enough for us 
to seize it at one point to determine it every- 
where. The infinite is indivisible, and were but 
one single atom of the universe submitted to our 
feeble hands we should know that nature is fin- 
ite, and that its immensity is but the splendid 
veil of its poverty." * 

This idea, then, of God, so essentially distinct 
from all other things, cannot be formed from our 
knowledge of things sensible. No one sensible 
thing can be the object of this idea ; and were 
we to add things finite together without end we 

* Lacordaire, " Conferences on God," Chap. L 



28 



First Lecture, 



should only reach the conception of an Indefinite, 
which would be utterly diverse from our idea of 
the Infinite. 

An unlimited number of things finite, as far as 
the human reason could go, would never make 
an Infinite. 

Nor if we were to abstract from things sensible 
any of their essential or individual characteristics 
could we acquire the idea of God, since this idea 
is not and cannot be an essential note of any 
individual essence or concept of things sensible. 
And the process of abstraction can only take from 
things sensible that which in some manner be- 
longs to them. 

Nor if God did not exist could we argue from 
the effect to the first Cause, since there could be 
no such cause, and a cause not existing is not a 
cause. There is contradiction in the terms. So the 
philosophers, ancient and modern, who deny the 
creation of the universe cannot form the idea of 
the Supreme Existence from the conclusion from 
cause to effect, because in plain words they deny 
the reality of any such cause. 

Whence, then, do they form the idea which they 
reject and deny? They cannot derive it from hu- 
man language or their own theories. Language is 
only the sign of an idea. Words suppose an idea 



The Existence of God. 



29 



perceived in some way by the mind. The first word 
ever spoken which expressed the idea of God must 
have come from some one who must have possess- 
ed this idea in order to its communication. But 
if there were no God there seems no possible way 
by which any man, looking upon things sensible or 
upon himself, could perceive the notion of the Infinite. 

It would be absurd to suppose that the human 
intelligence was necessarily determined to form this 
great idea of its own activity, and that this idea 
should be a mere form of the mind. For the idea 
of God is that of a Being infinite, and real, and 
actually existing. The idea of such a being not 
existing is a contradiction, since the notion of the 
Supreme cannot be subjectively true unless it is 
objectively real. 

Again, the idea which we have, is of a Being 
greater than all things else, and than which we 
can conceive nothing greater. But such an idea 
necessarily includes existence, since to be is much 
more than to be possible, and a being conceived as 
possible is much less than one conceived as exist-, 
ing. To such purport are the words of St. Anselm : 
' 'Therefore, O Lord, we believe Thee to be some- 
thing than which nothing greater can be thought 
of. Such is not anything which mere nature pre- 
sents. And the fool who hath said in his heart, 



30 



First Lecture. 



6 There is no God,' "understands that which he 
dares to deny to be something than which no- 
thing greater can be conceived. And this being 
cannot be in his intellect alone, since by the essen- 
tial notes it exists in reality. If, then, that which 
is the Being above all others were in the intellect 
alone, a mere possibility, it would still be less than 
a Being in actual existence, which would be a con- 
tradiction. So without doubt there exists a Being 
than which nothing greater can be thought of, and 
this idea of God involves His existence." * It 
would be impossible to think of God not existing, 
since such a thought would never be the concep- 
tion of God ; it would be the idea of something 
even infinitely less than God. We cannot have a 
merely subjective idea of an infinite being without 
any real external object. 

2. A second demonstration in the metaphysical 
order is even more clear and unanswerable. 

It is drawn from the necessity of an uncreated or 
self-existent Being. There is a Being unproduced 
and necessarily existing ; but such a Being is in- 
finite, and therefore God. 

The first or major proposition is proved by the 
following argument : If there be no Being exist- 
ing of necessity, nothing can exist ; but confessed- 

* St, Anselm, "Prolog, de Dei Exist., " Cap. IL 



The Existence of God. 



31 



ly there are many things existing, therefore there 
is a Self-existent Being. There is no need to de- 
monstrate the fact of the existence of things sensi- 
ble, while atheists, materialists, and idealists ad- 
mit at least their own existence. 

Now, if there is no necessary uncreated Being, 
then the first being that ever existed either came, 
without a cause, from nothing, or produced itself ; 
or two beings mutually produced each other ; or 
one being produced another in an infinite series. 

But each one of these suppositions involves an 
absurdity. That which is not is nothing ; and no- 
thing cannot produce anything. A being not ex- 
isting cannot produce either itself nor anything 
else. A thing must first exist before it can act 
or produce anything. And the idea of an infinite 
series of things is a contradiction in terms. There 
is a beginning or an end to a series, or it is no se- 
ries. YTe cannot conceive of an infinite series of 
finite things. And if there be a beginning, we come 
to the necessity of a Being which exists without 
the aid of any other being, having the cause of its 
existence in itself. 

It seems to us, then, that it will not be difficult 
to show that this Being which is thus self-existent, 
and without which there cannot be any finite ex- 
istences, is infinite and therefore God. 



32 



First Lecture. 



A Being existing necessarily, exists by an abso- 
lute possibility or by the power of its own es- 
sence. It cannot not exist. It is, therefore, neces- 
sarily all that it is, and if it be finite is necessa- 
rily finite. But a self-existing Being suffers no 
limitations. It is once and ever the same, with 
the same reason for its existence. If it were finite 
or limited it would be so from the necessity of its * 
nature, so that it could never be greater nor less 
than it is. But every finite being is by the essen- 
tial notes of its nature capable of increase or dimi- 
nution. The necessarily existing Being is not, there- 
fore, finite, and plainly must be infinite. It is im- 
possible for us to conceive of a finite being which 
contains in itself the reason of its own existence, 
since the notion of self-existence excludes limitation, 
and includes an absolute possibility and all reali- 
ty. By the supposition of the argument, the finite 
would at the same time be finite and not finite, 
which is a contradiction. There is no middle term 
between finite and infinite existence ; that, there- 
fore, which is not finite is infinite. 

Thus St. Thomas demonstrates the existence of 
the Infinite from the difference between the possi- 
ble and the necessary : "We find in things some 
which may be or may not be. They are produced, 
and they are corrupted. It is impossible that all 



The Existence of God. 



33 



such things should always be, for that which is 
possible only may not be, and often has no exist- 
ence. If, therefore, all things are possible in this 
way, there was a time when there was nothing. 
And if this be true, even now there would be no- 
thing ; for that which is not cannot begin to be ex- 
cept by the power of something which is. If, then, 
there w^ere no being, it would be impossible that 
anything should begin to be, and there could be 
nothing existing, which is evidently false. All be- 
ings are not, therefore, simply possible, but there 
must be a necessary Being. A necessary Being 
must have the cause of its necessity, either out 
of itself or from itself. There is no alternative. 
We cannot conceive an infinite series of necessaries 
having in themselves the cause of their necessity, 
no more than we can conceive of an infinite series 
of efficient causes. Therefore there must exist a 
necessary Being, having the cause of its existence 
in itself, and the cause of being to all other things ; 
and this Being is God." * It is evident, therefore, 
that there must be a Being who has no beginnings 
and who consequently exists of necessity, by His 
own nature, else there could be no other existence. 
And it is clear that a Being existing thus neces- 
sarily cannot have an imperfect or limited exist- 

* St. Thomas, "Surama," P. I. A. III. Quaes. 3. 



34 



First Lecture. 



ence, since there can be nothing to limit or restrain 
it. Such a Being is by its nature the absolute or 
sovereignly perfect Being. It cannot be otherwise 
conceived of, for all imperfection supposes limits, 
and in some respect is actually the negation of 
being. The absolute must be without limits, pos- 
sessing all reality and every perfection. All the 
attributes of God are derived from His necessary 
existence. Because He is thus self -existent He is 
one, eternal, and immutable. Two necessary beings 
cannot be conceived of. Unity is involved in the 
very notion of a Being existing by virtue of an 
absolute necessity. 



II. 

THE ARGUMENT PROM THE PHYSICAL ORDER. 

Thus far we have dw r elt for a moment upon the 
demonstration of the existence of God w 7 hich can 
be gathered from pure metaphysics. But there 
are other proofs which more directly and mani* 
festly address our reason, and which cannot be 
gainsaid. The Holy Ghost tells us that they who 
deny the being of God are without excuse, since 
this primary truth has been manifested to men : 
4 'That which is known of God is manifest in them. 



The Existence of God. 



35 



For God hath manifested it unto them. For the 
invisible things of Him, from the creation of the 
world, are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made : His eternal power also and 
divinity; so that they are inexcusable." * "If 
any one shall say," declares the Holy Vatican 
Council, " that certain knowledge of the one true 
God cannot be attained by the natural light of rea- 
son through the things that are made, let him be 
anathema." 

We proceed, then, to show how the tilings that 
are made manifest the eternal power and Divinity 
of God. 

1. Iso one can deny the existence of the visi- 
ble world, which we see and appreciate with our 
senses. But this visible world does not exist of 
itself, therefore it is produced or contingent. And 
if it be produced it must be produced by a Being 
which is not contingent, and therefore by God. 
The existence of the world proclaims thus the di- 
vinity of its Author. The parts of this argument 
are incontestable. 

Wo one can say that this visible world exists 
of itself either as a whole or in its parts. If it 
existed of itself it would be a necessary being, 
including in itself actual existence. But this is 

* Romans i. 19, 20. 



36 



First Lecture. 



not tlie case, since we easily conceive of the world 
as not existing, and we can conceive of many 
worlds similar to ours as simply possible. The 
idea of the world by no means implies its actual 
existence. 

If the world were a necessary being it would be 
eternal and infinite ; but we know that the world 
is not infinite, since it is extended and composed 
of parts ; while the infinite is necessarily without 
extension or parts. The conception of an infinite 
with parts is an absurdity which the reason re- 
jects. That which can be said of the whole is 
also to be said of all the parts. There is no such 
thing as an infinite number. 

The infinite is also immutable, being once and for 
ever all that it is. But the world is capable of 
substantial changes and modifications. The essence 
of the world, as of a composed substance, is con- 
stituted by a certain composition and union of 
parts ; but this composition, as we know by ex- 
perience, can be dissolved in its single parts, and 
the union once existing can be broken and a new 
composition can be substituted. 

There is no body which cannot in different ways 
be changed or modified, and the whole world, or 
the whole collection of bodies, is subject to new 
and varying modifications from the successive 



The Existence of God. 



37 



modes and motions of the single bodies which com- 
pose it. The world, therefore, is mutable and not a 
necessary eternal existence. But if the world be not 
a necessary being, it is contingent, and there is no 
conceivable medium between a necessary and a con- 
tingent being. If ifc be not the one, it is the other. 

The existence of the world demands, therefore, an 
efficient cause for its being, and no such cause can 
be found, save a necessary Existence, which is God. 
A being produced must be produced by another 
being, and whatever series be supposed we must 
come at last to a being unproduced, existing of 
itself, or necessary. Thus says Leibnitz: u If there 
be no necessary being, no being is possible.'' 
"Let there be a single moment," says Bossuet, 
" when there is nothing, then nothing will be 
eternally. Thus nothing will be for ever all truth, 
and there will be no truth but nothingness ; which 
is both absurd and contradictory." Since, then, 
there is something existing to-day, it is manifest 
that something has always existed ; otherwise we 
must conclude that the things which exist have 
come from nothing, having absolutely no cause for 
their existence, which is a pure contradiction in 
terms. For if we say that a thing is produced, 
and at the same time say that there is no cause of 
its production, we really say that it is at the same 



38 



First Lecture. 



time produced and not produced. Everything 
that exists must have a cause of its existence, a 
reason or foundation on which its existence rests. 
For it must exist either in virtue of a necessity 
of its nature, in which case it is eternal ; or by 
the power of some other being, which must then 
have existed before it, at least in priority of na- 
ture, as the cause is conceived before the effect.* 

This argument is simple and unanswerable. It 
is not supposed that there is any proportion of 
being between God and things produced. There 
could not be between a finite and an Infinite. 
Neither does the existence of the finite flow neces- 
sarily from the Infinite, as if the Necessary Being 
were forced to produce existences out of Himself. 
But as there is no effect without a cause, there 
must be an independent and Infinite, by whose 
power and will all other things exist. 

St. Thomas thus argues: "We find in sensible 
things an order of efficient causes. It is not possi- 
ble that anything should be the efficient cause of 
itself, for then it would be before itself, which is 
a contradiction. There cannot be an infinite series of 
efficient causes, and so there must be a first effi- 
cient cause existing of itself, which is God." f 

* Clarke, " Existence of God," I. Cap. II. 
fSt. Thomas, "Summa," Pars I. A. I. Quaes. 3. 



The Existexce of God. 39 

The same demonstration can be shown from the 
motion of matter. Thus we give the words of 
St. Thomas : " It is certain, as our senses testify, 
that matter is in motion. We know that there 
are some things in motion. But everything which 
is moved is moved by another. It cannot move 
itself, nor pass from possibility to the actual, 
without another agent." Matter in motion must 
have an efficient cause which produced this motion, 
since motion is not essential to matter, which of 
itself is inert. 

u Ia causes of motion or modification we cannot 
proceed to the supposition of an infinite series, as 
has been already proved in regard to efficient 
causes. Therefore there must be a prime cause of 
motion, which cause is moved by no being, and 
which is therefore Self-existent, or God." % If any- 
thing be evident, it is that the first cause of move- 
ment is not in nature, and that the laws of nature 
come from a Superior Will which moves and di- 
rects the universe. u Is it not clear," says Rous- 
seau, " that if motion were essential to matter 
it would be inseparable from it, it would be al- 
ways in the same degree, always the same in 
every portion of matter? It would be incom- 
municable ; it could neither be increased nor di- 

*Ibid. 



40 



First Lecture. 



minished, and we could not conceive of mat- 
ter in a state of repose ? The idea of motion is 
nothing else than that of passing from one place 
to another. There is no movement without some 
direction, for a thing cannot be moved at the 
same time in different directions. How, then, can 
matter move itself necessarily ? Has all matter in 
mass an uniform movement, or has each atom its 
own proper movement? In the first case the en- 
tire universe would form a solid and indivisible 
mass. In the second it would be a thin and in- 
coherent fluid, without any possibility of the 
union of its atoms. In what direction would be 
the common movement of all matter ? If every 
molecule of matter had its particular direction, 
what would be the cause of all these directions 
and differences? To give to matter a movement 
in the abstract is to utter words which mean 
nothing ; and to give it a determined movement 
is to suppose a cause which determines it." All 
the modifications or phenomena of nature furnish 
the same demonstration. How can one explain 
the successive reproduction of living beings, with- 
out admitting a first Being who has always exist- 
ed, and who is the principle of all the others? 
To suppose an infinite progress of causes and 
generations is to suppose a manifest absurdity. 



The Existence of God. 



41 



As well might one speak of a chain which 
should remain suspended, because each ring is 
held by the one preceding it, without any first 
ring which holds all the others. 

2. .Another physical demonstration is drawn from 
the order of the world, which demands an intelli- 
gent Cause. 

There exists in this world a wonderful order, 
which is the admiration of every intelligence. The 
various things of which the world is composed 
have each its place, and all are so disposed that 
they may obtain their effect or end. Who can 
deny this self-evident truth who has studied 
nature in any of its parts, in any grade of 
being, from the wonders of material existence to 
that of animal or intelligent life? The courses 
of the planets in their orbits, the marches of the 
stars in their fixed revolutions, the changes of 
the seasons, and the elements, all show a divine 
harmony, as things seemingly opposed proceed 
with regularity to one unvarying end. It cannot 
be said that these laws of nature which we dis- 
cern are the fruit of chance, for chance is notliing 
in itself, and cannot be the cause of anything, 
much less of regular motions to a fixed and ad- 
mirable end. 

Look also at the individual being* which the 



First Lecture. 



visible world presents to ns. Consider the won- 
derful structure of the human body, where in or- 
der so many parts concur to one end ; where dis- 
order is disease or death. Examine the marvels 
of the human eye, which by far surpasses the 
highest mechanism of art. See the endless won- 
ders of animal or insect life, daily opening to the 
student of nature new exhibitions of marvellous 
design. Behold how from the dying seed the 
plant buds forth, and the tree arises with its 
leaves and flowers and fruit. Remark how all 
that lives possesses the power to reproduce itself, 
as "the earth brings forth the green herb, and 
such as yieldeth seed according to its kind, and 
the tree that beareth fruit, having seed, each one 
according to its kind." * Even they who deny 
God, and seek to deify nature, are forced to admit 
this wonderful order which the world presents, this 
admirable disposition of means to an end. 

But this order so manifest in nature involves 
the necessity of an intelligent agent as its cause. 
Everything in order proclaims the author of this 
harmony to be supremely intelligent. 

Anything is said to be in order in proportion 
as it tends to an end, and we cannot conceive of 
order without such an end. But the idea of an 

* Genesis i. 12. 



The Existence of God. 



43 



end for wliicli anything is, necessarily supposes 
an intelligent being who sees and wills tins end. 
This evident conclusion we draw from all things 
We behold, whose construction proves design and 
demonstrates the intelligence of the maker. The 
works of art declare the design of the artificer. 
What unintelligent agent is capable of a work 
which implies an end ? 

Many of the existences which this world dis- 
plays are irrational and by nature indifferent to 
any order ; yet do they move with unerring regu- 
larity to their end, and so display the skill of 
their Maker and proclaim His magnificent design. 
4 4 The heavens show forth the glory of God, and 
the firmament declareth the work of His hands. 
Day to day uttereth speech, and night to night 
showeth knowledge/' * 

But this intelligent agent from whose mind pro- 
ceeds the order of the universe must be an infi- 
nite Being. Xo less an intelligence would be the 
sufficient reason for the harmony of things pro- 
duced. AVe cannot conceive of a finite mind which 
shall be adequate to this superhuman design and 
knowledge. 

Moreover, He who orders the things of earth to 
their end cannot be in the order which He pro- 
* Psalm xviii. 1, 2. 



44 



First Lecture. 



duces, as one of the things ordered; else He would 
be only one of the things produced, and Himself 
moving by a law proceeding from some other in- 
telligence. He could not be Himself depending 
upon an efficient cause, else He would not be the 
cause of the order of nature. 

But if He be independent He must exist of His 
own nature and therefore be infinite. To be inde- 
pendent is to be infinite, as to be dependent is 
to be finite. And independence, as it involves 
infinity, involves also all perfection and all reality. 
There can be no other way of reaching the adequate 
cause of the marvellous order of things contingent. 

St. Thomas draws the same argument in an- 
other way: " The things of nature are what they 
are in different degrees. In goodness, in truth, in 
nobility, there are degrees of greater or less. But 
they are greater or less in proportion as they ap- 
proach that which is best. There is, then, a being 
which is most true, the. best and the noblest, and 
therefore the greatest. There is a Being who is to 
all things in their differing ranks the cause of being 
and of goodness and of every perfection. There 
is an intelligent agent by whom all natural things 
are ordered to their end; and this Being is God." * 

To this purpose are the inspired words of Holy 
* St. Thomas, " Suinma," I. 2, § 3. 



The Existence of God. 45 

Scripture: " All men are vain in whom there is 
not the knowledge of God ; and who by these good 
things that are seen could not understand Him 
that is, neither by attending to the works have 
acknowledged who was the workman. But have 
imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift 
air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, 
or the sun and moon, to be the gods that rule 
the world. With whose beauty if they being de- 
lighted took them to be gods, let them know how 
much the Lord of them is more beautiful than 
they ; for the first author of beauty made all 
these things. Or if they admired their power and 
their effects, let them understand by them that 
He that made them is mightier than they. For 
by the greatness of the beauty, and of the crea- 
ture, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to 
be known thereby." * 

"When we inquire whether there is a first 
Cause of this universe, the imperfection and limi- 
tation of creatures appeal to the human reason ; 
when we inquire into the nature of this existing 
cause, the beauty, order, and magnificence of crea- 
tures are proposed to us ; and both considerations 
together form an integral . demonstration of the 
existence of God/' f 

* Wisdom xiii. 1-5. f Franzelin, " De Deo Uno," § 2. 



46 



First Lecture. 



IIL 

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE MORAL ORDER. 

The demonstration in this order of reasoning is 
not only incontestable in itself, but tends to con- 
firm the arguments already advanced. 

1. There is an unanimous consent of all man- 
kind in the belief in the existence of God ; but 
such a consent could not be if there were no God, 
therefore from this source we have a certain ar- 
gument. 

If we go back to the most ancient nations we 
have evidence of this universal belief in the ex- 
istence of the Supreme Being. We have only to 
consult the authors most worthy of credence, such 
as Plato, Aristotle, Socrates, and Zeno. Plato urges, 
among the proofs of the existence of the Deity, 
this admitted consent of all peoples. Cicero de- 
clares that "there is no one so inhuman that the 
idea of the deity has not imbued his mind. 
Among so many species there is no animal besides 
man that has any idea of God. And yet among 
men there is no tribe so wild or savage that it 
has no idea of the existence of God, even though 
it may be ignorant of His nature." * 

* " De Nat ura Deorum," Cap. XVI. " De Legibus," L. I. 



The Existence of God. 



47 



"Go through the world," says Plutarch; "you 
can find cities without walls, without letters, laws, 
or houses ; you will find none without temples to 
the gods, none which do not offer prayer or sacri- 
fice to obtain good or avert evil." * 

Among ancient historians there are none who do 
not speak of the religion of those whose history 
they write, who are not unanimous in the testi- 
mony to the belief in God's existence. 

Everywhere there are temples and altars erected, 
festal days of solemnity, priests and sacred rites. 
There is the testimony of such monuments even 
where history has not survived the ruins of time. 
If this be true of the most ancient tribes of which 
we have knowledge, and of the days of heath en- 
ism, it is much more true of recent times and mo- 
dem nations, in regard to which there can be no 
question. 

Thus St. Paul declares to the Athenians that 
the knowledge of God had come to all nations 
in such way as to render them inexcusable if 
they did not know Him: "God, who made the 
world and. all things therein, hath made of one nil 
« mankind to dwell upon the whole face of the 
earth, that they should seek Him, if happily they 
may feel after Him and find Him, although He be 

* " Contra Coloten. Epic." 



48 



First Lecture, 



not far from every one of us. For in Him we live 
and move and are ; as some also of your own poets 
have said, For we are also His offspring." * 

"The holy apostle," says Franzelin, " indicates 
that primary and obscure knowledge which the Fa- 
thers not improperly speak of as implanted in our 
nature, by which man is impelled to seek more 
diligently to know the Author of his own being 
and the maker of the world." He also teaches 
that the divine providence has so ordered all 
the facts of our race that we may be impelled to 
cultivate this primitive idea or conception to the 
better knowledge of the Supreme Cause of all : 
" Hence it appears how the idea of some divin- 
ity is common to all the nations of the world, 
and never can be eradicated from the mind, even 
though there be a perversion of the true notion 
of God. The most ancient doctors, Tertullian, Mi- 
nutius Felix, Cyprian, Arnobius, have appealed 
to the most simple and uncultivated mind for testi- 
mony to the existence of God 3 for by nature many 
things are suggested as if from a common know- 
ledge by which the Creator has been pleased to 
endow the human soul. " f 

Now, this consent so universal among the various 
tribes of men is a sure proof of God's existence. 

* Acts xvii. 24-23. \ " De Deo Uno," Thesis II. 



The Existence of God. 



49 



For this belief, as it is common to all, must have 
a common cause ; and there is no cause common to 
all except the human reason, which in some man- 
ner perceives this truth. Such a perception of the 
human mind could not be false, else reason would 
not be reason, and universal scepticism, which de- 
stroys reason, would be the result.* And surely 
no other cause can be found why men w T ho differ 
so much in all things else should agree in assert- 
ing the existence of a Deity, especially when this 
belief is opposed to the indulgence of passion, 
and calls men to the sense of their accountability 
to a higher power. This is the one belief which, 
under different forms more or less pure, has held 
the whole human race, and which no effort of false- 
hood, nor argument of infidelity has been able to 
eradicate. There can be no reason for this, except 
the existence of the light of this primary truth 
which shines upon every intelligence. If all ages 
and all nations have proclaimed the being of God, 
it is in obedience to the truth which commands as- 
sent, and which alone could obtain the universal 
consent of the reason. Dogmatic atheism contra- 
dicts the intelligence, involves absurdities in its 
terms, and never has been able to impose its belief 
upon a people or nation. 

*Rothennue, ' « Inst. Phil.," Pars III. Cap. III. 



50 



First Lecture. 



"God is here below," says Lacordaire, " the most 
popular of beings, while pantheism is a purely 
scientific system. In the open fields, resting upon 
bis implement of toil, the laborer lifts up his eyes 
towards heaven, and he names God to his children, 
by an impulse as simple as his own soul. The 
poor call upon Him, the dying invoke his name, 
the wicked fear Him, the good bless Him, kings 
give Him their crowns to wear, armies place Him 
at the head of their battalions, victory renders 
thanksgiving to Him, defeat seeks help from Him, 
nations arm themselves with Him against their ty- 
rants ; there is neither place nor time, nor circum- 
stance nor sentiment, in which God does not ap- 
pear and is not named. Even love itself, so sure 
of its own charm, so confident in its own immor- 
tality, dares not to ignore Him, and comes before 
His altars to beg from Him the confirmation of 
the promises to which it has so often sworn. Truth 
has an eternal accomplice in God. His is the name 
which all nations have adored, to which they have 
built temples, consecrated priests, offered prayers ; 
it is the highest name, the most holy, the most effi- 
cient, the most popular name which the lips of 
man have received the grace to utter." * 

2. A second demonstration may be given from the 

* " Conferences on God," p, 22. 



The Existence of God. 



51 



existence of the universal moral law which is writ- 
ten upon the hearts and consciences of men. This 
law approves what is good and forbids what is 
evil ; distinguishes between right and wrong, and 
recognizes the justice of rewards and punishment ; 
but such a law proves the existence of a supreme 
legislator, the divine Being who alone can impose 
n universal law, or implant its principles in the 
hearts of men. 

The existence of such a law appears from the 
testimony of the individual conscience. There is 
no one so low in the order of intellectual or moral 
life that he does not perceive the difference be- 
tween what to him appears right and that which he 
recognizes as wrong. If he sin against this sense 
which is in him, and which he cannot ignore, his 
conscience at once reproaches him with the con- 
viction of guilt. 

There is no nation which does not distinguish 
between good and bad actions, and which does not 
frame laws to protect the good and punish the evil. 
Every one admits the justice of such laws, and no 
argument is necessary to establish their necessity 
or propriety. Society could not exist without such 
provision for its own safety, or the maintenance of 
the rights of the individual, and the protection of 
the whole body against the lawlessness of human 



52 



First Lecture. 



passion. There would be no bond to the commu- 
nity of nations without the sanctions of such a 
law. It is not necessary that the convictions of 
right or wrong should be the same in every people ; 
nor does it militate against our argument that in 
some things there be error or difference of senti- 
ment. The idea of good and evil, of justice and 
injustice, exists everywhere, and is inseparable from 
the human mind. Otherwise man would be as an 
animal, without conscience, and only recognizing 
the obligations of brute force. 

The apostle St. Paul refers to this natural law 
when he declares that "when the gentiles, who 
have not the law, do by nature those things that 
are of the law, these having not the law, are a law 
to themselves ; who show the work of the law 
written in their hearts, their conscience bearing 
witness to them, and their thoughts between them- 
selves accusing or also defending one another.' 5 * 
This is the "manifestation of the moral law to the 
natural reason, since, without any positive revela- 
tion, they understand the difference between good 
and evil by the light of reason and the obligation 
to do the one and avoid the other.'' "This is the 
law written in their hearts or intellects, the writing 
whose proximate principle is the rational nature, 

♦Romans ii. 14, 15 



The Existence of God. 



53 



and not the letter of any revealed law." " More- 
over, he who by the light of reason understands 
the obligation to do good and avoid moral evil, 
understands also that this obligation binds every 
rational creature, and is existing always, every- 
where, and under every possible hypothesis. It 
is also well understood that there are no circum- 
stances in which the strictest obligation to avoid 
moral evil does not bind every rational creature ; 
while it is also admitted that there may be acts 
which, in some circumstances evil, are in others 
not evil, since, materially the same, they may be 
different in the moral order from the diversity of 
conditions." "This knowledge of a law absolute- 
ly obliging is formally included in the knowledge 
itself of good and evil. Moreover, St. Paul plain- 
ly teaches that this knowledge, by reason of a 
moral law, so absolutely obliges men that the con- 
science commends certain actions as good and con- 
demns others as evil, with an approbation or con- 
demnation which will stand even on the day when 
God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus 
Christ." * 

But the existence of such . a universal law de- 
monstrates the existence of a supreme Lawgiver, 
who can be none other than the great First Cause. 

*Franzelin, « De Deo Uno," Thesis III. 



54 



First Lecture. 



A law universal and absolute, binding all classes 
and conditions of men, cannot have its force from 
the human wills which it restrains, and which, left 
to themselves, would diner indefinitely as passion 
might lead them. There is no one human lawgiver 
who has jurisdiction over all consciences, to whom 
all tribes owe obedience. This law must come 
from One who is above all legislators, who has 
supreme dominion over men, No one else could 
bind the universal conscience. But such a supreme 
lawgiver is God. 

Again, this law does not come from men ; for if 
such a supposition were possible, the same power 
which establishes a law could also abrogate it, 
change or modify it. Yet such modification or 
abrogation of the universal law of right and wrong 
is impossible ; therefore men were not and could 
not have been its author. 

" Neither can reason of itself alone promulgate 
such a law. Reason does not make an action to 
be good or evil. It only perceives that it is such ; 
so that if the action were not intrinsically good 
or bad, reason could perceive no moral quality in 
it, and would look upon it as indifferent, as is 
the case in circumstances where no moral judg- 
ment appears. The most that reason can do is to 
produce the sense of an obligation which is specu- 



The Existence of God. 



55 



lative only, and not practical with power to bind 
the conscience." * 

There is no answer to this argument, for there 
is no one who can thus impose a sense of morality 
upon the universal conscience but He wiio is the 
light o£ the reason, sovereign truth, and infallible 
justice, the creator of all intelligences, and the 
fountain of all law. To say that there is no God 
is to deny the existence of all morality, and to 
abolish the distinction between right and wrong. 

u In the knowledge of a moral law absolutely 
binding men," says Franzelin, "is included at least 
a confused knowledge of God as the Supreme 
principle and end. For the ultimate reason of 
this absolute obligation which man naturally re- 
cognizes cannot be the dignity itself of human 
nature, as the followers of Kant would say ; since 
man, by the knowledge of his absolute obligation, 
does not see his own dignity which commands him, 
but his dependence upon a superior power w T hich 
he is bound to obey. And as he perceives this 
moral obligation to which every rational creature 
is subject, by this very fact he beholds the exist- 
ence of a Superior in whose dominion over all 
creatures this obligation is founded, and at least 
obscurely recognizes Him as the Supreme Lord to 
* Rothenflue, "Inst, Phil.," Pars III. Cap. III. 



56 



First Lecture. 



whom he owes absolute obedience. So the apostle 
declares that the heathen, by the same light of 
reason by which from the physical order the invi- 
sible things of God are known, also know the mo- 
ral order to be the law of God absolutely obliging 
them. Hence they are convicted of sin, because 
when they know the law of God that they who do 
such things are worthy of death, they not only do 
them, but also consent to those who do them." * 
' ' They are inexcusable, because that when they 
know God they have not glorified Him as God, or 
given thanks ; but became vain in their thoughts, 
and their foolish heart was darkened. For profess- 
ing themselves to be wise, they became fools." f 
"Thus from the consideration of the natural rea- 
son disposed to the true and the good, and from 
the consideration of human society, is easily un- 
derstood the necessary existence of the moral or- 
der, the existence of the ultimate end or the en- 
joyment of the true and the good, the necessity of 
rights and duties, since such are the essential teach- 
ings of reason, which cannot deny them, without 
contradiction. And these essential truths whose 
necessity and existence are well understood, could 
have no foundation, unless there were a Supreme 
Good, a holy and just lawgiver, and a sovereign 

* " De Deo Uno," Thesis III. f Romans i. 21, 22. 



The Existexce of God. 



57 



judge. Thus as from the physical order the human 
reason can know the existence of God, so from the 
consideration of the essential facts of the moral or- 
der it can rise to the knowledge of Him as the 
supreme and efficient Cause." * 

"Even as truth is the object and life of the 
mind, justice is the object and life of conscience. 
Conscience sees and approves a rule of the rights 
and duties between beings endowed with liberty. 
That rule is justice. But where is justice? Is it a 
simple result of human will? In that case justice 
would be but a convention, a fragile law called 
into life to-day, and which may fail to-morrow. 
Is it an order founded on the very nature of man? 
But that nature is variable, corruptible, subject to 
passions that lead it astray. What is order for 
one would be disorder for another. If, then, jus- 
tice be a reality, it must be an eternal and abso- 
lute law, regulating the relations of free volitions, 
as mathematics are an eternal and absolute law 
regulating the relations of material beings. Be- 
yond this notion justice is but a name which arms 
the strong against the weak, the prosperous against 
the needy. Xow, this notion necessarily calls forth 
the notion of God, since an eternal and absolute 
law could only be a reality in the person of a be- 

* Franzelin, ibid. 



58 



First Lecture. 



ing subsisting of himself, possessing a will active 
and just, able to promulgate an order, to maintain 
it, to reward obedience and punish rebellion." * 

Here, then, in this brief lecture we have given 
the demonstration of tlie existence of God, which 
the reason clearly sees and apprehends. There is 
no answer to these arguments. We may hear, and 
we have heard, empty denials which overthrow the 
possibility of all logic, and make sport of the hu- 
man intelligence. Universal scepticism is contrary 
to reason, and the negation of God is the negation 
of all truth. To say that there is no such thing 
as truth is to contradict nature and mock the hu- 
man intelligence. The mind can know nothing but 
truth, and if man, with all his high powers, be de- 
ceived by all he sees and perceives, he is worse 
than the beasts, who at least are sure of their own 
instincts. 

"What reason is there," says Cicero, "why we 
should doubt that those things which I have de- 
monstrated are most true? If reason, if the his- 
tory of the world, if all tribes and nations, if the 
Greeks, if the barbarians, if our ancestors proclaim 
them ; if they have ever been believed by the 
greatest philosophers and poets, by the wisest and 
most distinguished of earth who have built cities 

* Lacordaire, u Conferences on God," p. 33. 



The Existence of God. 



59 



and founded republics, shall we wait until the 
beasts speak, and refuse assent to the universal 
voice of mankind?' 3 * Well do these modem phi- 
losophers call themselves agnostics by a term 
which is a disgrace to human reason. They know 
not God ; they know nothing ; they do not know 
that they exist ; they do not know that they think. 
They have, according to some, no souls ; they arc 
the product of a curious organism which has come 
to be by some incomprehensible process of evo- 
lution. Yet they cannot be sure of anything. 
"What seems to be thought may be only the move- 
ment of molecules over which there can be no do- 
minion of will. They rejoice to be the offspring of 
apes, and to have been evolved out of the monkey, 
the kangaroo, and the toad. The whole theory of 
evolutionists and agnostics is confessedly found- 
ed on nescience impudently turned into a claim of 
science. If, then, they know nothing, how can 
they know the thing they deny, or understand 
the meaning of their negations 8 Yet with all their 
profession of universal doubt, the confession that 
nothing can be certainly known, they prate of all 
things high and divine, tell us of the laws of the 
spheres, of the age and duration of the world, and 
by bold conjecture seek to satisfy themselves that 

* " De Divinatione," Lib. I. 



60 



First Lecture. 



there is no God, or at least nothing greater than 
themselves. 

Astronomy, and geology, and chemistry have 
been brought to contradict the truths of revela- 
tion, so as to destroy the Christian's God, and 
with Him the dominion of a Supreme First Cause. 
In all their ravings against truth, natural or re- 
vealed, there is not a semblance of real logic, not 
a syllogism whose premisses are proved, or whose 
conclusion is contained in the terms of the argu- 
ment. . All is loose, bold, and irrational conjecture. 

I know not why the theory of evolution has 
been accepted, unless to do away with God and 
man's responsibility to a higher power, and to as- 
sert the universal reign of matter in its state of 
confusion. "The whole theory of evolution is ar- 
gumentatively sustained by the vicious art of para- 
logism, of which the first premiss, which alone re- 
quires proof, is never proved at all, nor is the 
proof attempted. The second, which they attempt 
to prove, would not stand in need of proof at all 
if it were scientifically stated. A miserably crude 
conception of a single-threaded series of life, trac- 
ing from jelly-fish to man, is employed, even in 
spite of a corrective knowledge in their own natu- 
ralist books. For when they are working at their 
theory, all their better knowledge seems to vanish, 



The Existence of God. 



61 



and we find them at once reducing all nature's 
boundless wealth of being to the limits of one di- 
mension, and that of a most awkward, broken, in- 
termittent character, as indeed was required by 
them for their evolutional dream, which is there- 
fore founded, even in its only likely part, on 
a most withered caricature of natural gradation. 
And when this childish conception is perpetually 
plied under the marked action of a false principle, 
that gradation after another is procession out of 
another, we are well able to estimate the scientific 
value of the theory which consists of their joint 
result.'' * 

Kindred indeed to this absurdity is the theory 
that if there be a God He is absolutely unknow- 
able, because He cannot be adequately compre- 
hended. " Self- existence is absolutely unthink- 
able." How, then, does the acute philosopher so 
think of it as to deny it ? How does he reason 
against the possibility of an idea which he com- 
prehends well enough for the purpose of his ar- 
gument % How can he say that the thing he thinks 
of is unth inJcable ; that the God of whom he 
knows something is unknowable? Is this not a 
contradiction in terms ? Then will he speak of an 
Absolute of which he has no idea, and try thus 
* m Essay on Darwinism," by Rev. Dr Laing. 



62 



First Lecture. 



to reconcile what lie calls religion with science? 
If he knows liow to deny a truth, he must in 
that very denial assert his own existence and the 
■principle of contradiction by, which he sees that 
a thing cannot be and not be at the same time. 
Else his denial is empty jargon, and he does not 
know the meaning of a denial no more than of 
a perception. Was there ever a greater contra- 
diction of the powers of reason than this attempt 
to deny the first principles of either being or 
thought? There is an Absolute, and yet "we are 
debarred eternally from thinking of it"; "we 
are not allowed even to conceive it." What is, 
then, the meaning of the term? What does the 
Absolute signify to the intelligence? Does the 
agnostic mean that God is unknowable, because 
He, being infinite, cannot be comprehended by the 
finite ; because thought in all its range cannot 
measure the Being whose limitless perfections are 
bounded only by immensity which stretches far 
beyond our ken ? "No ; this is not the confession 
of those who glory in knowing nothing. Their 
argument is simply the most childish absurdity : 
"If there be a God He is infinite; but the infi- 
nite cannot be thought of or known, therefore 
there is no God." The Infinite is thought of in 
this very proposition, and God in some measure 



The Existence of God, 



63 



is confessed, else He could not be denied. It is 
not necessary that man should fully comprehend 
God. If he could do so he would be the equal 
of God, and then there would indeed be no God. 
We have the idea of the Infinite, as a being 
than which nothing greater can be conceived. 
This idea excludes the possibility of comprehen- 
sion, but the idea remains intact in all its gran- 
deur. And the great First Cause has so written 
the evidence of His being on the works of His 
hands and in the human intelligence that no one 
can deny it ; that the attempt to deny it is the 
logical assertion of it ; that with it stands or falls 
the intelligent existence of man. This primary 
truth must be confessed, or there is no truth ; and 
the barren field of agnosticism is the land of dark- 
ness where not one light of the human reason can 
shine. Man has reached his last term of degrada- 
tion when, in his pride, he has denied God. 

And in the illumination of revelation and the 
grace of the Gospel of Jesus Christ we know that 
there is a light which enlighteneth every man who 
cometh into the world ; that the beams of the di- 
vine fulness reach all human hearts ; and that as 
they yield obedience to the truth they know, they 
are guided to greater and more perfect knowledge 
of Him who is Truth, whom to know is to live in 



64 



Fiest Lecture. 



mind and soul, whom to deny is to extinguish 
every ray of human intelligence. In nature, as in 
grace, it is true that the Supreme Mind reveals 
Himself to pure hearts, that He abhors the proud 
and draws near to the humble. 

We believe that there are no atheists who are 
sincere; that the human reason cannot doubt the 
existence of Grod. And we find for all the infi- 
delity of our day a cause in the pride of an intellect 
that would cast aside all restraint, and in the rebel- 
lion cf a heart which would do away with its ac- 
countability. It would do away with all law, and 
therefore seeks to strike a blow at Him who is the 
foundation of order. Sin, whose stings of remorse 
torment the soul, raises its arm against the Most 
High. Pride would even scale the throne of the 
Almighty and cast darkness upon the inaccessible 
light. Angels in their excelling greatness arose 
against the Omnipotent, and in a moment lost 
their principality. "How art thou fallen from hea- 
ven, O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning ! 
How art thou fallen to the earth ! And thou saidst 
in thy heart, I will ascend into heaven ; I will ex- 
alt my throne above the stars of God; I will as- 
cend above the height of the clouds; I will be 
like the Most High." * 

* Isaias xiv. 12-14. 



The Existence of God. 



65 



And man, "made a little lower than the angels," 
may, in the freedom of his will, follow in the path 
of rebel intelligence, "wrap up sentences in un- 
skilful words," and "hide counsel without know- 
ledge." * He may not only refuse obedience to 
the Mind that drew him from nothing, but even 
in words deny the existence of his God. But 
swiftly comes the punishment even before the day 
of doom. Clouds of the thick night gather around 
the heart and conscience ; ray less gloom covers all 
the scenes of failing life and the ravages of death ; 
from the depths of woe cries out the wreck of a 
broken and ruined humanity. The light of hope 
goes out and sinks eternally in the grave. Who 
but the Almighty can interpose ? what voice be 
heard where pride has spoken its false words of 
blasphemy ? 

"I have spoken unwisely, and things that above 
measure exceeded my knowledge. Therefore I re- 
prehend myself and do penance in dust and ashes. "f 

u O Lord, our Lord, how admirable is Thy name 
in the whole earth! For Thy magnificence is ele- 
vated above the heavens." " Send forth Thy light 
and Thy truth ; they have conducted me and 
brought me unto Thy holy hill, and into Thy 
tabernacles." X 

* Job xxxviii. 2, xlii. 3. \ Job xlii. 3, 6. % Psalm viii. 1, 2, xlii. 3. 



i ' 1 



Second Lecture. 



THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 



Second Lecture. 



THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. 



'«God said to Moses, lam who am. He said, Thus slialt thou say to the children 
of Israel : He who is hath sent me to you. 11 — Exodus iii. 14. 

We have seen how the human reason demon- 
strates the existence of God as the great First 
Cause. In this demonstration are also included 
many things, concerning His being and essence, 
which flow from the very idea of self- existence 
and independence. He who is not contingent is 
self-existent and eternal, being always that which 
He is, because He exists by virtue of His own es- 
sence. 

It will add to the interest of this brief course 
of instructions if we dwell for a few moments 
upon the consideration of what God is, and try 
with our feeble powers to look at the magnitude 
of His perfections. They surpass our full compre- 
hension, as they are the attributes of the Infinite, 
yet we can clearly see how they are essential to 

69 



70 



Second Lecture. 



a self-existent and necessary being. According 
to the demonstration of our intelligence, He is a 
Being than whom nothing greater can he con- 
ceived, and the supreme First Cause of all things. 

This simple truth which is necessarily involved 
in the idea of God presents Him to us as a Be- 
ing absolutely simple. " I am who am." What- 
ever is in Him, is really and identically the di- 
vine nature and the fulness of His essence. As 
such He is a spirit. He is the greatest and most 
noble among beings. But matter or a body can- 
not be the most noble; and "it is impossible that 
a body should be ever the most noble. For a 
body is either living or not living ; and a living 
body Is more noble than one without life. Yet 
a body living does not possess life of itself, else 
every body would live. The bodies, therefore, 
which live derive their life from something dis- 
tinct from themselves, as the human body lives 
by the soul. That by which the body lives is, 
then, more noble than the body itself. God, there- 
fore, could not be a body." * 

Again, matter possesses no power to move itself, 
and the first mover must be himself immovable, 
and the cause of motion or modification to others. 

The Supreme Cause cannot be a body, since 

*"Summa," St. Thomas, Pars I. Quaes. III. 



The Divine Attributes. 



n 



then He would be capable of modification, and 
would need Himself a Cause outside of His being, 
which is a contradiction. The First Being is al- 
ways in existence, never in potentiality, else there 
would be the possibility of something before Him 
and greater than Himself. 

The spiritual is more noble than the material, 
since the material is composed of parts, and is 
incapable in irself of either life or intelligence. 
To suppose God to be material is to contradict 
the essential idea of deity, to render Him im- 
perfect and dependent, and therefore not God. 
Matter as such is incapable of intelligence. That 
matter should think is an impossibility, since it 
is composed of parts to which neither singly nor 
collectively can thought be attributed. God must, 
then, be a pure act, the first of all beings, as the 
most noble ; and in Him, therefore, there can be 
no composition of matter and form. "Everything 
composed of matter and form is perfect and good 
by its form, hence it is perfect and good only by 
participation. But God cannot be perfect by parti- 
cipation, since He is so by His essence, which is by 
far the more noble mode of existence." * In Him 
there can be no distinction of being and essence. 
He is His own deity, His own life, and what- 

* St. Thomas, ibid. 



72 



Second Lecture. 



ever else we may predicate of Him or see Him 
to be. 

"The substance of God is a simple entity with- 
out any composition of partial entities of any kind, 
or of actuality or possibility distinguished from 
each other in Him. And this is proved from the 
principle that the divine substance is absolutely 
necessary and intrinsically immutable by the virtue 
of its essence. But a composed substance cannot 
be such, because, as says St. Gregory Nazianzen, 
from the very fact that a substance is composed 
of parts, dissolution is not repugnant to it." * 

God is, therefore, of necessity absolutely simple 
and spiritual. Reason does not, indeed, fully com- 
prehend the nature of a spirit, neither does it 
fully comprehend the nature of matter. It con- 
ceives, however, the immaterial, and fully under- 
stands that as such it is in a higher order of 
being than matter. And having seen that the 
great First Cause must possess all perfections and 
be utterly independent of all other existences, 
it passes at once to the conclusion of the spiri- 
tuality of the divine Being. A material God, or 
one composed of matter and spirit, would be a 
contradiction to the reason which in its very no- 
tion of the Supreme excludes imperfection. 

*Suarcz, "Be Essentia Dei," Cap. VI. 



The Divixe Attributes. 



73 



If we, then, lift our eyes to the throne of the 
Deity we find how true are the words which 
Jehovah spoke to Moses, His prophet: "lam 
iclw am. Say to the children of Israel : He who 
is hath sent me to you/' In this eternal neces- 
sity of existence, or in Self- Existence, we find ex- 
pressed our notion of the Almighty, and from this 
idea as a fountain Ave draw the knowledge of the 
attributes which of necessity belong to God. 
These attributes are in no way distinct from His 
essence ; but the sufficient reason of all which we 
know that God is and must be, is found in His 
necessity of being or His self-existence. So, how- 
ever we reason, from the things that are made 
or from effects to an intelligent and omnipotent 
cause, we come to the idea of His essential being, 
for ever existing, for ever the same, the fulness 
of all possible conceivable perfections. And from 
this necessity of being which must belong to Him 
we conclude the attributes which He must possess. 
These attributes are the necessity of a perfect Be- 
ing who exists by virtue of His own essence. 

Such .a self existent Being is necessarily one, 
immutable, independent, simple, immense, and 
eternal. A brief meditation upon these attributes 
of God will help us to appreciate the conclusions 
of reason as well as the dignity of our own nature. 



Second Lecture. 



I. 

GOD IS 01S T E. 

1. The unity of God flows necessarily from the 
perfection which belongs to Him. As self-existing 
and independent, He is infinitely perfect ; but 
there can be but one infinitely perfect being, 
since unity is a perfection. He is the greatest 
being of which intelligence can conceive, and can 
therefore have no equal. If God were supposed 
to have an equal, we could conceive of a being 
without an equal who would be still greater. He 
who has an equal is less in the order of existence 
than he who has none. God can have no equal, 
and therefore must be one. 

2. Moreover, a being infinitely perfect is one who 
has supreme dominion over all entities ; on whom 
alone all things possible or actual depend ; to 
whom alone the things that are, adequately owe 
their existence. Such are the necessary conditions 
of supreme perfection ; and if one of these con- 
ditions w^ere wanting God would not be infinite. 
So if we suppose more gods than one we contra- 
dict the essential idea of the Supreme, and there 
can be no God. If there were many gods, each 
one, according to the hypothesis, could create ; each 



The Divine Attributes. 



75 



one would be independent of the others, and no 
one would be infinitely perfect. 

"If there were many gods they must be each 
one independent of the others, or depend mutually 
upon each other, or all depend upon one. In either 
case there is no God. If they are all independent 
deities, then there is no one superior to the others, 
no one with supreme dominion, no one endowed 
with perfection. 

"If they depend mutually upon each other, 
there is, by the hypothesis itself, no one supreme, 
no one possessed of the attributes of deity. 

"If all depend upon one, then the supposition 
fails in its terms, and he alone is God on whom 
all the others depend, who are therefore no gods. 

" It cannot be said that many gods being all equal- 
ly perfect, all will the same, and ever act together. 
The idea of many equally perfect beings is itself 
a contradiction. - Bat if they will ever the same 
they must do so either necessarily or freely. If 
necessarily they will all things, then they are 
not free by nature, and so are not perfect beings. 
If they are supposed to will f reely, then they can 
will contrary things and there could be no reign 
of order." * 

3, As we have seen, God exists by the virtue of 

*Eotheiiflue, "Inst. Phil.," Part III. 



76 



Second Lecture. 



His own essence, and exists necessarily ; but only 
one such Being is possible. If more than one God 
were possible, many would be possible to an inde- 
finite, even infinite number, for everything in God is 
infinite. But there cannot be an indefinite number 
of gods, since a necessary Being always exists. 
Then the number must be definite or infinite. 
There is no reason why, according to the sup- 
position, the number should be definite ; and an 
infinite number is impossible, because it is a con- 
tradiction. Thus unity is involved in the condi- 
tions of a Being self-existing and infinitely perfect 
in Himself. 

4. The hypothesis of two principles self - existing, 
one supremely good and the other supremely evil, 
is likewise contradictory to human reason. As 
this contradiction has had its influence upon many 
false systems of religion, it will be well to notice 
its absurdity. 

These two powers cannot be God, as we have 
already proved the necessary unity of God, and 
demonstrated that two self-existing beings cannot 
be supposed. But the hypothesis destroys itself, 
and gives no explanation of the difficulties it at- 
tempts to remove. Either there is nothing in the 
evil principle which is in the good, or there are 
some things common to both. In the first case the 



The Divine Attributes. 



77 



evil principle has no reality, and is therefore no- 
thing and no object of knowledge, since the good 
principle possesses all realities. In the second case 
neither of the princii)les are necessary beings ; 
neither self existing nor possessed of all realities. 
Nor do we see how either could be absolutely bad 
or absolutely good, as they are said to possess 
realities in common. Again, if these principles are 
in operation, which is the necessary consequence of 
their existence, either their powers are equal or 
unequal. If equal, as one tends to good and the 
other to evil, neither can effect anything, since 
their powers are balanced. If unequal, then the 
strongest prevails over the other, and in the world 
all must be either good or all must be evil. 
Surely if the good Principle cannot overcome the 
evil, then He is not God, who is of necessity as 
supremely wise, as supremely powerful, as He is 
good. While, therefore, the hypothesis of an evil 
principle is a contradiction in itself, it gives no ex- 
planation of the evils which exist in this world. 
All the evils of which we have any knowledge on 
earth are either metaphysical, physical, or moral. 
In neither case is there any repugnance that such 
evils should exist under the dominion of One God 
supremely good. 
Metaphysical evil consists in the necessary cha- 



78 



Second Lecture. 



racter of things finite. The finite wants the perfec- 
tion and the reality of the infinite. This defect in- 
heres in all things that are made. Only the infi- 
nite has no limits and possesses all realities. If, 
then, God create (and He is free to create, else He 
is not God), He cannot create an infinite, and the 
work of His hands must fall short of absolute 
being. Still, there is a sense in which everything 
made attains a noble end, the highest possible end 
of a creature — the giving glory to God. "How ad- 
mirable is Thy name, O Lord, in the whole earth ; 
for Thy magnificence is elevated above the hea- 
vens. For I will behold Thy heavens, the works 
of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars which Thou 
hast founded." "There are no speeches nor lan- 
guage where their voices are not heard. Their 
sound hath gone forth into all the earth, and their 
words unto the ends of the world." "Praise ye 
the Lord from the heavens ; praise Him in the 
high places. Praise Him, O sun and moon ; praise 
Him, all ye stars and light. For He spoke, and 
they were made ; He commanded, and they were 
created." * The material creation showeth forth 
His power, and the immaterial creation in intelli- 
gence and will sends up the tribute of praise. 
Thus says the Holy Scripture : God, on the prl- 

* Psalms viii. , xviii., cxl., viii. 



The Divine Attributes, 



79 



meval day, "saw all the things that He had made, 
and they were very good." '* 

Physical evil arises also from the necessary limi- 
tation of finite creatures. A created intellect, as 
finite, must be subject to ignorance and liable to 
error. Matter in its nature is exposed to change 
and dissolution, and the body is the prey of 
disease and death. Yet these evils are not to be 
considered in themselves, but as means to an end. 
Man has an ultimate end, and all which subserves 
this end is really good, though in itself it may be 
noxious. That alone is repugnant to the goodness 
of God towards His creatures which prevents them 
from attaining the end of their being, and thus 
their supreme happiness. In human life those 
events or experiences are not accounted evil, if 
they are the steps to a greater and higher good. 
Considered in this light, physical evil may be re- 
garded as, in the divine providence, a positive bene- 
fit, guiding the finite to the better knowledge and 
ultimate enjoyment of the Infinite. 

Moral evil or sin on the part of the intelligent 
agent presents no difficulty, nor is it repugnant to 
the goodness of the Supreme First Cause. It 
comes from the finite nature of the intellect and 
will, from the existence of the natural law and hu- 

* Genesis i. 31. 



80 



Second Lecture. 



man liberty. The created intellect cannot be infi- 
nite, for this is a contradiction. There is also no 
difficulty in the existence of a moral law which 
binds the rational creature. All the universe moves 
under fixed laws ; but intelligent agents are capa- 
ble of morality, and the sense of right and wrong 
is written upon their consciences. It could not be 
otherwise with an intelligent Governor and the 
rational beings which are subject to Him. His will 
is the necessary law of His creation, and His holi- 
ness and goodness are seen in the expression of 
that law which He has engraved upon human 
hearts, with its sense of guilt or innocence, its 
sanctions of reward or punishment. 

As for human liberty, it would be difficult to 
conceive of a rational intelligence without free- 
will. But this liberty is, indeed, in itself a great 
good and a real perfection. Without it man would 
be a mere machine, neither capable of merit nor 
virtue. By it he is able to acquire the supreme 
bliss of his ultimate end as the reward of his own 
well-used free-will ; by it to advance in the suc- 
cessive degrees of moral culture and to attain real 
goodness after the likeness of his great Creator. 
Without liberty man would be only one of the 
animal races, who follow their instincts and are 
never held responsible before Goci. Intelligence 



The Divine Attributes. 



81 



would be no positive good to man without free- 
will, which, is the highest endowment of the hu- 
man soul. But a gift so great implies the possi- 
bility of abuse, else liberty would not be liberty. 
If the free-will be abused to the disobedience of 
the natural law, to the violation of the dictates of 
conscience, who shall impugn the wisdom of God, 
or seek to attack the divine unity for the solution 
of the problem? The only problem is to account 
for the actual exercise of free-will, not for its ex- 
istence. The One Supreme God could not give lib- 
erty to men without permitting the possibility of 
its abuse. Who, then, would argue that all rational 
creatures should be deprived of the gift of liberty 
with its great rewards, because some would abuse 
that gift to their own ruin ; or who would take 
from the freedom of the One infinitely good Crea- 
tor, because His creatures should choose to disobey 
His law? " To say that God had no right to 
create a being who might misuse His gifts is to 
say that the wicked are able to destroy God by 
hindering the exercise of one of His essential attri- 
butes. Whosoever is free not to exercise a power 
is free also to exercise it under pain of not pos- 
sessing it. How could the goodness of God have 
required such a sacrifice ? How could it have re- 
quired that the wicked should have been preferred 



83 



Second Lecture. 



to the just, that life should have been withdrawn 
from the just who would make good use of it, 
because of those who would have turned it into a 
curse? Why should I have been condemned to 
nothingness because one of my forefathers w r ould 
have abused his existence ? Where in this would 
have been justice, wisdom, or goodness \ God had 
not to choose between creating or not creating a 
wicked man, but between creating or not creating 
generations of good and evil together ; and as all 
presented this mixture to His prophetic glance, 
He had to choose between creating the universe 
or not creating anything."* We have dwelt for 
a moment upon this objection, since in the present 
day it is often practically raised against the Unity 
of God, as if absolute harmony with the Creator 
were a necessary consequence of the creation of 
intelligence. While plurality in .the deity is im- 
possible and is contradicted by the reason, there 
is no foundation for the supposition of an evil 
principle, whose existence, if it were possible, 
would only still more increase the difficulty of the 
irrational objector. The idea of unity is inherent 
in the conception of God, who, because He is in- 
finite, must stand alone, far above all beings pos- 
sible or actual. That there have been those among 

*Lacordaire, " Conferences on God," Conf. III. 



The Divixe Attributes. 



83 



men who have professed a belief in many gods is 
no argument against our thesis. They have done 
so not by the use but by the abuse of reason. 
They who have made gods of the things inanimate 
on earth, of the sun and moon and stars, of the 
animals whose attributes they worshipped, of he- 
roes of the human race; they who have bowed 
before blocks of wood or stone, have all sinned 
against their reason and are inexcusable. Even in 
their errors and the darkness of their mythology 
they still held to one Supreme God, the lord of 
all their fabled deities. So says Tertullian : "Even 
the pagans in their peril of danger or death cry 
cut to the One God," * thereby showing how 
nature vindicates its dignity as the creature of 
one First Cause. Orpheus, among the most an- 
cient of the poets, declares: " There is one existing 
by himself who created all things. So beside this 
great king let there be no other." And Horace: 
"He who rules the affairs of men and gods, who 
with varied seasons tempers the sea and the earth 
and the world, is the Being than whom there is 
nothing greater, nor shall there ever live any- 
thing like Him." 

*" Apolog.," Cap. XVII. 



84 



Second Lecture. 



u. 

GOD IS IMMUTABLE. 

The immutability of God is a necessary conse- 
quence of His self-existence. Tims He exists by the 
virtue of His own essence, and necessarily exists, 
being always all that He is. No other supposition 
would be consistent with the idea of a necessary 
being. The slightest change would contradict the 
fundamental notion of God. The essence of a nec- 
essary being is absolutely immutable, and all that 
is in Him is by the virtue of this essence. If the 
least thing were taken from Him or added to Him 
the whole being would be destroyed ; and, by the 
hypothesis, He would cease to be self-existent. 
Neither is there any conceivable agent that could 
so act upon the divine essence as to change His 
condition. He is the one First Cause, and as such 
cannot be the effect of anything, neither in w r hole 
nor in part. The change of any being implies 
either the loss or gain of some intrinsic reality, 
and the internal state of God is absolutely un- 
changeable. Neither could God change Himself, 
as by the essential condition of His being He is 
altogether simple, and must be always what He is. 

Again, if the Supreme were to be changed it 



The Divixe Attributes, 



85 



would be of necessity into something greater, or 
less, or equal. But there is nothing greater than 
God, since He is infinite ; and were He to become 
something less than Himself He would cease to be 
God. There is nothing equal to Him, else there 
would be a plurality of gods, which, we have seen 
to be impossible. 

" Every entity which is modified acquires some- 
thing by the modification, and attains some perfec- 
tion not before reached. But God, since he is infi- 
nite, comprehending in Himself the fulness of the 
perfection of all being, can acquire nothing nor at- 
tain to any reality which does not always belong 
to Him." * 

In creatures there can be successive modifications 
without the destruction of their entity. They may 
be conceived as having no existence ; and they 
may be conceived as being. They may be subject 
to changes either in their substance or in their 
accidents. " Bodies are liable to corruption, which 
implies a substantial change ; or they may be 
locally moved, as are the celestial bodies. 

"There is a mutation of tilings created in the 
disposition towards an end, or the application of 
power to different objects, as is the case with the 
angels ; and universally all creatures are mutable, 

* St. Thomas, " Summa," Pars I. Qiues. IX 



86 



Second Lecture. 



according to the power or will of the creator ; but 
in no such way is the Infinite changeable."* The 
immutability of God rests upon the truth that He 
is once and always all that He is, and infinite in 
every perfection. 

If now it be objected that there are relative 
changes in God by reason of the exercise of His 
free-will and His dealings with creatures, we re- 
ply that He cannot be judged as are finite beings, 
whose free volitions are successive, whose in- 
ternal state is subject to constant modification. For 
God is one pure eternal act. With Him there 
can be neither past nor future. Whatever He 
wills He wills eternally. Whatever He knows He 
knows eternally. There is no knowledge which 
He can gain, and all that He proposes is in Him 
from all eternity. 

"So free volitions, as they are the acts of an 
intelligent agent, affect the internal state of a be- 
ing, and in God are necessary, first because what- 
ever is in God is by virtue of that simple act by 
which from all eternity He exists and wills ; and, 
secondly, because the freedom of will is in itself a 
real perfection, and the divine being cannot be con- 
ceived without it. The term or object of the di- 
vine will is freely chosen and is extrinsically con- 

*lbid. 



The Divine Attributes, 



87: 



tingent and variable in this sense — that the term 
could be chosen or not ; but when once the term is 
chosen it cannot be changed. God cannot change 
His will. For the decrees o£ God or His volitions 
are hypotlietically necessar3 r , and hence immutable. 
To will or not to will is a perfection; but to will 
a thing and then successively not to will it, is an 
imperfection which presupposes ignorance or levi- 
ty." * So when God proposed to create it was by 
an eternal will. "By an internal act He was al- 
ways a creator ; but this creative act formally taken 
had for its term the world about to be produced 
from nothing in time. Hence the creating act be- 
fore the creation, and at the time of the creation, 
nnd after the existence of the world is always the 
same— namely, willing the world to exist in time, 
and for such a duration, and in such a manner. 
Man, indeed, when he begins to act suffers an in- 
ternal change. From not working he begins to 
work. From not knowing he begins to know. 
But God, when He works, acts from all eternity, 
either necessarily, as in all His acts within Him-, 
self, or freely, as in all His operations without 
Himself — as, for example, in the creation, which He 
eternally knows and wills — so that one act of God 
on account of His infinity is equivalent to all pos- 
* Rothenflue, "Inst, Phil.," Pars III. Sectio III. 



88 



Second Lecture. 



sible acts of intelligence, or power, or will." * In 
His relations to creatures His acts and Avill are 
eternal, and all the change is in the creature, who 
is eternally known of God as he is, now possibly 
the object of love, now the object of hatred. For 
the Infinite, by one eternal and most simple act, 
sees the prevarication of the wicked and the fideli- 
ty of the just. Nothing new or unknown can cross 
the intelligence or affect the will of Him who is 
infinitely perfect in all things. This conception of 
the Almighty which reason itself demands is grand 
beyond all our powers of expression. We see how 
it must be, even when the thought fills up our 
feeble hearts and prostrates our minds overwhelmed 
with wonder at the foot of the throne where Infi- 
nity reveals itself. Such a God is worthy of our 
highest adoration. 

III. 

GOD IS IKDEPE^DEINTT. 

The one, immutable Deity is necessarily indepen- 
dent. He is all-sufficient to Himself, as He pos- 
sesses every perfection, and He can depend upon 
nothing, neither for His existence, nor for His pre- 
servation, nor for His happiness. 

* Rothenflue, " Inst. Phil./' Pars III. Sectio III. 



The Divine Attributes. 



89 



By the essential notes of deity God can depend 
upon nothing, because independence is a perfec- 
tion, and dependence is a manifest imperfection. 
If He possess not all perfections He is not God ; 
and, indeed, there is nothing upon which He could 
depend. He could not depend upon the creature, 
for the creature is the work of His hand, deriving 
all its reality from Him. He is the Supreme First 
Cause, and if He were to depend upon anything 
out of Himself He would become to that extent 
an effect, which would be a contradiction. He is 
self- existent, and therefore nothing can minister to 
Him who is the fulness of being. A being which 
depends upon another for existence or continuance 
of life is not necessary, since it may be or not be, 
according to the will upon which it depends. Such 
a supposition would deny the self-existence of God 
and render Him contingent like all creatures. 

And as He could need nothing for existence, 
neither can He need anything for His happiness. 
What could affect the bliss of the Infinite, with 
whom there can be no possible shadow of change, 
nor variety of experience? " To true beatitude is 
required the actual and permanent possession of 
all that is good and true, and the full intuition 
of this permanent possession. But God, as infinite- 
ly perfect, possesses all things that are good and 



90 



Second Lecture. 



true, free from all imperfection."* He is all that 
is good and true. And with perfect sight He per- 
ceives all that He is. Therefore is He supremely 
blessed in and of Himself, and so perfectly inde- 
pendent and sufficient to Himself. Nothing can 
be conceived of bliss which God does not possess 
in His own being; no light or knowledge can be 
imagined which He does not contemplate in His 
own essence. Infinite felicity is in the infinite 
sight and knowledge of His perfections. He is 
life ; He is intelligence ; He is the supreme good ; 
He is the ever-living truth. Of nothing more can 
the mind conceive, for nothing more is possible. 
Yet all this infinite perfection must He be who 
is God. 

IV. 

GOD IS ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE. 

In our opening definition of the Supreme Being 
we have spoken of His simplicity, as this is the 
essential note of His being, and as we could not 
comprehend the nature of His attributes unless 
He were free from all composition. Such compo- 
sition would destroy His independence and His 
unity, as well as all His necessary perfections. 
* Rothenilue, "Inst. Phil." 



The Divine Attributes. 



91 



Keason denies the attribution of such, imperfec- 
tion to the Self -Existent, who must possess all pos- 
sible reality. It will be well, however, to dwell 
for a moment upon this attribute of God, as there 
are those who would deify matter, or in some way 
make the Infinite one with the creature. And 
there are those whose conceptions of the great 
First Cause, which they admit, are filled with the 
false notions of erroneous philosophy or disguised 
infidelity. 

If God were not simple He would in some way 
be composed. But such composition would render 
Him dependent and imperfect, and therefore deny 
His existence. 

There are two kinds of composition, physical 
and metaphysical. A thing is physically composed 
when it consists of parts really distinct ; of matter 
and form ; or of subject and accident. 

It could not be said that God is thus physically 
composed without contradicting in terms the essen- 
tial notion of the Infinite. 

He cannot be made of parts really distinct one 
from another, since these parts in an infinite being 
are impossible. Let us suppose that there are 
parts in God. Then these parts are either self- 
existent and independent, or else they derive their 
existence from some other source and are depen- 



92 



Second Lecture. 



dent. In the first case each part would be perfect 
in itself and there would be as many gods as there 
are parts, which, we have demonstrated to be a 
contradiction, as there can be but one God. In the 
second case, if the supposed parts are all depen- 
dent and none are self-existing, then there is no 
God. There is a direct absurdity in supposing 
that each part is infinite, as, being only a part, it 
is not and cannot be infinite. The hypothesis con- 
tradicts itself. 

Neither can there be matter and form in God, 
who, as essentially intelligent, cannot be compound- 
ed of matter, which is in its nature composed and 
extended. 

There also can be no accident predicated of the 
deity. The accident is not necessary to the subject, 
since ifc may be gained or lost without destroying 
the identity of the entity receiving or losing it. 
But in the Infinite all is necessary and immutable 
by an eternal necessity. 

Not even metaplty steal composition can be pre- 
dicated of God. There is no distinction in Him 
between possibility and actuality. Creatures are 
and may be possible as God knows them, without 
actually existing ; but the Infinite is eternally, 
because He is possible eternally. Creatures are 
brought from possibility to actuality by the power 



The Divine Attributes, 



93 



of the Creator ; but God, by the essential note of 
deity, always is. As we have seen in former de- 
monstrations, the state of mere possibility is for 
Him a contradiction. Thus reason points with cer- 
tainty to the divine perfections. Neither is there 
any real distinction in Him between His essence, 
existence, and attributes. He is all reality. Be- 
tween Him and creatures there is no point of com- 
parison, as His being is complete in an eternal 
perfection, while the things that are, come from 
His power and are dependent upon His will. So 
our demonstration from effects leads to the cause, 
from beings contingent to the being necessary, 
from the composed to the simple and infinite. 



V. 

GOD IS IMMENSE. 

The immensity of God is another consequence 
of His necessary perfection. If he were not im- 
mense He would be limited and so finite. This 
immensity is peculiar to the divine nature, and al- 
though we may find some similitude of this in- 
fection in creatures, it properly belongs to God 
alone. Whoever possesses this attribute is infinite, 
and infinitude could not exist without it. We de- 



94 



Second Lecture. 



fine tliis attribute as "that intrinsic and essential 
determination of the divine nature by which God 
is necessarily substantially present to all things 
without any term or limit." "This determina- 
tion is intrinsic, as distinguished from ubiquity, 
which is extrinsically predicated and is a contin- 
gent relation depending upon the hypothesis of 
the creation ; while immensity is an attribute ab- 
solutely necessary to God, so essentially belonging 
to Him before the existence of any creature, that 
without it He could neither be nor be conceived." * 
He is present by substance, and not simply by 
power; and while He fills all things, He is not cir- 
cumscribed by place or space. "He is in all 
places, as in the things to which He gives the 
power of being ; and He fills all places, not as 
bodies, which cannot co-exist in the same place at 
the same time, but by causing that all things 
should exist in the space which they fill." "He 
is in all things by power, since all are subject to 
Him ; and He is in all things by essence, because 
He has created all things ; and He is in all by sub- 
stantial presence, because He knows all things." f 
We can conceive of space as possible or actual. 
In the one case it is the possibility of extension ; 

* Rothenflnc, "Inst. Phil." 

f St. Thomas, "Summa," Pars I. Quaes. VIII. 



The Divine Attributes. 



95 



in the other it is the actual extension or the rela- 
tion of things in the place they occupy towards 
each other. So, strictly speaking, God is not in 
space, as He fills all things and can have no rela- 
tion of place towards creatures. He exists in His 
immensity, which, as an immutable and essential 
perfection, cannot be indefinite or capable of in- 
crease. This transcends every mode of extension, 
while in its infinity it contains the sufficient reason 
of all real extension, and so of all space. * 

This attribute, as it is a perfection, must belong 
to God. It is much more perfect to be every where 
than to be circumscribed by limits of place. An 
angel who can be present in many places at once 
is far more perfect than one who can only be pre- 
sent in one place ; so an infinitely perfect being 
cannot be in limit, but to him there can be no 
place to which He is not substantially present by 
the essential determination of His nature. 

Again, if God were not immense He would be 
tied by His nature to one or more places. If not 
omnipresent He would be either in one place or in 
many places. He could not be in all places at the 
same moment. And to this circumscription of lo- 
cality He Avould be bound either necessarily or by 
the exercise of His free-will. 

* Eothenflue. 



96 



Second Lecture. 



There is no reason in the divine essence why He 
should be necessarily so bound; rather the essen- 
tial note of deity rejects such circumscription or 
imprisonment. And there is no power out of God 
which can confine Him to any fixed locality. To 
suppose this would be to deny His freedom, and 
to erect a force stronger than that of deity. 

And if by His free-will God could pass from 
place to place, He would suffer constant changes, 
pass through new experiences, and gain or lose 
reality. Thus He would be mutable and so imper- 
fect, and so not God. 

It is true, then, in a certain sense that "God is 
everywhere and now T here" : nowhere as He is in no 
fixed place, everywhere because He is in all places. 
"God," says St. Paul, "who made the w r orld and 
all things therein, being Lord of heaven and earth, 
dwelleth not in temples made with hands, seeing 
it is He who giveth to all life and breath and all 
things. For in Him we live and move and are." * 
And when we speak of Him as on earth, in the 
temples made with hands, or in heaven, we mean 
not that in these places He is confined, which w r ould 
be impossible, but that there He manifests Him- 
self and works the special effects of His power. 

If we seek to inquire how God is immense Ave 
* Acts xvii. 24-28. 



The Divine Attributes. 



97 



shall find among things created no adequate pic- 
ture of this perfection. There is, however, a simili- 
tude of His omnipresence in the action of the human 
soul upon the body. Thus the soul, which is a 
spirit, informs the body ; and its presence and 
activity are manifest in all parts of the body at one 
and the same moment. As God is in the whole 
universe and in all its single parts, so is the soul 
present entire in the whole body and in all its parts. 

The voice of man, expressing the idea of the mind, 
sends forth the word or language, which is entire 
wherever the sound travels and in all who hear it. 
Neither the word nor the idea are divided or weak- 
ened by the number of those who are hearers. 

These are faint similitudes of the Infinite ; yet 
they enable us to grasp more clearly the grand idea 
of that immensity by which God is in all things, 
reaching beyond all bounds of thought, everywhere 
entire in all His universe and in all its single parts. 
This is His limitless perfection, the being to which 
no bounds can be set, the reality which contains all 
things in itself. So says St. Anselm : " The being of 
God and His power are the same. As, therefore, His 
power is always and everywhere, so whatever God 
is, is always and everywhere." * And St. Thomas : 
u God is in all by His power, as all things are 

* "De fide Trinit.," Cap. IV. 



98 



Second Lecture. 



subject to Him ; He is present in all, as all tilings 
are naked and open to His eyes ; and He is in all 
by His essence, as He is in all tilings the cause of 
their being." * 

VI. 

GOD IS ETERNAL. 

According to St. Thomas, eternity is the " entire 
and perfect possession of interminable life." f Such 
eternity necessarily belongs to God ; rather He is 
eternity itself as a pure act which can have neither 
beginning nor end. 

He is self-existent, being always necessary by an 
absolute possibility. To such a being there can be 
neither beginning nor end. To suppose either 
would be to contradict the self-existence of God 
and make Him an effect, which would be the denial 
of deity. He who is the first cause must always 
be, else He is not a necessary being, and, if not 
necessary, would be contingent. The possession of 
perfect and interminable life is, then, involved in 
the very idea of God. 

Bat God is, as we have shown, immutable, to 
whom no change, no increase of life or reality, is 
possible. Hence there can be no succession of 

* "Summa," Pars I. Quaes. VHI. f Pars I. Quaes. X. 



The Divine Attributes. 



99 



being or knowledge in Him, else He would be con- 
stantly mutable. Existing necessarily, He exists 
ever ; and to suppose a possible end to His being 
or to any reality belonging to Him is to destroy 
His deity. 

He is by tlie virtue of His essence, hence He is 
all actuality ; and there is no possibility to Him 
which can be distinguished from His essence. He 
is always, therefore, all that He is, without begin- 
ning or end, or any succession of knowledge or 
experience. 

So if God were not eternal He could never be ; 
as He is self-existent, to whom possibility is actu- 
ality ; and if there were one moment supposed 
when He was not, then a necessary Being, which 
He essentially i3, is impossible. As we have seen, 
God is possible because He is x and He is because 
He is possible. 

" The eternity of God is not a certain successive 
duration, so that past or future could be ever pre- 
dicated of Him ; but He is simple and absolute 
being from which the least actuality cannot be 
taken. This truth the heathen have recognized, 
and Plato declares that 'He is, He was, He will 
be, are parts of time, and cannot well be applied to 
the eternal nature, to which He is only belongs.' 
Wherefore as God is essentially determined by 



100 



Secoxd Lecture, 



His immensity to intimate existence in every place, 
so by His eternity must He co-exist in all time, 
and with whatever tilings He creates ; not as if 
He were in time as a member of the succession of 
things, but as eminently embracing in Himself all 
time." * So says St. Augustine : " Eternity is the 
substance itself of God, which is immutable. In 
Him there is no past, as if it were not still ; no 
future, as if it were not yet. There is nothing in 
Him but present being. Here we cannot say, He 
was, or He will be ; for He who icas is no longer, 
and He who will be is not ; we can only say of 
God that He is" f 

Since, then, God and eternity are the same, eter- 
nity is a pure act and the full perfection of life. 
As space is the local relation of created things to- 
wards each other, so is time the relation of things 
succeeding each other. To a created spirit endow- 
ed with intelligence this time is either extrinsic 
or intrinsic. The succession of things external to 
it, as the movement of the heavenly bodies, the 
changes of the seasons, constitutes time extrinsic. 
The succession of various thoughts, cognitions, and 
acts of will make to the finite mind intrinsic time. 
If only one such spirit were conceived to exist, 

*Rothenflue, "Inst. Phil.," Pars III. Cap. IV. 
t In Psalm ci,, Serm. II. 



The Divine Attributes. 



101 



and to exist alone, there would be no extrinsic 
time, but t-lie life itself of this spirit in its vital 
acts would be the only time. Here would be the 
only succession in thoughts, in increasing know- 
ledge, and in the acts of will. So if two spirits 
were supposed to exist with different powers of in- 
telligence, the one whose vital acts exceeded the 
other's would even in the same extrinsic time 
possess greater and longer life. " Knowledge can 
to a greater or lesser degree equal the object known, 
and one volition can embrace many acts of will as 
one. If, then, there is a spirit who in His know- 
ledge embraces all things that can be known in one 
act, and in one volition contains all that He wills, 
He will have and can have only one act of know- 
ledge and one act of will ; and this act will not 
only be equivalent to all possible successive acts of 
knowledge or will, but will far surpass them all, 
as including all in one, thereby being free from 
the imperfection of successive cognitions or voli- 
tions. Such a spirit will eminently possess all in- 
trinsic time and all possible life, by the exclusion, 
of any succession in knowledge or will. God is 
by His nature such a spirit, who knoweth in one 
eternal act all that is knowable, and willeth all 
that He wills. While to know and to will are per- 
fections, to know and to will successively are an 



102 



Second Lecture. 



imperfection ; as then tlie intelligence and will do 
not attain at once to all and the whole of their 
object, and as there remains something yet to be 
known or willed." The Infinite, as having all 
perfection, can have but one and this a fully ade- 
quate act of knowledge or volition. " This know- 
ledge and volition are a reality constituting the ab- 
solute possibility or the essence and being of God, 
so that they are not anything superadded to the 
divine essence as a form to the subject, but they 
are the essence itself, the intimate being of God, 
and hence God Himself."* So is He, as self -exist- 
ing, essentially fully and perfect life. He cannot 
be conceived as not existing. He is Life itself, in- 
finite and interminable. 



VII. 

GOD IS OMNISCIEOT. 

The divine attributes of which we have already 
spoken belong absolutely to God, as they are in- 
volved in the idea of His being. He is unity, mi- 
ni u tabil i t y , independence, simplicity, immensity, 
and eternity. 

There are also other attributes, which, while they 

*Rothenflue, "Inst. Phil." 



The Divine Attributes. 



103 



are absolutely proper to Him, include in their con- 
ception some relation of the deity to an object, 
whether that object be the perfection of the divine 
nature itself or the creature which He produces 
and preserves. Thus the divine intellect perceives 
all things which are the object of knowledge, all 
things that are possible, all things existing or 
future ; and the divine will is the free and 
eternal volition of the Infinite First Cause. 

The intellect of God is the divine essence itself, 
necessarily determined to know all that can be 
known. God is truth and knowledge, and there 
can be nothing cognoscible which He does not eter- 
nally know ; in fact, it is cognoscible because He 
sees it to be such. 

The Supreme intelligence is manifest in all His 
works, in the beauty and order of the creation, 
and in the intellect of man which He has made. 
There can be nothing in the effect which is not 
in some way in the cause ; and the variety and 
order of creatures demonstrate an intelligence above 
them all. 

This intellect of God is not a faculty unessen- 
tial to Him, which can suffer change in increase 
or diminution ; but it is, as we have already seen, 
a pure act eternal and complete in itself. This 
is the only perfect mode of knowledge, and the 



104 



Second Lecture. 



only way in which, the divine being conld be im- 
mutable. 

Such being the necessary consequence of His 
self- existence, it is manifest that His knowledge 
must embrace all things, and that nothing can 
be hidden from Him. There are among things 
cognoscible the things which are simply possible 
which never are actuated ; the things which exist, 
past, present, and future, whether they are to hap- 
pen necessarily or by the free-will of an intelligent 
agent ; and the things which are conditional, and 
may be or not, according to circumstances which 
may or may not arise. Whatever can be known 
in any way is necessarily eternally known to God. 

Possibilities are the object of knowledge ; they 
are capable of actuation by the free-will of God, 
and they really are the divine essence itself as far 
as it may be imitated out of Himself. If the su- 
preme intellect did not see all these, it would not 
see or know itself ; and an infinite intelligence 
must adequately embrace all the works of His 
power, the things that are because His free voli- 
tion actuates them. And created intelligences, who 
by the conditions of their being act freely, are all 
known to the omniscience which beholds all they 
will do in the exercise of their freedom. The in- 
animate creation moves by the law of the Creator. 



The Divine Attributes. 



105 



Their movements are all before the one eternal gaze 
of the Infinite. It is the same intelligence which 
sees in the same way all that men will freely do. 
This necessary vision of God does not prevent 
their full liberty, as it does not cause them to 
act, but beholds them in the freedom of intelli- 
gent agents. There can be no repugnance between 
the divine foreknowledge and the liberty of man. 
If anything be certain, it is our freedom in all in- 
telligent actions. He who knoweth all things must 
know how free agents will use their liberty, and 
it would be a contradiction of reason to suppose 
that the foreknowledge of God should render free 
actions necessary. Foreknowledge of the future 
no more takes away the free-will of men than 
memory of the past renders necessary actions al- 
ready performed. 

So the Infinite, in His unsearchable wisdom, be- 
holds all that is or can be, all that is knowable, 
in one instant, eternal, and perfect vision. 

Prom the omniscience of God we also perceive 
the perfection of the divine will, which, as His 
knowledge, is a simple and pure act. Whatever 
He wills He wills once and eternally without the 
possibility of change. The freedom of the divine 
will consists in this, that there is and can be no 
extrinsic cause which can move or compel its 



106 



Second Lecture. 



action. God is absolutely independent, and exter- 
nal violence cannot be conceived in His regard. 
But while within Himself all is necessary, without 
Himself He is free from all necessity. His es- 
sence is necessary, and therefore the internal ac- 
tion of the divine will is necessary and eternal. 
He must love Himself with the most perfect love. 
But without His own essence His will enjoys eter- 
nal liberty. He is free to create or not to create : 
and the laws of the universe are the fruit of His 
volition. No creature can be necessary to Him, 
as He is most sufficient to Himself, and as nothing 
can add to His essential beatitude. As His know- 
ledge is perfect in one pure act, so is His will. 
All he wills He wills from eternity, and there can 
be no more change in His volition than in His in- 
telligence. 

We may well say with the apostle: "O the 
depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the know- 
ledge of God ! How incomprehensible are His 
judgments, and how unsearchable His ways ! For 
who hath known the mind of the Lord? Or who 
hath, been His counsellor ? Or who hath first 
given to Him, and recompense shall be made him % 
For of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all 
things." * 

* Romans xi. 33-36. 



The Divine Attributes. 



107 



VIII. 

GOD IS IHFIHITELY GOOD. 

The goodness of God belongs to Him, as His 
other attributes, by virtue of His essence. He is 
goodness itself in its perfection with all that name 
implies, and because He is infinitely good He is 
infinitely just and merciful. 

He is infinitely good by nature, as in Him are 
all possible realities ; and no possible defect can 
be attributed to Him. Metaphysical evil, which 
belongs to all finite things, can have no place in 
the Infinite. 

He is supremely holy, as all His free acts are 
in perfect accoid with His nature, and as His will 
is the unchangeable law of right. 

There can be no act of God which does not ac- 
cord with His natural goodness and with all His 
attributes. His knowledge and wisdom, as His will, 
are the exercise of one act. So He who is sanctity 
is, in His life within Himself, and in His dealings 
towards things created, the supreme law of holi- 
ness. Free to create or not to create, having once 
chosen to create, His eternal will in all His acts 
moves by the law of His being. So to the crea- 
tures which come from nothing by His power, 



108 



Second Lecture. 



and depend upon His hand, He is supremely- 
good. They, finite in themselves, are the objects 
of His infinite beneficence. While He can owe the 
creature nothing, His nature is such that He can- 
not act without showing forth the riches of His 
goodness. In the varied ranks of the creation 
He gives to the creature all its reality. To the 
inanimate matter He gives being ; to the vegetable 
world in its manifold beauty He imparts life ; to 
the wondrous varieties of animal life He gives 
sensation with its measure of intelligence. To 
man, the king of the material universe, He bestows 
the greater gift of reason with its power of free- 
will. His is the arm which upholds the angelic 
hierarchies in their excelling strength, in the glory 
of their spiritual life. All reality comes from Him, 
the ever-living fountain of all good, and every 
created ray shows forth His light, and every act 
displays the infinite riches of His beneficence. He 
cannot act but by the display of the perfection 
of His being. Though His ways are not accord- 
ing to finite wisdom or human foresight, yet has 
He provided for the beatitude of all His universe, 
that each and all of His creatures may attain their 
end ; and the circle of life, which begins in Him, 
returns to Him in the harmony of His works, and 
in the glory which they give, where ' 'day to day 



The Divine Attributes. 



109 



uttereth speech, and night to night showeth know- 
ledge,'' where u His name alone is exalted, and 
His praise is above heaven and earth. " 

Thus giving to all things all their good, and so 
disposing creatures that they may attain the end 
of their being, His sanctity displays itself in jus- 
tice and mercy. 

"In this," says St. Thomas, "the true justice 
of God is seen, that He gives to all things their 
due, according to the dignity of every existence, 
whose nature He preserves iu its proper order and 
vigor."* In His dealings with the intelligent 
agents to whom He has given liberty He supplies 
all the physical power and the reality which are 
theirs by the purpose of His will. And as He 
cannot contradict the will of His creating act by 
extinguishing their free-will, He is of necessity a 
moral governor, rendering to all their due. In this 
respect "the justice of God is rightly called His 
goodness towards creatures tempered with wisdom. 
Thns a prince, while he wills the peace of his 
kingdom, at the same time wills that no one of 
his subjects should be punished ; but wisdom 
shows him that to neglect the punishment of 
transgressors against the law would be the en- 
couragement of crime and the destruction of all 

* Pars I. Quaes. XXI. 



110 



Second Lecture. 



peace and prosperity. So goodness demands the 
punishment of the wicked, else he would cease to 
be good towards the good, and would become just 
to no one." * Sanctity and wisdom require retri- 
butive justice, which, never exceeds its end, which 
punishes the guilty in proportion to the crime, 
and thus saves the rights of all and the order of 
the w r hole. So only could God dispose society 
towards its end, or even vindicate His ow r n rights 
over the creature. The freedom of the intelligent 
agent is a great good in itself. It would be an 
unspeakable evil to take it away. It would be 
contrary to the justice of God to allow those who 
abuse this gift to destroy the peace and bliss of 
such as rightly use it. 

Moreover, the divine law, which is the divine 
being itself, is of infinitely more value than the 
loss of happiness which the creature incurs by the 
misuse of liberty. If God were to sacrifice the 
sense of rigrht which is the law of His nature to 
the waywardness of the disobedient He would de- 
stroy the peace of the universe and contradict the 
essential harmony of His works. He would sin 
against His own goodness, and, like the prince or 
government which encourages crime by neglect of 
law, He would be good to no one. 

* Rothenflue, Section III. Cap. II. 



The Divine Attributes. 



Ill 



The beneficence of tlie Deity goes even beyond 
nil that in any way the creature could claim from 
the creator, not only in giving to it all its good, 
but also in averting its evils as far as may be 
possible or consistent with the nature of the finite 
or the perfections of the Infinite. More than this 
could not be without the destruction of the great 
gift of the moral agent and the contradiction of the 
essential attributes of the Godhead. So far mere 
reason gives testimony to the goodness of the su- 
preme First Cause. This is not the place to pre- 
sent the greater knowledge which revelation gives 
of the inner life of the Almighty, and the riches 
of love which He has shown in the redemption of 
tlie creature wrecked by the misuse of free-will. 
The whole earth is filled with this mercy, which 
has revealed the Infinite in His incomprehensible 
condescension. u T^ere is a true light which en- 
lighteneth every man that cometh into this world." * 

IX. 

GOD IS OMNIPOTENT. 

The omnipotence of the Deity is essential to the 
perfection of His being, else there might be con- 
ceived an agent more powerful than Himself, and 

*St John i. 9. 



112 



Second Lecture. 



thus He would cease to be God. As the Self- 
Existent, the First Cause, He must possess the 
power of working all effects which are possible ; 
and all effects are possible which involve in them- 
selves no contradiction. Contradiction is the nega- 
tion of power, and therefore God cannot contradict 
Himself. He must then be able to bring into ex- 
istence all things which are possible, and so to 
create all things from nothing by the simple ex- 
ercise of will. Here we see the omnipotence which 
produces effects natural and supernatural, and by 
the same volition preserves in being and life the 
universe which He creates. Thus He gives actu- 
ality to the possible, awakes from nothing the 
world, the creature material and immaterial, and 
governs all by His most wise providence. 

The power to act is a perfection, and we cannot 
conceive of an intelligent being without it. The 
Supreme, then, possesses this activity ; and as all 
in God is infinite, His power of acting must be in- 
finite. There is, therefore, no limit to His power. 
It is, as we have proved, not determined to any 
action out of Himself, for in all such actions He 
possesses perfect liberty. And in the exercise of 
His w T ill He can need nothing, no matter or instru- 
ment, as He is all-sufficient to Himself. Nor can 
His activity be ever weakened or exhausted by the 



The Divine Attributes. 



113 



manifold operations of His hand or the stupen- 
dous effects which He produces. " Knowest thou 
not, or hast thou not heard ? The Lord is the 
everlasting God, who hath created the ends of the 
earth : He shall not faint nor labor, neither is 
there any searching out of His wisdom."* "To 
create is to be the cause, the ultimate and com- 
plete, sufficient reason, of the existence of things 
possible ; but a finite being, as essentially depen- 
dent and deriving its entity from another, can never 
be the cause of its own existence, otherwise it 
would exist by the virtue of its own essence, and 
be both necessary and infinite. Neither can a 
finite be the cause of the existence of other enti- 
ties, since it cannot impart to others what it has 
not in itself. So the Infinite only can create, and 
God, as the first and necessary cause, is omnipo- 
tent." f It is also manifest that creatures cannot 
concur with God in the work of creation as causes 
instrumental ; since in this divine operation the 
Supreme intellect alone can act, the omniscience 
which knows all possibles, in concurrence with 
the will, w r hich from possibles chooses one rather 
than another. The creature may, indeed, be 
employed in the divine works, and the universe 
concur in harmony to one end; but in the 

* Tsaias xl. 28. f Bothenfiuo, Pars III. Sec, III. A. IV. 



114 



Second Lecture. 



creating act no power but that of the Omnipotent 
can enter. 

The preservation of things created in the order 
of the divine will is the continuation of the creat- 
ing act, by which the Maker of all once wished the 
possible to be actuated. The creature can no more 
continue to be by its own power than it could 
come from nothing by the virtue of its essence. 
The being w T hich it has is imparted by the divine 
power ; and that being I will last as long as the su- 
preme intellect in the act which brought it into 
existence has appointed. So the Almighty holds 
all that is in its being or life by the act of His 
will, and to the actions of all creatures concurs 
physically by His power. He gives them the life 
by which they live, the activity by which they 
work, and in the physical act of their preserva- 
tion continues the one operation by which He cre- 
ated them. "In Him they live and move and have 
their being." 

Thus in the exercise of inlinite intelligence and 
wisdom He who has by omnipotent power pro- 
duced all things that are from nothing, guides all 
to its end and disposes all His universe by a 
blessed providence. The finite can no more mea- 
sure this providence than it can comprehend the 
length and breadth and height of the infinite. 



The Divine Attributes. 



115 



Yet reason tells us that the supreme mind must 
act for an end, and that the means for this end are 
provided by unerring wisdom. There can be no- 
thing in the vast creation, however small it may be, 
which has not its place in the order of the uni- 
verse, its share in contributing to the great end 
proposed by the divine intellect. Man, in his im- 
perfect vision, sees the stupendous nature of this 
order ; but only the unmeasured powders of Deity 
can behold the beauty and harmony of the whole, 
which by one eternal act was evoked out of no- 
thing by omnipotence. 

Thus have we sought in this brief conference to 
bring forward the fuller view which His attributes 
give of the eternal First Cause, whose existence 
reason demonstrates to us. This contemplation 
flows directly from the idea of God which our 
human intelligence gathers from the works of His 
power. The divine Being is all that perfection im- 
plies, and to deny Him any one of these attributes 
is to deny altogether His existence and to con- 
tradict reason. Will, then, the unbelieving heart 
take refuge in dishonesty, and seek to darken the 
natural light by unskilful words? Shall He be 
called unknowable because His perfections carry 
us to the unlimited regions of the infinite, and 
teach us how worthy He is of our wonder and 



116 



Second Lecture. 



praise? To know Him in some degree is the life 
itself of tlie created intellect ; to comprehend 
fully the necessary attributes of God is the bliss 
of the uncreated mind alone. One could not 
expect the human reason to comprehend the di- 
vine nature nor to penetrate the mysteries which 
envelop it. As reason necessarily has its bounds, 
there can be no proportion between our ideas and 
His infinite perfections. We have not the mea- 
sure of the possible, nor of that which is ; and 
our perceptions are too limited to fathom the se- 
crets of His nature or of His providence. Having 
but a dependent existence, circumscribed by the 
bounds of time and space, how could we compre- 
hend eternity, immensity, omnipotence, and the 
ineffable perfections of absolute Being % We are 
forced to admit these attributes, because they are 
contained in the fundamental and necessary notion 
of a First Cause ; but we cannot know them per- 
fectly, and can only judge of them within certain 
limits. It would be to destroy them to seek to 
circumscribe them in the narrow sphere of our 
conceptions. We know that God is eternal, be- 
cause He exists necessarily ; we conceive that He 
must be immense, free, immutable, all-powerful, 
supremely wise, supremely good, supremely just — 
in one word, supremely perfect— -since all these per- 



The Divine Attributes. 



117 



fections are identical with the idea of a necessary 
being. This necessity of being which reveals itself 
as the primary attribute of the First Cause is an 
absolute necessity, independent of every condition, 
and consequently of all limits. It does not apply 
to any degree of being, but to being absolute and 
without restriction. In other terms, by the fact that 
a first principle exists necessarily, it is clear that 
it must possess being in all its fulness, without im- 
perfection or limits. It must be all that it can be 
without contradicting its nature ; for if one were to 
suppose the divine nature imperfect or limited, 
we should be forced to restrain or exclude the ne- 
cessity of being under some respect, and thus to 
destroy the fundamental notion and essential cha- 
racter of the First Cause. But if we discover in 
the necessity of being the source of all perfections, 
we have no means to comprehend them, to ex- 
plain them, or to determine their nature and their 
numberless relations. "Man," says Eousseau, "is 
intelligent when he reasons ; but the supreme in- 
telligence has no need to reason. All truths are to 
Him but one single idea, as all places are to Him 
one single point, and all times one single moment. 
Human power acts by means ; the divine power acts 
by itself. God can do w T hat He wills, and because 
He wills ; His will is His power. God is good ; 



118 



Second Lecture. 



nothing is more evident ; "but while the goodness 
of man shows itself in love towards his fellows, 
the divine goodness is love of order, since it is by 
order that He maintains all that exists, and binds 
each part of the nniverse with, the whole. God is 
just ; it is the consequence of His goodness ; but 
while it is human justice to render to every one 
his due, the justice of God will demand account 
from every one of that which He has given." * 

And as we cannot judge of the divine perfec- 
tions by our incomplete ideas, neither can we 
measure them by their exterior effects, because in 
creatures they are but a manifestation limited by 
the finite character of the object. God was not the 
less all-powerful and sovereignly good before the 
exercise of His power and goodness towards crea- 
tures. The exercise of His attributes adds nothing 
to their infinite reality, nor could He be anything 
more nor less than He is by nature, infinite. 
Sublime as is this idea of God, it is the plain 
deduction of our reason, and he who would ignore 
it must put out the light of his intelligence and 
contradict the primal truths which nature teaches. 

" Truth," says Lacordaire, "is that which is, in- 
asmuch as it is perceived by the mind. What, 
then, is that which is ? Do we understand by 
* 1 < Encyclopedic du XlXe. Siecle," Vol. XV. p. 184. 



The Divixe Attributes. 



119 



this the heavens, the earth, and the seas? Is this 
that which is ? What ! the heavens, the earth, the 
seas, mankind even, all that we see, are stamped 
with such a character of limit and change that 
we find there nothing of the grandeur contained in 
that powerful word, being. Human tongues have 
exhausted their energies to express the nothing- 
ness of visible things ; and however pride may de- 
sire to magnify the theatre upon which it acts, 
all that it can add to the universe is to discover 
in it a ray of being, and consequently a ray of 
truth. Where, then, is being ? Where is that 
which is ? Ah ! already I perceive and even know 
it. Being is absolute, eternal, and infinite, plurali- 
ty without division, the ocean without shores, the 
centre without circumference, the plenitude that 
contains itself, the form without figure — the whole, 
in fine, without which all that is, is but an act 
and a gift. But in so speaking whom have I 
named ? I have named Him who has said of Him- 
self, I am who am. I have named Him who said 
also, / am the truth. I have named God. Behold 
being and behold truth. God alone is truth, 
because He alone is being. He does not possess 
truth as something foreign to Himself, but He is 
substantial and personal truth, because He is be- 
ing, possessing Himself ; because He is at the same 



120 



Second Lecture. 



time, and by the same act, the eye that sees, the 
object seen, and vision. Whoever knows Him 
knows all ; whoever knows Him not knows no- 
thing. What know you, indeed, out of Him? 
The phenomena of the world, their laws, the com- 
position and decomposition of bodies, the science 
of dust? You do not even reach so far, for to 
attain this you must at least penetrate the last 
reason of an atom ; and where will you find it, if 
you ignore God, the principal end of all? 

"It is not, then, the want of light which pre- 
cipitates a part of mankind into scepticism and 
keeps them away from the truth ; it is the abuse 
of their freedom. The darkness wherein they lose 
God is voluntary darkness. God shows Himself, 
and they fly from Him ; He is the object present 
to their intelligence, and they choose to make of 
their intelligence a sepulchre or a chaos rather than 
adore the light that shines upon it. They abandon 
the inner light, the only true light, to pursue the 
obscure and powerless attractions of the material 
universe, from which they expect the joy of apos- 
tasy in the pride of false science. And yet the uni- 
verse, all limited as it is, all pale and silent as it 
rises before our minds, is itself full of God. If it 
be not His likeness, it is at least a vestige, a linea- 
ment of Him. From the hyssop to the cedar, from 



The Divine Attributes. 



121 



the dew of morning to the evening star, all nature 
is a reflection of the divine power, beauty, and 
goodness. God, who in the body of man has as- 
sociated matter with the most subtle operations of 
the mind, has willed, in the body of the world, 
to associate it with the revelation which His mind 
perpetually makes to our own. To each ray of 
ideal light there corresponds a ray of sensible 
light ; to each vision of the uncreated world a 
vision of the created ; to each voice of the one 
the voice of the other." * 

They, then, who refuse to see the perfections of 
God, and would degrade their highest aspirations, 
the nobility of their birthright, to the level of 
materialism, are without excuse. Their abuse of 
freewill comes from the corrupt passions of our 
nature, which fear the arm of the Omnipotent, or 
from the pride of intellect, which would reject 
the restraints of the Omniscient. With all their 
scepticism the moral nature falls, and where the 
light of reason is darkened the eternal principles 
of right are ignored. Man descends from his 
kingly throne among the living things of the crea- 
tion, and becomes one of the beasts of the earth. 
Yet in his degradation he is inexcusable and 
must suffer the penalty and the shame in time 

* Lacordaire, " Conferences on God." 



122 



Secoxd Lecture. 



and in eternity. u Professing to be wise, tliey be- 
come fools, who change the truth of God into a 
lie. And as they liked not to have God in their 
knowledge, He delivered them up to a reprobate 
sense. ?? * Such falsely-called votaries of reason are 
they who destroy reason, debase their understand- 
ing, and hurl their godlike nature from its 
throne, that they may lie down with the atoms 
of the dust or with the passions of the brute. 
All-unchanged, all-sufficient, all-attractive remains 
the everlasting truth. No human folly can dark- 
en its light or tarnish its beauty. In its eter- 
nity it remains the centre and fount of life, 
goodness, and knowledge. 

* Romans i. 22, 25, 28. 



Third Lecture. 



THE CREATION OF THE WORLD. 



Third Lecture. 



THE CREATION OF THE WOULD. 



"In the beginning God created heaven and earth.''' — Genesis i. L 

Wlfl have argued from the creation to its Author, 
from the things that are made to their Maker. 
This visible world cannot be its own cause, nor can 
inert matter begin of itself its varied and wonder- 
ful motion. Order and design far beyond the ken 
of our intellect are manifest in the material uni- 
verse, and in the more wonderful nature of man. 

Yet while the demonstration is so clear, the folly 
of the human heart has sought to confuse the sim- 
plest truths. In different ways the conclusions of 
reason Lave been rejected, and men have not 
failed to magnify the created at the expense of the 
Creator, and to put the material world in rivalry 
with God. Hence in this brief series of confer- 
ences it is necessary to dwell upon the act of di- 
vine power and will by which the universe comes 



9 

126 



Third Lecture. 



forth to being from nothing, and thus to extol the 
perfections of the Most High. We will try to give 
voice to reason in its contemplation of the crea- 
ture, and from the light of the finite things that 
are to redouble our testimony to the Supreme 
Truth and Life, avIio is essential being ; to behold 
Him in the glorious act without Himself w r hich 
showed forth something of the possibilities hidden 
in His infinite knowledge. 

No one can look at the universe which in its 
vastness spreads around us without seeing how all 
the different entities of which it is composed are 
bound together by efficient causes so that one pro- 
ceeds from another, or by final causes so that one 
exists as the end of another. This bond makes the 
harmony of the universe. The planets that move in 
their orbits ; the simple bodies which act upon each 
other by attraction or repulsion ; the obedience of 
things inanimate to the law of gravitation ; the suc- 
cessions of life by which one being produces another 
and lives for another ; the varied seasons of nature 
in their regular manifestations of being — all bear 
witness to a unity of purpose and end, and declare 
to us one harmonious whole. Here is a series of ef- 
ficient causes leading the reason to the sight of the 
First Cause ; here is an order of final causes which 
shows forth the ultimate end. For, as we have al- 



The Creatiox of the Would. 



127 



ready proved, second causes demonstrate the nec- 
essary existence of tlie First Cause; and the action 
of this Cause could not be without its unity of end. 
Thus lies before the human intellect the world in 
its varied ranks of being and life. Xo one can ig- 
nore this manifest reality without degrading him- 
self to the level of irrational and insane scepti- 
cism. 

The errors of the ancient philosophers in regard 
to the origin of the world were, indeed, all incon- 
sistent with the idea of a Supreme First Cause. 
Their false and inconsequent reasonings were con- 
futed by many of the pagan writers, who often 
failed to see the truth they vindicated, as well as 
the absurdity of their many conjectures. Yet mo- 
dern infidels have far surpassed them in inconsis- 
tency and self-contradiction. And, with all the 
light of revelation shining around them, they are 
more senseless and less sincere than the heathen, 
who saw God by the light of nature. Before we 
proceed, then, to the vindication of the truth in 
regard to the creation of the world, it is proper to 
show the untruth of the theories advanced by an- 
cient or modern infidelity. We shall see that all 
the folly of our own day has been anticipated by 
the often-refuted systems of pagan philosophy. 

They who deny the creation of the world by God, 



128 



Third Lecture, 



and assert another theory for the origin of the 
universe, may be classed among fatalists, casual- 
ists, or pantheists. To prove the falsity of these 
systems is to prepare the way for the proper un- 
derstanding of the divine operation in the work 
of creation. 

Those who were called fatalists attributed the 
existence of the world to an invincible necessity, 
and asserted the eternity of matter as the principle 
of all things. There were those who declared the 
whole universe as it now is to be eternal, and to 
co-exist with the Deity; while others only supposed 
matter to be eternal, the substance of which the 
divine power framed the world. In neither case 
did they, in words at least, deny the existence of 
the Supreme God, although in denying His attri- 
butes they assailed His being. 

This false philosophy involved the assertion of 
three contradictory propositions whose absurdity we 
have already made manifest in the preceding lec- 
tures. It asserts either that the world is eternal, 
or that the motion of matter is eternal, or that 
at least the elements or atoms of which the world 
is made are from eternity. Let us repeat the de- 
monstrations already given which prove the falsity 
of these propositions. 

First, if the world be eternal it must exist of 



The C be ati ox of the Would. 



129 



itself, having the reason of its own existence in its 
essence, and so be endowed with every perfection, 
and, in fact, be God. Xo other supposition is pos- 
sible to an eternal being which has no canse, but 
is necessarily. But the world is not endowed with 
these perfections. It is confessedly composed and 
extended, and cannot be infinite. It has parts, as 
an infinite cannot have, and all its parts are finite, 
and no collection of finites could ever make an in- 
finite. As it cannot be, therefore, infinite, it cannot 
be eternal. 

Again, the world does not exist by the virtue of 
an absolute possibility, since its possibility and its 
existence are plainly distinct. There is no need 
that it should exist ; and we can easily conceive 
of the world as not existing, and of many worlds 
like ours which actually do not exist. There is 
no repugnance in such a conception, as there is 
in the idea of God, which essentially includes full 
being. To conceive of God as not existing is to 
conceive that there is no God at the same time 
that there is a God, to whom self-existence is a 
necessary note. 

Again, if the world were eternal, it, as infinite, 
would be absolutely immutable, and incapable of 
any substantial change or modification. Such are 
the conditions of the infinite. But the world and 



130 



Third Lecture. 



the matter of which it is composed are capable 
of substantial changes, of separation, dissolution, 
and corruption. And there is no body which is 
not subject to constant modifications from the ac- 
tion of other bodies and the various forces which 
affect matter. 

Infinity cannot, then, be attributed to this world ; 
and as it cannot be infinite, it cannot be eternal. 
Limit in being includes limit in duration. 

Secondly, nothing is gained by the assertion 
that the motion of material things is eternal. If 
matter cannot be eternal, neither can its motion 
be eternal. Matter is essentially inert and will 
not move without a cause. To suppose an eternal 
motion without any cause is to suppose a contra- 
diction ; and bodies which resist movement will 
not move unless a power stronger than the na- 
tural inertia of matter be brought to bear upon 
them. AY here is there such a power, unless there 
be a First Cause? 

Thirdly, the same argument which proves the 
contingency of matter applies to its elements or 
atoms. Divide matter as you will, its atoms are 
not infinite. There is no such thing as an infinite 
number, and if the elements were eternal they 
would exist independently of God and be pos- 
sessed of His attributes. But experience tells us 



The Creation of the World. 



131 



that the atoms of matter are not independent of 
each other ; that they are subject to constant 
change, and are in no sense necessary beings. 
Only one can be eternal, as containing all life in 
Himself, and existing by the virtue of His es- 
sence. This interminable life can be predicated 
of nothing which in its very nature is contingent 
and mutable. The hypothesis, therefore, of the 
eternity of matter is contradictory to the funda- 
mental notions involved in the idea of being. It 
cannot stand with reason, and it offers no expla- 
nation of the existence of the world. That exis- 
tence must have a cause, and one not of its own 
order or not contained in itself. 

The theory that the world and all things that 
are, took their present form from pre-existing mat- 
ter by chance is also utterly unreasonable, while 
it gives no explanation of the difficulties it at- 
tempts to solve. Chance is nothing, and can there- 
fore produce no effect. We have shown that mat- 
ter cannot be eternal, and that under all its forms 
it is liable to constant changes. To suppose, then, 
that -by mere chance the different ranks of being 
took their shape and place, is to give no solution 
of the great question kow matter came to be, and 
to present to the mind the most wonderful effect 
without any cause. Chance is no force, and will 



132 



Third Lecture, 



give no motion, and the material atoms of which 
the universe is composed will not move from their 
inert state, unless some power be brought to act 
upon them. The beings of which we are con- 
scious are not all material. The domain of intel- 
ligence is not the realm of matter ; and no move- 
ment of molecules could ever produce the phe- 
nomena of thought, memory, will, or understand- 
ing. Let man do what he will with the atoms or 
elements of matter, he can never produce con- 
sciousness or intelligence. The power of the elec- 
tric current will make wonderful motions and 
arouse startling mechanical effects ; but it can 
never produce the slightest simulation of spiritual 
activity or thought. Think of the wondrous forms 
of nature, whether animate or inanimate, from the 
tiniest insect which the microscope can hardly dis- 
cover to the mightiest species of animal life. Con- 
sider the marvellous order and symmetry which 
distinguish all that nature reveals to us, and the 
perfection of art which all the acuteness of man 
can only feebly imitate. Who could think that 
all this magnificent display of an intelligence vaster 
than any human knowledge could come from chance, 
which is absolutely nothing ? Reason rejects a theory 
so manifestly absurd, so impossible, and so inade- 
quate to solve the problem of being and life. 



The Creation of the World. 



133 



The manifold difficulties in the attempts to erect 
a philosophy upon such false and contradictory 
principles have led the rebellious heart and mind 
of man to construct another theory more vast, but 
none the less false. This pretentious theory identi- 
fies all things with God, so that the universe and 
all that is are really one and the same divine sub- 
stance. There is only one substance, according to 
this philosophy, only one absolute being. If there 
seem to be many substances, many distinct beings, 
it is only in appearance ; as all things which are, 
are only the one God, beside whom there is no- 
thing. The one eternal substance, becoming active, 
produced out of itself the visible world and the 
universe, so that all existences, matter or spirit, 
are of the same essence with God. They have 
passed out of Him in such a way that, though 
one substantially with Him, they have the ap- 
pearance of distinct entities. Or they have not 
in any way passed out of Him, but are really 
the divine essence ; so that spirit and matter, 
thought and extension, are immanent attributes of 
God, and the manifold thoughts and various ex- 
tensions which we are conscious of, are the modifi- 
cations of these attributes of the one and neces- 
sary substance. But since this theory presents at 
once many facts inconsistent with the character 



134 



Third Lecture. 



of a necessary being, some have not hesitated to 
deny the reality of the world and things finite, 
and to declare that they are mere phenomena with- 
out reality, illusions deceiving the senses and in- 
telligence of men. God thus exists alone, and all 
that appears to us is only the divine substance 
working deceit in the appearance of things which 
only seem to be, but have no distinct reality. This 
pantheism under various forms is held by many 
of our modern infidels. They talk of an absolute, 
and declare that there is nothing else ; and while 
asserting matter and motion to be eternal and 
without any cause, they are nn willing to acknow- 
ledge a supreme deity. 

Again, we see how infidelity refutes itself, and 
how reason rises up to deny the propositions of 
rationalism which render truth impossible and lead 
to universal scepticism. Pantheism in any shape 
is contrary to facts and to the certain conclusions 
of our intelligence. 

No one but a fool can hold that there is only 
one substance existing. Everything that is, which 
is distinct from other things, has its own essence, 
else there would be no distinction. There are as 
many substances as there are entities distinct in 
number or species. One man is distinct from an- 
other, and not to be confounded with any other 



The Creation of the World. 



135 



being. He is not a stone, any more than fire is 
water. Facts which reason and common sense de- 
monstrate to be true, prove to us tliat there are 
substances besides the infinite essence of God. 

And if such a false hypothesis were admitted, 
then to the one infinite substance would belong 
attributes contradictory of each other, and changes 
destroying the perfection of the divine nature. 
For all that takes place in the universe would be 
only so many modes of existence of the divine 
substance. All the modifications of creatures would 
really be the modifications of God. " Among men, 
some are sick and others well ; some seek for 
that which others hate ; some are ignorant of that 
which others know. Therefore all those who are 
really according to this false philosophy but the 
one substance, present to us the contradiction of 
the one God being at the same time sick and well, 
hating and loving the same thing, and at the same 
moment being ignorant of that which He knows. 
Neither can any argument be drawn from the nature 
of man, who may suffer different modifications in 
the various parts of the body, since man is a com- 
posed substance, and, indeed, the aggregate of many 
substances, while by the theory of the pantheist 
there is only one substance, and that the divine. 5 ' * 

*Rothenflue, "Inst Phil.," Pars I. Sec. I. Cap. III. 



136 



Third Lecture. 



On tlie same principle all the actions of crea- 
tures must be attributed to God, and these actions 
are not only contradictory of each other, but often 
impossible to the Deity. He who by nature is in- 
finitely holy would be guilty of vice and crime, 
and pursue Himself with hatred. For if there 
were only one substance, men, in their various 
ranks and sinful lives, would be only so many 
modifications of God, the only agent, the only 
existence. Thus would perish any true notion of 
the Supreme, since things finite and mutable, as we 
see them to be, can never be confounded with the 
Infinite ; and in the loss of any proper idea of 
God the reign of universal scepticism would be 
inevitable. 

The theory of emanation from the divine sub- 
stance is an impossibility, as it contradicts the es- 
sential attributes of the Deity. That which ema- 
nates from any substance is necessarily of the 
same essence with it, else there could be no real 
emanation. The universe and all its parts are 
confessedly changeable and finite, while the divine 
essence is absolutely immutable. There is no pos- 
sible sign of the Deity in the qualities of matter 
ever moving, always subject to change ; and by 
such an hypothesis the simple would be made to 
send forth from its essence a composed substance, 



The Creatigx of the World. 



137 



and the infinite a finite. No human intelligence 
can really entertain such manifest contradictions. 

The proposition that the world and the material 
universe are an emanation immanent in the divine 
substance is fully as contradictory and absurd. 
"For, according to this false philosophy, spirit and 
matter, thought and extension, must be considered 
constituent attributes of the divine essence. The 
absurdity of this is easily seen. If thought be an 
essential property of the divine essence, it will be 
wherever that essence is. In like manner if exten- 
sion be an essential attribute, it must be ever 
where that divine substance is. For attributes 
fiow necessarily from the essence of a thing, and 
cannot be separated from it, since they really are 
identified with it. If, therefore, extension be di- 
vided, and it is by nature divisible, the divine 
essence and thought would also be divided, which 
is impossible. Extension and thought cannot, 
therefore, be the properties of one divine essence, 
since, by the hypothesis, that essence would be 
rendered at the same time divisible and indivi- 
sible. 

" Moreover, thought is the property of a simple 
substance, and extension belongs only to a body 
composed. It is as impossible for a composed sub- 
stance to think as it is for thought to be divided. 



138 



Third Lecture. 



These two properties are, then, contradictory, and 
in the same subject would mutually destroy each 
other. Extension cannot be the attribute of any 
simple substance ; much less can it be the attri- 
bute of God, as all in God is of necessity infinite, 
and extension can never be infinite. 

" Again, all the essential properties of a being are, 
as we have seen, identical with it. Hence all the 
attributes of the Infinite are infinite and immu- 
table. But neither are the various thoughts of 
men, nor the complex of our thoughts, immutable 
and infinite any more than extension." * 

As for the theory that all the things we see or 
take cognizance of by the senses are unreal phe- 
nomena, nothing in themselves, but various mani- 
festations of the one divine substance ; while it is 
contradictory to reason as producing real scepti- 
cism and universal doubt, it is equally repugnant 
to the primary notion of the Deity which Ave have 
already demonstrated. These varied phenomena 
would be only different positions of the divinity 
thus suffering new experiences and constant mu- 
tations. Then the distinction between the different 
things of which the world is composed would be 
only apparent, and all common sense and morality 
would be subverted. The conviction of our own 

* Rothenflue, Pars I. Sec. I. 



The Creation of the World. 139 

individuality and of the relations in which we 
stand to others, with consequent duties and rights, 
would be rendered an illusion. There could be no 
such thing as free-will or the exercise of intelli- 
gent liberty, and our whole life, physical or moral, 
would be as an empty dream. There is no con- 
viction stronger in the human mind than that of 
our own distinct existence, and of the distinct 
existence of the various things which nature presents 
to our knowledge. To overthrow this would be to 
render any knowledge impossible, to deny our per- 
ceptions of the absolute, and to give to man only 
one faculty — the faculty of doubting everything. 

No reason for such a false hypothesis can be 
given. It explains nothing. Rather upon the sim- 
ple and uncontradicted cognitions of nature it 
throws the cloud of negation and uncertainty. 
While all the problems which reason offers are easy 
of solution to a Tight mind, these theories are abso- 
lutely inexplicable, nor can they be intelligently 
received, since they involve a contradiction. To 
what end could this emanation of the divine essence 
be supposed, unless to render the Deity more per- 
fect by the constant evolution of Himself? But 
the infinitely perfect cannot advance in any grade 
of life or being, and there is nothing to be added 
to absolute reality. 



HO 



Third Lecture. 



To such contradictions and absurdities which rea- 
son rejects lead the paths of error, which begins 
by the denial of primary and essential truth. The 
light of the intellect is put out, and the testimony 
of the soul to the realities of being is ignored. 
Man ceases to be either an intelligent or moral 
agent. The beams of the Deity which shine upon 
the creature show their splendor in vain when the 
truth of our existence and the power of human 
liberty are both denied. " God, indeed, contains in 
Himself all being and all reality ; but He is not 
the aggregate of an infinite number of realities, nor 
the subject of accidents. He is the one reality and 
Being Absolute, containing in Himself all being, so 
that in the things that are, there is no being and 
no reality which are not in Him, not indeed for- 
mally, but virtually, as He can from nothing pro- 
duce the finite ; and eminently as in an infinite 
manner He possesses all that is found in things 
contingent in an inferior or imperfect mode." * He 
is the soul and life of all nature, since the forces 
of nature are from Him, and all things are sup- 
ported by His power. Thus, as we have seen in 
our demonstrations of His existence, the visible 
world gives its never-ceasing tribute of praise to 
His power and perfections. 

* Rothonflue, "Inst. Phil." 



The Ore ati ox of the Would. 



141 



Having thus briefly shown the falsity of the theo- 
ries which ignorance and infidelity have advanced 
to account for the existence of the world, we are 
prepared to prove that the universe, the complex 
of all the things that are, was created by God. 
Reason not only accepts this truth, but demands 
its acceptance of every rational mind. 

By creation we understand the actuation of any- 
thing from nothing, so that the creature which now 
exists was before its actuation nothing, both by rea- 
son of its form as also of any pre-existing matter 
of which it could be made. In this sense the 
thing created up to the instant of its creation was 
nothing. By the act of the divine will, that is 
brought into being which had before no existence, 
neither in itself nor in any subject pre-existing. By 
such an act, and by such an act alone, came the 
finite to be. No other conceivable mode of its 
existence can be imagined without the contradic- 
tion of the fundamental principles of thought. 

It is not necessary to prove the existence of the 
world, as we have already demonstrated that the 
denial is absolute and unreasonable scepticism. 
Neither are we required to repeat our proofs that 
the world is composed of finite and mutable parts. 
But that which is thus finite is contingent, and 
therefore produced. It cannot have the cause of 



142 



Third Lecture. 



its existence in itself, therefore there was a time 
wliea it was nothing. It was, then, created from 
nothing. The agent in the act of creation is and 
must be the Infinite ; for besides the finite there 
remains only the Infinite. 2so other cause can be 
conceived of, as it is manifest that the finite 
cannot produce itself, that any chain of second 
causes must lead to the First Cause, which is pro- 
duced by nothing, and is, therefore, uncreated and 
eternal. 

If, then, the Infinite alone can be the agent in 
the work of creation, that which He brings to ac- 
tuality was nothing until His almighty power pro- 
duced it. We have clearly proved the falsity and 
impossibility of any emanation, either transient or 
immanent, from the divine essence ; and so the uni- 
verse must come from nothing. There was no pre- 
existing matter from which it could be produced, 
since matter, in its atoms and in all its forms, can- 
not be eternal, and must have been created. There 
is no alternative in this reasoning. Either the 
world was eternal and therefore God, which we 
have demonstrated to be absurd, or it came from 
nothing by the will and power of the Almighty. 
And as the visible things of the universe " testify 
to His eternal power and divinity," they bear wit- 
ness to the act by which that power brpught them 



The Creatiox of the Would. 



143 



into being, and that act was and could be none 
other than creation. In no other way could He 
produce the contingent and the finite. 

The very idea of the contingent leads to the 
necessary ; and the notion of creation includes 
the metaphysical imperfection of the thing made. 
That which is created cannot be eternal, because it 
must have a beginning of existence. There was a 
time when it was not ; and beginning of existence 
is the contradiction of eternity. Neither could God 
have created the world from eternity, as then He 
would have given a beginning of existence to that 
which already existed. An eternal creation is no 
more possible than a series of successions or actual 
time without a beginning. Such a series would be 
infinite ; and the infinite, as immutable, can have no 
successions. Neither can there be an infinite num- 
ber, as number signifies the possibility of increase, 
and therefore is always finite. 

God alone is eternal. He alone Las all power; 
but contradictions to Him are impossible. He can- 
not make the finite to be infinite. By His su- 
preme will He awoke the universe from nothing 
into being, and with the creature time began in 
the moment of actuality when the eternally possi- 
ble became an existence. "If any one do not ac- 
knowledge," says the Vatican . Council, "that the 



144 



Third Lecture. 



world and all things which it contains, both spi- 
ritual and material, were produced, in all tlieir 
substance, by God, out of nothing, let him be ana- 
thema. If any one shall say that the substance or 
essence of God, and of all things, is one and the 
same, let him be anathema. If any one shall say 
that finite things, both corporeal and spiritual, or at 
least spiritual things, are emanations of the divine 
substance ; or that the divine essence, by manifesta- 
tion or development of itself, becomes all things ; 
or, finally, that God is universal or indefinite 
Being, which, in determining itself, constitutes all 
things, divided into genera, species, and indivi- 
duals, let him be anathema." * 

No objection from reason can be alleged to this 
simple truth. There is no way by w T hich the world, 
which certainly exists, could come into being, ex- 
cept by the creating act of God. To say that we 
know not the mode of creation is only to say that 
the finite has not been able to fathom the life of 
the Infinite. No one can object that the creation 
cannot be conceived of, as in the denial the con- 
trary is directly asserted. No one can deny that 
of which he has no conception. Nor is it difficult 
to understand the actuation of a possible by an 
almighty, omniscient power. We know that the 
* Dogmatic Decree, Vatican Council. 



The Creation of the World. 145 

finite world is neither eternal nor necessary, and 
must, therefore, have the cause of its existence 
out of itself, else it can never be. But it is, and 
so it came from nothing, by the force of a hand 
to which there is no impossibility but contradic- 
tion. 

In the act of creation there is no repugnance, 
neither on the part of the thing created nor on 
the part of God. The thing made before the di- 
vine act is nothing and can be no agent. The di- 
vine essence is essentially active, and the exercise 
of power is subject to His will. There is, then, no 
repugnance with His attributes that He should 
will to show His might without Himself in the 
realm of creation. To say that He could not cre- 
ate or work effects without His own being is to 
limit His perfection and omnipotence. It is to 
deny His deity. 

While, therefore, our intelligence sees that there 
can be no effect without a cause, and clearly de- 
monstrates that the adequate cause of this visible 
world is not and cannot be in itself, it leads us 
by indisputable argument to the throne of the di- 
- vinity. There alone can the first cause be found. 
And the same reason tells us how that divinity 
could give being to the universe of things contin- 
gent by the creating act alone. In no other way 



146 



Thied Lecture. 



could He awake from nothing the realm of finite 
existence, the harmony of the wondrous whole. 
Either this grand and reasonable conception of the 
Deity and His works, or the wreck of reason and 
knowledge in illusion of mind and sense, in uni- 
versal doubt. There is again no alternative. 

"The dogma of creation is the only mode of 
explaining the origin of things which answers to 
the principles of right reason. For, once admitted 
the existence of things contingent, which no sane 
mind can doubt, either we attempt to arrive at a 
necessary being who could have produced them, 
by the absurd theory of an infinite series, and we 
teach atheism ; or we say that God evolved them 
from Himself, and so are pantheists ; or we hold 
that from matter pre-existing He formed them, 
and propose dualism ; or believe that He created all 
that is from nothing. No other mode of explana- 
tion can be thought of. But atheism, pantheism, 
and dualism are contradictory to reason and can- 
not be held by any one. Therefore remains the 
dogma of creation as the only reasonable explana- 
tion of the origin of the universe." * 

This view of the creative act is in full accord- 
ance with the voice of revelation from the patri- 
archal day even to the coming of our Lord Jesus 

* Mazzclhi, " De Deo Creante," Art. III. 



The Creation of the World. 



147 



Christ So Reason with her light blends with the 
greater effulgence of the noonday. "In the be- 
ginning God created heaven and earth." Creation 
is the act, one and indivisible, of the Infinite Be- 
ing, by which through His eternal will He called 
into being all that exists, communicating to all 
finite things in their different degrees a share of 
the perfections which He possesses without limit. 
We gaze upon the work of His prolific hand and 
are filled with wonder. Being in any degree ex- 
cites the admiration of our intellects, which look 
with awe at the chasm which separates existence 
from nothingness. Omnix)otent power alone can 
cross that chasm. Before us lie the almost end- 
less varieties of life which open to the true mind 
the display of the infinite will and knowledge of 
God. In Him, the central fountain of being, they 
live and move, and show- forth the resemblance of 
the uncreated beauty. At the two extremities of 
creation are the pure spirits excelling in their 
principality, and inert matter, which of itself has 
neither activity nor motion. Between these two 
extremes is man, "a little less than the angels," 
binding together in some manner the spiritual and. 
the material worlds, himself partaking of both, and 
possessing at the same time the glory of spiritual 
life and the higher qualities of corporeal bodies. 



148 



Third Lecture. 



He looks up at all the picture of divine power 
and love spread out before Mm. There is the 
earth beneath him, with its mineral riches hidden 
in its bosom, its wonders of prolific vegetable life, 
and the more mysterious and varied powers of ani- 
mal existence. There are the stars of the heaven, 
so vast, so numerous, and so bright in their gigan- 
tic marches that the Holy Scripture calls them 
the army of the skies. There is being far beyond 
the ken of mortal vision ; there is life gushing 
forth in every domain of the almost illimitable 
space. This conception of the creative act, con- 
formed to the principles of reason and faith, is 
the most sublime and most profound which finite 
mind can form of the work of the Most High. Ia 
His eternity of infinite bliss abode the Ancient of 
days, to whom there is no time, no succession, no 
modification, no past, no future. By His will, from 
nothing arose the world of spiritual and material 
existence. From nothingness came forth the vast 
universe of life ; and the hand that awoke in the 
silence the harmony of praise, in the void the 
ranks of being, still holds the realm of power, 
where all that is, is by Him ; where all that lives, 
lives in Him, Here in the tribute of praise to the 
great Creator reason and faith meet together. 

Yet the testimony of human reason will guide us 



The Creation of the World. 149 



to a better knowledge of the created world, its 
laws and its end. All the works of God are 
marked with the perfection of His hand. Though 
the finite cannot possess all reality nor be abso- 
lutely perfect, yet the nature of the creation 
bears witness to the wisdom which framed its 
order and governs it by a watchful providence. 

The laws of nature flow from the will which 
formed the universe and disposed all creatures to 
their end. They are the evidence of the design of 
the infinite mind. Yet are they fixed laws which 
He alone can pass. No created will can touch the 
physical laws which He has ordained, by which 
matter moves as He wills, by which the day suc- 
ceeds to night, the seasons come and go, and the 
stars of heaven march in their orbits and immu- 
tably accomplish their appointed courses. There 
is nothing in the essence of the elements nor in 
the nature of matter which renders these laws 
absolutely necessary. If the force of attraction 
and gravitation be found among the qualities of 
all material things, it is not because matter could 
not be without this power. It is because the will 
of the Creator thus endows inert nature and thus 
governs the harmonious action of creatures. He 
could have ordained otherwise had He so willed. 
He could have given to the elements in their 



150 



Third Lecture. 



physical state another essence, another combina- 
tion, and greater powers unlike those they now 
possess. What are the laws of nature but the will 
of God ? These laws are not the material thing, 
which of itself has no activity. So the order of 
the world speaks to the rational intelligence ; and 
matter, not only in its existence but also in its 
obedience to law, testifies to an omniscient and there- 
fore a creating power. Unlike the moral order, 
which rests in the infinite sanctity and justice, 
the physical laws are founded in no divine per- 
fection, but depend upon the free-will of the 
Almighty, who, while He could have created an- 
other universe with a widely different order, was 
pleased to create this visible sphere with its un- 
varying rule. As He w r as pleased to ordain the 
physical laws of which nature bears evidence, so 
He alone can depart from His ow r n order, and for 
wise and just causes make by miracle exceptions 
to His rules. As the unvarying order, so the ex- 
ception, declares the presence and might of the 
Creator. 

The material as well as the spiritual creation in 
all its parts shows forth to all intelligences the 
glory of God. The finite could not be without the 
Infinite, and the Infinite could not act without an 
end. 



The Creation of the World. 



151 



Let us, then, turn our eyes for a moment from 
the creature, from being in its varied ranks, to the 
throne of the Omnipotent, to the source of life; 
and, gazing with reverence upon the inaccessible 
glory, ask the end of this display of creating power, 
the motive of the eternal will which from nothing 
awoke the prolific realm of life, and being, and 
beauty. The voice of reason, which tells us of the 
creating act, shall again reply. The end of God 
in His work can be nothing else than His own in- 
trinsic glory. The end of the thing created can 
only be to give Him praise, to magnify His wis- 
dom. Thus the Omniscient finds glory within and 
without Himself, and there can be no higher mo- 
tive, no more magnificent end. 

'•The intrinsic glory of God is the complex of 
all the divine perfections, as He, adequately know- 
ing them in their infinirude, infinitely loves Him- 
self, and by this love is filled with joy and is most 
blessed." * 

The extrinsic glory of God comes from the same 
perfections, as they are manifested to creatures and 
by them are known and loved. 

How, then, is the intrinsic glory of the Most High 
the end or motive of the creating act ? The crea- 
ture can add nothing to Him who by nature is in- 

* Bothenfiue, Pars I. Sec. III. 



152 



Third Lecture. 



finite in every good. He can seek nothing out of 
Himself. Neither can anything beyond His own 
essence be the motive of His act, else upon that 
would He be dependent. It can be only the ex- 
ercise of the divine liberty, which is an infinite 
perfection, and which finds its fulness in the choice 
to create. No necessity could compel His action, 
and, therefore, by His eternal free volition He 
glorifies His attributes in the work of His omni- 
potence. 

It is easily seen that the extrinsic glory of the 
Creator is the end of the creature thus coming 
into being by the exercise of the eternal will. The 
creation is the manifestation of the infinite perfec- 
tions in the degree which necessarily belongs to 
the finite. The things created are, in their infinite 
distance, images of the all-perfect Being from 
whose hand they come. And God, as absolute 
goodness, cannot act without showing forth His 
beneficence. He gives existence, which is the 
greatest of all gifts, and the image of His own 
eternal life. Every reality, however imperfect, is 
the faint picture of the fulness of all realities. So 
when He creates, necessarily that which He creates 
displays the omnipotence of God as the efficient 
cause, and the intelligibility of the divine essence 
as the exemplar ; while by the harmony of the 



The Creation of the World. 



153 



whole, and the subordination of means to an end, 
it presents as in an image the supreme wisdom and 
beauty. 

And the infinite sanctity, which, according to St. 
Thomas, is the love of essential order, cannot fail 
to demand that the divine goodness so manifested 
should be praised and loved. " Sanctity demands 
that all things should be praised and loved accord- 
ing to the dignity and attractions of their nature ; 
but there is nothing more worthy of love and 
praise than the perfections of God."* Therefore 
when by an eternal free volition He was pleased 
to create, He necessarily wills His own extrinsic 
glory. 

Nor could the supreme wisdom propose to itself 
any end unworthy of the infinite mind, nor un- 
fitted to the nature and constitution of the crea- 
ture. But no finite thing is worthy of the infinite, 
and therefore the outward manifestation of the 
supreme reality and beauty, or the extrinsic glory 
of the Most High, is the end of the things cre- 
ated. And to their nature and constitution this 
end well responds. The order of the world, with 
the constancy of its laws, displays the wisdom of 
its Maker, while the varying ranks of existence, 
all-wondrous as they are, reflect the light of the 

* Rothenflue, Pars I. Sec. III. 



154 



Third Lecture. 



divine knowledge and beauty. K"o absolute per- 
fection can be the portion of any created thing, 
nor is there any finite intelligence which can ade- 
quately know the limitless attributes which in 
their reflection shine forth in the creature. This 
world, all-wonderful as it is, exhausts not the 
power which has no bounds. Yet we can attribute 
to it a real perfection, as in the plan of God 
it fulfils its end, and in the degree in which He 
wills most aptly manifests the uncreated glory and 
beauty. ISo jar is ever in the harmony of the 
material universe, and even the human intelligence 
is not vast enough to read the revelations which 
are written upon the varied page of nature. The 
means which Supreme wisdom has chosen are fit- 
ted to the end with an exactness of design and a 
majesty of conception which call for the adoration 
of the creature, which, in the midst of wonders 
seemingly without end, sees the hand which form- 
ed them all, and bows down in humility and awe. 
Well do the inspired words echo the voice of the 
Most High in His wondrous works. They speak 
to the intelligence from every side, from moun- 
tain and valley, from the rocks and the seas, from 
the trees of the forest and the flowers of the field, 
from the tiny gradations of insect life to the 
mighty behemoth — " the beginning of the ways 



The Creation of the Would. 155 

of God" — from the lowest form of sensible exist- 
ence to the face of man, the pride and monarch 
of this terrestrial scene. "Where wast thou when 
I laid the foundations of the earth? Tell me if 
thou hast understanding. Upon what are its bases 
grounded, or who laid the corner-stone thereof? 
When the morning- stars praised me together, and 
all the sons of God made a joyful melody ? Who 
shut up the sea with doors, when I made a cloud 
the garment thereof, and wrapped it in a mist as 
in swaddling bands? And I said: Hitherto shalfc 
thou come, and shalt go no further, and here thou 
shalt break thy swelling waves. Didst thou since 
thy birth command the morning, and show the 
dawning of the day its place.? Hast thou entered 
into the depths of the sea, and walked in the low- 
est parts of the deep ? Have the gates of death 
been opened to thee, and hast thou seen the dark- 
some doors ? Where is the way where light dwell- 
eth, and where is the place of darkness? Shalt 
thou be able to join together the shining stars^ 
the Pleiades, or canst thou stop the turning about 
of Arcturus ? Canst thou bring forth the day- 
star in its time, and make the evening-star to rise 
upon the children of the earth ? Dost thou know 
the order of the heaven, and canst thou set down 
the reason thereof on the earth ? Canst thou send 



156 



Third Lecture. 



lightnings, and will they go, and will they return 
and say to thee, Here we are ? Who hath put 
wisdom in the heart of man ? Who can declare 
the order of the heavens, or who can make the 
harmony of heaven to sleep? When was the dust 
poured on the earth, and the clods fastened to- 
gether ?" * 

Here, then, with these inspired words which 
reason echoes from every hill and valley of earth, 
we rest our brief argument. It is a demonstration 
which no one can reject and still hold the funda- 
mental principles of human knowledge. We have 
spoken principally of the material world of which 
the senses bear testimony. But the reality of the 
spiritual is as clear, and its finite character as evi- 
dent. It is among the works of God, who is Him- 
self a pure spirit, and has created spirits to be 
the more perfect image of His intellectual per- 
fections. There is nothing finite or independent 
which can produce itself, and therefore the uni- 
verse of spirit and matter came into being and is 
by the creating will of the Infinite. God alone 
abides in His eternity, all-sufficient to Himself, 
the fulness of existence, and the fountain of all 
being. If matter, the lower creation, leads to Him, 
still more does the grandeur of the spiritual turn 

* Job xxxiii. 



The Creation of the World. 157 

with true submission and adoring love to its Au- 
thor. 

It will be seen that in this argument we have 
spoken only of the creating act, and have not dwelt 
upon the order nor manner of the great work of 
God. It is the same operation of omnipotence in 
any view, whether we see an instantaneous creation 
of visible things in their perfection, or see them 
slowly and by orderly steps developed from pre- 
created matter. In either case the difference is 
only in the mode of the divine act. Matter can 
only exist by His almighty will ; and it requires 
the same force to give to it the power to develop 
itself and to take new forms and put on new 
beauty. There is nothing in the material but that 
which God gives it. As it can have no being ex- 
cept by creation, so it can have no power of life 
or reproduction which does not come from the 
same infinite source. Perhaps it is a more sub- 
lime revelation of the Supreme intelligence when 
the creature does not at once possess the whole 
of the perfections of which it is capable, but by 
slow degrees arrives at the height of its being, 
and, participating to some extent in the creative 
power, contributes itself to the embellishment and 
beauty of the material creation. All comes frcm 
the one prolific source of life and might. We 



158 



Third Lecture. 



know that in the present administration of the 
universe the Creator thus gives to tlie tilings 
made the power of growth, of life that quickens 
others, of reproduction. The earth throws out its 
treasures ; the rocks pass through their changes ; 
the minerals are formed by regular processes ; the 
seed, dying in the ground, germinates the flower 
and fruit ; the living races of animal life have 
power to reproduce themselves. "The earth" in 
the primeval day " brought forth the green herb, 
and such as yieldeth seed according to its kind" ; 
and the living things of earth and air and water 
came forth according to their kind, and heard 
the mighty benediction which bade them u in- 
crease and multiply." All these forces to continue 
life, either vegetable or animal, are solely from 
the hand of God. They are His one living, last- 
ing, and elfective creating act. That finite things 
may be in the rank of efficient causes is the gift 
and continual operation of the First great Cause. 
There is and can be no such thing as spontaneous 
production in the strict sense. The First Cause 
always acts where there is life or being. The un- 
ceasing operation of the Creator in the preserva- 
tion and development of all that is, can be the 
only cause of the phenomena which we see pro- 
duced by the regular laws of nature. If He were. 



The Creation of the Wobld. 



159 



to cease His work or liold His hand, tlie universe 
would return to the nothingness whence it came. 

Let us see the teaching of the Angel of the 
Schools, the greatest of philosophers: " The pri- 
mordial divine act of creation terminated in three 
creatures, the spiritual intelligences, the celestial 
bodies, and the elements or simple bodies. These 
last were constituted of primordial matter and 
their respective substantial forms. At the same 
time there was concreated in the primordial matter 
a true passive potentiality for all subsequent bod- 
ily forms, so that these latter were virtually pre- 
contained in the primordial matter. Thus was com- 
pleted the work of the Mosaic six days. All the 
rest was the result of a gradual natural evolution 
— that is to soy, of an evolution effected by the 
Creator according to the laws imposed by Him- 
self on nature, and through the operation of na- 
tural causes. St. Augustine maintains that in the 
very beginning of the creation there were certain 
entities specifically distinguished in their proper 
nature, as the elements, the celestial bodies, and 
spiritual substances, while there were some in their 
seminal forces only, as animals, plants, and men, all 
of which were afterwards produced in their proper 
nature by that operation by which, after those 
six days, God administers nature already created. 



160 



Third Lecture. 



"St. Augustine maintained that the six Mosaic 
days were not meant to express succession of time, 
but succession of order. Others, Greek Fathers, sup- 
posed them, on the contrary, to represent succession 
of time. Either opinion may be safely entertained." 

According to the view of St. Augustine, 4 'in 
those first days God created the creature either in 
its cause, or in its origin, or in act, in the work 
from which He afterwards rested. Nevertheless 
He subsequently until now works according to 
the administration of created things by the work 
of propagation." "The six days were completed 
with the sowing of the seed of the future Cosmos. 
There ensued thereupon a Sabbath of rest. The 
fresh elemental world was sown with germs of fu- 
ture beauty in diverse forms of life, in diversity of 
species, and possibly varieties under the same spe- 
cies. After this Sabbath followed the order of the 
divine administration, wherein, as it continues to 
the present hour, the divine wisdom and omnipo- 
tence superintended the natural evolution of visi- 
ble tilings according to a constant order of His 
own appointing, and amid the ceaseless cycles of 
alternate corruptions and generations." Comment- 
ing upon this doctrine of St. Thomas, Rev. Father 
Harper, from whom we have thus quoted, explains 
the meaning of the " Divine work of administra- 



The Creation of the World. 



161 



tion": " There is absolutely no act whatsoever of 
any creature possible without the Divine co-opera- 
tion in the act. God can operate, as He does in 
a pure act of creation, without the co-operation 
of the creature ; but it is a metaphysical impos- 
sibility that a creature should elicit the smallest 
act without the help of God. Now, the divine 
work of administration includes even more than 
this. Two things notably fall under this His ad- 
ministration. The one is the constant order of 
laws by which the visible universe is governed. 
Among these laws are those of propagation or pro- 
duction. The second, which may be called ex- 
ceptional, is this : Evidently there must have been 
a beginning to each higher family of living things. 
Hereditary propagation must have been established 
subsequently to the production of the first pair 
in each family of life. That these primitive pairs, 
then, should have been evolved out of the poten- 
tiality of the matter without parentage, belongs to 
a special divine administration. In other words, 
God must have been the sole efficient cause of 
the organization requisite, and, therefore, in the 
strictest sense is said to have formed such pairs, 
and in particular the human body, out of the pre- 
existent matter."* 

* Harper, " Metaphysics of the School, " Vol. II. Appendix A. 



162 



Third Lecture. 



It will be seen at once how totally this doctrine 
of evolution differs from the unreasonable theory 
of modern infidels. There is in the plans of the 
Creator an evolution of the indimdital, " the gra- 
dual development of organs which pre-existed only 
in the sense that the living egg was endowed with 
an invisible, intangible, immaterial internal force 
or power capable of producing them all on the 
occurrence of the requisite external conditions." 
Thus, according to St. Thomas, the seminal forces 
created in primordial matter act out their innate 
vigor ; thus the divine operation makes the material 
concur to the perfection of His work. 

The modern theory proclaims the evolution of 
the species and the constant production of new 
kinds of animals and plants by a mere process of 
natural generation, where there can be found no 
unfolding of seminal forces or development of that 
which already existed. This false and contradic- 
tory philosophy seeks to overturn the unity of the 
divine administration, and to proclaim an indepen- 
dence of the Creator. There are limits to evolu- 
tion which reason itself sets. Says an able article 
of Professor St. George Mivart: u There is a limit 
which stands at the beginning of all species of ani- 
mals and plants considered as one great whole. 
This limit marks the commencement of life itself. 



The Creation of the World. 



163 



If the world of inorganic matter, such as limestone, 
granite, sand, water, air, is, as is commonly sup- 
posed, entirely devoid of everything like life, then 
it seems clear that such a world could never by it- 
self give rise to a living being. It seems clear that 
the action of some other and higher agency than 
the properties of such substances must have been 
needed for the first introduction of life " " That 
spontaneous generation does not now take place 
has become the conviction of the great majority 
of living scientific men — men belonging in other 
respects to the most various schools of thought. 
But if such generation cannot be made to take 
place now, it is not easy to understand how it 
ever could have occurred. A vague supposition of 
undefined and inconceivable conditions, other than 
those we know, can be no explanation ; and sure- 
ly, if anywhere, then in physical science, actual 
experience must be our guide." * 

"The modern misapplication of the principle of 
evolution has led to grave philosophical errors, be- 
cause certain recent physicists have done that for 
which Aristotle blames the first known essayists 
in philosophy. They have practically ignored the 
formal and efficient causes by which, according to 
a different order of causality, each nature is essen- 
* American Catholic Quarterly, April, 1883. 



164 



Third Lecture. 



tially constituted, and have based their theories ex- 
clusively upon the material cause. Accordingly 
they seem wedded to the strange hypothesis that 
the organism constitutes the form (the species), 
rather than that the form constitutes the organ- 
ism. In all the theories more or less based on 
protoplasm, or on the diseased bioplasm of Dr. 
Beale, theories of pangenesis or of the evolution of 
the living cell, there is consequently a fatal flaw. 
They do not account for life. They begin with or- 
ganism ; but organism connotes life. A V hence, then, 
this life? Take the first instance, and how is it 
that this particular inanimate chemical compound, 
has taken such a start? If matter evolves itself 
spontaneously into life without aid of formal or 
efficient cause, why have not the metamorphic 
rocks through all these eons of time shaken off 
the incubus of their primitive passivity, and wak- 
ened up into protoplasm, and thus secured to 
themselves the privilege of self-motion, internal 
growth, reproduction? Again, is it possible to 
imagine that brute matter, inert and purely pas- 
sive, could by its own unaided exertions pass 
from the laboratory into the kingdom of life? 
And if one mass could do it, why not all? Why 
do those venerable metamorphic rocks remain at 
the root of the geological tree unchanged ? Be- 



The Creation of the World. 



165 



cause, as the Angelic Doctor teaches, the human 
embryo goes through successive provisional stages 
of life, it in no wise follows that man is originally 
descended from inferior animals. The whole false 
theory completely ignores the action of secondary 
efficient causes in natural evolution. An efficient 
cause cannot go beyond the limits of its own na- 
tive energy." * 

We therefore repeat that there is no contradiction 
between the truths of revelation and the teachings 
of right reason. Let science continue its researches. 
Let geology and chemistry and astronomy reveal to 
us all they may. The facts which they will make 
known will only demonstrate the grandeur of truth. 
]STo discoveries can prove the falsity of the first 
principles of reason and their legitimate conclu- 
sions. The light of faith will only illumine the 
evidence of the human intelligence. God in His 
revelation cannot contradict Himself in nature. 
Rightly known, He alone can give harmony to the 
reason or peace to the heart. There is only one 
light, and this is the light of deity. All other lights 
are faint reflections of the uncreated splendor. And 
all the false beacons along the path of man's pro- 
bation are deceits to lure him from the true goal 
of his desires. They lead him to the land of uni- 
* Harper, " Metaphysics of the School," Vol. II. p. 747. 



168 



Third Lecture. 



versal darkness, where scepticism will rob Iiim of 
every ray of knowledge. There may be trials of 
faith. Difficulties may confront him as he ap- 
* proach.es the shores of immensity and lifts his 
gaze to the throne of the Infinite. But what are 
such difficulties compared with the constant con- 
tradictions which meet the unbeliever at every 
turn— contradictions which wreck the human mind ? 
Empty theories which have no basis in fact or 
logic, vain conjectures unproved by demonstration 
or experience, take the place of the certain truth 
which no man can deny unless he make his God a 
liar and himself a fool. It is indeed the day of a 
proud philosophy when the leaders of thought, as 
they boast to be, profess that they know nothing, 
and build their theories upon nescience. We fear 
not science. We deplore ignorance. If the men 
of science will be true to their reason, we will meet 
them on every field and teach them the harmonies 
of nature and of faith. We will show them how 
the human mind turns from the creature in all its 
variety and beauty to the creature's God. Let them 
continue their researches into the bow^els of the 
earth, interrogate the grand monuments of the pri- 
mitive creation, throw new light upon the wonders 
of organic life which have peopled the earth from 
the most remote ages ; let them invoke all the re- 



The Creation of the World. 167 

sources of science to put in evidence the forces em- 
ployed in the formation of the mineral masses 
which compose the solid framework of our globe. 
Let the astronomer penetrate the secrets of the 
heavens, attempt to tear aw~ay the veil which thus 
far has only been raised, trace the history of the 
worlds that roll in the immensity of space. Neither 
reason nor faith will oppose their researches. In 
the path of true knowledge they will be the guide. 
They will lead to humble adoration of the great 
First Cause, the almighty mover of all, the su- 
preme law-giver w r hose reign science proclaims. 
They will teach the true heart to bow before His 
infinite attributes ; they wall tell you of Him 
w r hose efficacious w r ord spoke the universe from 
nothingness into being, of the supreme intelligence 
that conceived the sublime plan of creation, of the 
hand that has executed the wondrous plan, and 
holds the world of being, where on every side, from 
myriad voices, from the spirits that people heaven, 
from the vast chorus of life, from nature animate 
and inanimate, comes up the glad hymn of praise 
to the Creator. 



Fourth Lecture. 



THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 



Fourth Lecture. 



TEE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. 



"And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth; and "breathed 
into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul. "—Genesis ii. 7. 

Our brief course of lectures leads us to consider 

tlie human soul, its nature and destiny. It is the 

degradation of infidelity which, contrary to all the 

dictates of reason, denies the dignity of man and 

seeks to place him among the beasts of the earth. 

Accounting for the manifestations of knowledge 

and sensation which are found in the different 

grades of animal life, by a theory of materialism ; 

the rationalists apply the same principles to man, 

and thus refuse to believe in the existence of the 

soul. To them there is nothing but matter under 

various combinations and movements ; and as all 

matter is subject to change and corruption, they 

are pleased to account for intellectual action by 

the attraction or repulsion of molecules, or by the 

extreme subtlety of the material organism. Here, 

in 



172 Fourth Lecture. 

as in the various explanations of the existence 
and qualities of matter, the modern atheist is not 
quite so sincere as the ancient pagan philoso- 
phers. The infidel of our day is more unscrupu- 
lous as to the facts of physical science, and, prid- 
ing himself upon the rejection of Christianity, he 
cares less for the testimony of reason. Yet, as 
we have seen in former lectures, he is not quite 
so far advanced in philosophy as the heathen, who 
had not the guilt of denying the truths of reve- 
lation. They who cast off all belief in the exist- 
ence of the human soul are all materialists in 
some rank ; while, with unreasonable contradiction 
of themselves, they have no sufficient answer to 
give to the great questions which concern our race 
and its destiny. Epicurus thought the human 
mind to be some most subtle body, as air or fire, 
or the purest blood, or a composition of the four 
elements. Aristotle called it a fifth element of a 
higher essence which was the complement and per- 
fection of matter. Spinoza, a leader among modern 
materialists, declares the mind to be a modification 
of the body, to which he gives the two attributes 
of thought and extension. Hobbes, an English 
philosopher, bases all knowledge upon sensation ; 
and as the senses perceive only what is material, 
matter is the only reality. The mind is physical, 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



173 



and all thoughts result from the pressure of mate- 
rial objects upon it. Sensation consists in the 
movement of particles of matter, so that when the 
movement ceases the vividness of the conception 
gradually diminishes. The atheists of our day, as 
they love to call themselves, with all the boasted 
discoveries of science, have made no improvement 
upon these theories. They content themselves 
either with the simple negation of rational philo- 
sophy or with the reiteration of the oft-confuted 
propositions of pure materialism. 

It will, then, be our purpose to demonstrate, from 
the facts which reason gives evidence of, the exist- 
ence of the human soul, its nature and its immor- 
tality. Our argument will be necessarily very brief, 
yet we trust it will contain all the essentials of a 
rigid thesis. 

I. 

THE EXISTENCE OE THE HUMAN* SOUL. 

If there be any fact of which we Lave certainty 
it is that of our own existence. No one can deny 
this, since the denial is the logical affirmation of 
the fact. Who is it that denies ? He asserts in 
terms that it is some one who has the cognition of 
what existence is, and that that being really is. He 



174 



Fourth Lecture. 



also understands what it is to affirm, and implies 
the belief in tlie principle of contradiction, that a 
thing cannot be and not be at the same moment. 
The denial of one's own existence is really im- 
possible. 

But the consciousness of existence contains in 
itself more than this. It contains the conviction 
of a distinctness of being which is not confounded 
with other entities. Consequently the certainty of 
the existence of many things is here concluded ; 
and that each man is distinct from other men, 
and from the many substances of which our senses 
testify. 

It can, therefore, be assumed as a fact not to be 
contradicted that man exists and is the superior 
of all sensible things. ' 'God created him to His 
own image and likeness, and gave him dominion 
over all living things, and over the whole earth." * 

Now, what is man, according to the testimony 
of reason ? There can be no question as to the 
existence of the body, nor that he possesses ani- 
mal life. Bat he is not simply an animal ; he is 
endowed with reason, and in this respect is far 
above the races of mere animal life. He possesses 
something to wiiich they, in all their wonderful 
powers, can make no pretension. Every body is a 

• Genesis i. 26. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



175 



distinct substance, and is what it is by its sub- 
stantial form. Bat man is such by reason of the 
principle within him possessing the qualities which 
distinguish him from the brute creation. It is 
incontestable that he thinks, perceives, deliberates, 
and wills. Man, as we know him to be, cannot 
be conceived of without these powers of reason 
and will. We see in him at once the physical 
phenomena which depend upon the general laws 
of matter ; the physiological phenomena which 
come from the special laws of his organization ; 
and the jxsychological phenomena which differ from 
either of the other and rely upon the particular 
laws of intelligence and will. In organic bodies 
we see the properties of which there is no trace 
in inert matter. There are the vital functions 
which certainly exist and work in the sphere of 
their own laws. What is their precise nature, 
and in what consists the particular force which 
produces them, we know not. We are as ignorant 
of these things as of the cause of gravitation or 
of the principle of affinity. If in the vital func- 
tions which are more or less independent of the 
intelligence, we are forced to admit an unknown 
cause and often a secret action which are not 
within the domain of observation, and which phy- 
siology is obliged to suppose without comprehend- 



176 



Fourth Lecture. 



ing them, is it possible to believe that the sci- 
ence of intellectual facts can be reduced to that 
of the organic forces ? 

Here we are obliged to admit phenomena of an 
entirely special nature, which are as distinct from 
mere organic action as that is distinct from the 
simple combinations of inert matter. It is by the 
examination and analysis of these intellectual facts 
that we can ascend to their cause and determine 
the nature of the intelligent principle or soul 
which produces them. It is certain that, besides 
the phenomena which the physiologist discovers 
with his material instruments, there are the facts 
of a widely different order, which can neither be 
seen nor touched, and whose existence we should 
never suspect, if our own consciousness did not 
assure us of them. These are the facts which be- 
long to the intelligence, by which they are made 
known ; and they are not subject, as are other 
facts, to necessary and immutable laws, but they 
come from a higher and personal force which is 
at the command of will. If we seek to conceive 
them and to explain them, we must refer to a 
personal principle which acts in and by the bod- 
ily organs to produce them. In other words, we 
must refer to the principle which constitutes our 
individuality, which answers to consciousness of 



The Immortality of the Soul. 1?7 

personal distinct existence, which is at once the 
subject of perception or judgment, and the cause 
of any act of our wills. The bodily organism, 
the nerves and muscles, will explain no intellec- 
tual phenomena, since in them there can be no 
source of intelligent or voluntary action. What- 
ever may be the subject of thought or the prin- 
ciple of volition, they are surely not among sen- 
sible phenomena. 

It is also certain that all our acts of intelligence 
and will come from one and the same principle, 
since we have equal consciousness of both, since 
we are sure that it is the same faculty in' us which 
remembers, perceives, understands, and wills. It 
is the one and simple principle, which has con- 
sciousness of its own acts, which is not a passive 
instrument by means of which are produced in us 
the necessary phenomena of nature, as those which 
result from the vital actions. Our consciousness 
attests that it is itself the immediate cause of 
voluntary acts, which it not only produces but 
produces freely ; and without being able to do all 
it may will, without being the master of the or- 
ganic movements which are subject to the laws of 
nature, it is the master of its own determinations 
which belong essentially to it, which spring from 
tlie will alone, and which it changes or modifies as 



173 



Fourth Lecture. 



it pleases. These incontestable facts prove that 
there exists in man a principle of a different nature 
from his bodily organs. 

" Consciousness makes known to us that we 
think, desire, feel, and experience numberless affec- 
tions, some of which are subject to our will, while 
others are independent of us. This ebb and flow 
of ideas, volitions, and sentiments have a point in 
which they are connected, a subject which receives 
them, remembers them, combines them, and seeks 
or avoids them. This being of which we are in- 
ternally conscious, philosophers have called the me. 
It is one and identical under all transformations ; 
this unity, this identity, is an indisputable fact 
which consciousness reveals to us. Who could 
make us doubt that the me which thinks at the 
present moment is not the same which thought 
yesterday, which thought years ago ? 

" Notwithstanding the variety of thoughts and 
desires, the changes of opinion and will, who could 
deprive us of the firm and deep conviction which 
we have that w r e are the same who experience 
them all, that there is something here within us 
which is the subject of them all % If there were 
not something in us permanent in the midst of this 
variety, the consciousness of the me would be im- 
possible. Memory and combination would also be 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



179 



impossible, for there would be within us only a 
succession of unconnected phenomena. Thinking 
is impossible without something which thinks and 
remains identical under the variety of the forms of 
thought. There is, therefore, within us a simple 
subject which connects all the changes which occur 
in it : there is a substance. In it there is unity. 
The unity which we cannot see in corporeal sub- 
stances is presented to us in the principle which 
thinks and wills, at the first instant, as a simple 
internal fact, without which all the phenomena 
which we perceive within us are absurd, and all ex- 
perience of the external world impossible. With- 
out the unity of the me there can be no sensation, 
and without sensation no experience of the beings 
around us. The permanent reality of the me con- 
sidered in itself, and abstracted from the things 
which pass within it, is a fact which Ave perceive 
in an intuition and which we express in all our 
words. If this presence, this internal experience, 
be what is called the intuition of the soul, then we 
have intuition of our soul. The variety of isolated 
phenomena, instead of proving anything against 
the unity of the intuition of the me, on the con- 
trary evidently confirms it. If we conceived only 
one fixed and identical thought, there would be 
less necessity of uniting it with the idea of a 



180 



Fourth Lecture. 



subject in which it resides ; but when there is a 
multitude of different phenomena, which cannot 
co-exist without contradiction, we must refer them 
to something constant, or else the internal world 
is converted into an absolute chaos. The intelli- 
gent principle within us is conscious of its unity 
in multiplicity, of its identity in diversity, of its 
permanence in succession, of its constant duration 
in the appearance and disappearance of phenomena. 
Either we must admit this, or we must renounce the 
legitimacy of all testimony of consciousness, and 
embrace the most complete scepticism that ever 
existed, extending it both to the internal and ex- 
ternal world. The thinking being not only per- 
ceives itself, but it knows itself as a real object, to 
which, by means of reflection, it applies the ideas 
of being, unity, permanence, and the subject of 
modifications." * 

The moment man admits his power to think and 
will, in that moment he admits the existence of a 
principle within him which we call the human 
soul. He cannot deny that he thinks ; this would 
be a contradiction. JSTor can he deny his power 
of free volition, as it is involved in the exercise of 
his intelligence. 

Experience demonstrates that Ave possess true 

*Balmes, "Fundamental Philosophy," Vol. II. pp. 347, 352. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 181 

liberty, and in many of our actions are free from 
all necessity. As reason establishes our own iden- 
tity, so do incontestable facts prove the freedom 
of the human will. We understand by free-will 
that power of the intelligent principle by which it 
determines itself to seek good and avoid evil. We 
can seek what we choose ; but the object of our 
choice is either good or some appearance of good 
which attracts our reason. We cannot will a thing 
unless we know something of it, and unless it has 
the power to attract us. The will can elicit acts, 
and even call upon the other powers of the soul, 
as the memory and understanding ; and in this 
sphere of its operations it is free from all compul- 
sion. It can choose from contraries ; it can love 
or hate ; and the terms of its action are freely 
chosen. Xothing is more certain than that Ave 
possess this true liberty. It is the unalterable 
conviction of our own consciousness, by which we 
act, and by which we measure the good or evil of 
human life. We lay out our plans and order the 
current of purposes by which our life on earth is 
directed to some end. We employ our intellects 
in this or that field of art or science. We control 
our physical organs and subject them to our wills. 
We have the perception of right and wrong ; and 
are conscious of the sense of guilt and the stings 



162 



Fourth Lecture. 



of remorse, if for the gratification of an evil desire 
we sin against our moral sense. Sucli self- accusa- 
tion and remorse would be impossible if we were 
not conscious of our freedom. Human laws accept- 
ed by every one are founded upon this fact. 

We distinguish clearly those actions which are 
necessary from those which are free. The vital 
forces act spontaneously without the concurrence 
of our wills. We know we must feel the pangs of 
hunger and thirst in famine and want. The pro- 
cesses of digestion go on according to their laws. 
Light will illumine the eye, and sound reverberate 
upon the ear. Still, we never are in doubt as to 
those actions which we know are free, and for 
which we instinctively give to ourselves praise or 
blame. No false philosophy can take from us the 
consciousness of our liberty, and no materialistic 
theory can be made the dictate of reason or the 
law of society. Such a contradiction of our inti- 
mate sense would destroy the moral principles 
which bind together men and nations. It is well 
that the infidel does not practise the principles he 
professes, and it is certain that human society 
could not exist for one moment if they were ac- 
cepted by mankind. 

The divine attributes of which we have spoken 
also demand the freedom of intelligent creatures. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 183 

since the justice and goodness of God in dealing 
with us imply the exercise of our free-will. Reason 
tells us that God is a moral governor, and that we 
are His subjects in this order of His providence. 
He does reward the good and punish the evil. 
There are consequences which, flow from evil in 
the natural order, and there are rewards attached 
to good ; and these consequences are felt often for 
many generations. Moreover, we have already 
shown the existence of a moral law, by which all 
men are bound through the will of the supreme 
legislator. Yet if men were not free to choose the 
right and reject the wrong, there could neither be 
merit nor demerit, and for us good and evil would 
be only empty words having no significance. The 
justice of God would be impugned and His good- 
ness towards us denied. We would be cheated 
with the mockery of an appearance of free-will, 
and punished for acts for which we could not be 
held responsible. The consciousness of the uni- 
versal moral law is the foundation of all human 
law ; and the adequate end of law is not only the 
punishment of the transgressor, as a warning to 
the rebellious wills of men, but as a just desert 
which our natural sense of right and wrong de- 
mands. We experience a satisfaction in the pen- 
alty meted out to the criminal, as it is the only 



184 



Fourth Lecture. 



proper expiation of his offence. The sense of pify 
for the wicked is less than our sense of justice 
which demands that crime shall be punished. In 
these facts, and the principles that flow from them, 
the whole race of men concurs ; and this unanimous 
consent can only come from the natural sense, 
which is a just criterion of truth. 

Two things are, therefore, established beyond all 
cavil : that there is a principle within us which 
thinks and wills, and that this is one and the 
same principle, which under all its variety of acts 
is identical. Reason gives this simple demonstra- 
tion, the rejection of which is the denial of all 
truth and the assertion of universal scepticism, 
which we have shown to be unreasonable and im- 
possible. The thinking and willing principle is the 
human soul, to whose existence reason bears her 
infallible testimony. 

II. 

THE JSTATUEE OF THE HUMAN SOUL. 

For greater clearness and conciseness we will 
speak first of the substantiality of the soul ; sec- 
ondly, of its immateriality; and, thirdly, of its 
spirituality. 

1. The human soul is a substance. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



185 



A substance is something subsisting by itself 
and capable of modifications. "The word sub- 
stance implies something which is under (sub- 
slat), which is the subject on which other things 
are placed. By substance we understand some- 
thing constant in the midst of variation, something 
which, although it is in various w r ays succes- 
sively, according to the variety of modifications 
which affect it, remains constant and identical 
under different transformations. When we say 
that the substance has received any new modifica- 
tion, although we understand by this that the sub- 
stance is in a new mode, we do not mean that it 
is different in itself, that it has lost its internal 
primitive being and taken a new being ; but we 
only consider this change as external, and as leav- 
ing untouched a certain base which we call sub- 
stance. If it were not so, if we did not conceive 
something constant and identical under modifica- 
tions, we could not distinguish substance from its 
modifications. The modification passes from not- 
being to being, and from being to not-being, and 
now it resigns its post to another and very differ- 
ent modification. But the substance is the same. 
It does not pass from not-being to being with the 
succession of its modifications. Ordinary language 
confirms this truth. When there is a variation of 



186 



Fourth Lecture. 



modifications we say that the substance changes ; 
that is, we conceive something which existed be- 
fore the change, and exists after it. We say that 
a modification has entirely disappeared ; we do 
not say this of the substance, but only that it is, 
or is presented to us in a different manner. We 
therefore conceive something which remains con- 
stant and identical, something which does not dis- 
appear with the disappearance of the modifica- 
tions." * 

Now, the human soul is a substance thus by it- 
self subsisting, and capable of modifications while 
it remains in its integrity. It possesses the fa- 
culty to think, perceive, and will ; and its many 
thoughts, cognitions, and volitions are its modifi- 
cations, which, while they are various, do not af- 
fect the unity nor identity of its being. This 
truth is clearly manifest and cannot be contra- 
dicted. If the soul were not a subject remaining 
identical in all its modifications, if our thoughts 
and volitions were not always in the same think- 
ing principle, we could have no memory of any 
past thought or knowledge. The present sensa- 
tion would be the only possible one, and all rea- 
soning which consists in judgment and comparison 
would be impossible. Every instant we should 
*3almcs, ' 1 Fundamental Philosophy," Vol. II. p. 332. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 187 

change, and cease to be conscious of any past. 
We should each moment with our modifications 
lose our identity. But this conclusion is not only 
absurd, but in direct contradiction with our own 
experience. 

Again, if the soul were not a substance it would 
be an accident or modification of the body, accord- 
ing to the theory of Spinoza and other material- 
ists. But such it certainly cannot be. It is not 
a constant modification of the body, always re- 
maining the same ; for we know that the soul is 
itself often modified, and therefore not in this 
sense always the same. When an accident is es- 
sentially changed it ceases to be. And if the 
soul were a continually changing modification of 
the body, it would lose its identity and cease to 
be one and the same principle. To such contra- 
dictions are they led who seek to deny the dis- 
tinct existence of the human soul, and attempt to 
explain the phenomena of thought by material- 
ism. On account of the union of the soul with 
the body, it suffers varied affections by the modi- 
fications of the different members of the body. 
Yet it is not subject to the same mutations, and 
it has its intellectual life independent of the affec- 
tions of the bodily organism. By the force of 
will it can even often triumph over the changes 



188 



Fourth Lecture. 



of the body and the physical evils to which it is 
subject. This could not be if it were only an ac- 
cident or a modification of the material frame. 
And, as we have seen, such a theory would extin- 
guish its activity and liberty, and render it the 
equal in nature and power of the world of matter. 
We must admit, therefore, that the soul, which 
we know to be one identical principle, is a sub- 
stance distinct from the body. Every man has 
the unalterable consciousness of his own identity, 
and also of the individuality which implies the 
distinct existence of his soul. " Every agent acts 
in accordance with its nature and the mode of its 
existence. Hence that which acts by itself, and 
independently of every other being, really subsists 
by itself and independently of any other being. 
But the most excellent act of the soul is the in- 
tellectual act, which, in its nature, is totally inde- 
pendent of the bodily organs. The senses per- 
ceive the particular and individual object. The 
intellect, on the contrary, perceives directly the 
universal. If, then, the intellectual soul acts inde- 
pendently of the body, it must exist indepen- 
dently of the body and subsist by itself. Let us 
add to this argument a fact from experience. One 
of the proofs of the alteration of the bodily or- 
gans in the act of sensation is that, the sensible 



The Immortality of the Soul. 189 

carried to excess corrupts the organ wliicli per- 
ceives it. A light too brilliant puts out the eye; 
a sound too loud deafens the ear. The contrary 
takes place with the intelligence of man. The 
higher it ascends in the knowledge of the truth, 
the more it enjoys ; and the greater possession of 
the higher truths does in no way prevent the per- 
ception of the verities of a lower order." * 

2. The human soul is immaterial. 

Having clearly demonstrated that the soul is a 
substance, we proceed in the second place to show 
that it is immaterial. Endowed with the faculty 
of knowing and willing, it is of necessity free 
from all physical composition ; but matter is es- 
sentially composed of parts, and therefore it is 
not a material substance. The argument is very 
simple. 

"If the soul w r ere composed of parts really dis- 
tinct, either one part w^ould know and another 
would will, or each part would both know and 
will. But both suppositions are impossible and 
absurd. By the first hypothesis the part which 
wills would not know the object of volition, and 
nothing can be willed unless it be foreknown. 
Knowledge necessarily precedes the act of voli- 
tion. Yet by the supposition only one part would 

* L'Homme, (t Mgr. De LaBoiiillerie," p. 55. 



190 



Fourth Lecture, 



be conscious of knowledge, while another distinct 
part would be conscious only of willing. And we 
are certain that in us it is the same principle 
"which both knows and wills." * The soul, then, 
could never act, as in it there would be nothing 
on which to found a volition, no perception of 
an object to be desired. 

If, according to the second hypothesis, every 
part of the soul possessed the faculty of knowing 
and willing, then really there would be as many 
souls as there are parts, and it would be not the 
composition which acts, but the simple principles 
to which intellectual activity is attributed. The 
same argument may be drawn from the various 
sensations which the soul experiences, none of 
which are divided, but by one principle are per- 
ceived and compared with each other. 

"Matter, whatever opinion may be entertained 
of its essential property, is necessarily a composite 
being ; matter without parts is not matter. A 
composite being, although called one, inasmuch as 
its parts are united together and conspire to the 
same end, is always a collection of many beings ; 
for the parts, though united, are still distinct. If 
sensation could be predicated of a composite be- 
ing, the sensitive would not be a single being, but 

* Rothenilue, " Inst. Phil.,'' Vol. II. p. 124. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



191 



a collection of beings. But sensation belongs es- 
sentially to a being which is one, and if divided 
is destroyed ; therefore no composite being, how- 
ever well organized, is capable of sensation. If 
we observe what takes place in us, and reason from 
analogy to other sensitive beings, we shall discover 
amid the variety of sensations a single being which 
perceives them. It is one and the same being that 
hears, sees, touches, smells, and tastes ; that remem- 
bers sensations after they have disappeared ; that 
seeks them when agreeable, and avoids them when 
unpleasant — enjoys the former and suffers in the 
latter. If we imagine a flow and ebb of sensations 
without any connection, without a constant being 
to experience them, the result will be not a sen- 
sitive being, but a collection of phenomena, each 
one of which by itself alone offers the same diffi- 
culty as all united — the necessity of a being to 
experience them. Let us take a being composed 
of two parts, and see if it can acquire the sensa- 
tion of sound. If both parts perceive, either both 
perceive the whole sound, or each a portion of it. 
If both perceive it entire, one of them is super- 
fluous. If each part hear the sound, not entire, 
but only a portion of it, we shall have a divided 
sound ; and what is the division of a sound ? But 
even such an imaginary . division does not serve 



192 



Fourth Lecture. 



to explain the phenomenon ; for the part of the 
sound perceived by one will never be heard by the 
other, and there never, therefore, will result a com- 
plete sensation. Shall we suppose the two parts 
to be in relation and to mutually communicate 
their corresponding sensation? Then we really 
have not one sensation only, but as many as 
there are parts ; not one sensitive being only, but 
many. The hypothesis of communication of the 
parts recognizes the necessity of unity to consti- 
tute sensation. The object of this communication 
is that each one may perceive the whole ; the sen- 
sation, therefore, must be wholly in one subject. 
So at the very time that unity is denied it is ac- 
knowledged to be necessary. The supposed parts 
are either simple or not ; if they are simple, why 
persist in advocating materialism when w T e must 
finally return to simple beings? It is a manifest 
contradiction to say that sensation is an eifect of 
organization, and yet place it in a simple being 
which cannot be organized. There is no organiza- 
tion where there are no parts organized."* 

The human soul also possesses the faculty of 
thinking, and cannot be conceived of without this 
faculty ; but it is absolutely impossible for mat- 
ter to think ; therefore the soul is immaterial. 
* Balmes, "Fundamental Philosophy, * Vol. I pp. 255-257. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 193 

It is impossible for a substance composed of 
parts, as matter is, to think. It can neither have 
the idea of a simple or composite object, nor can 
it reason and judge. 

The idea of a simple object, as of truth or 
beauty, or of the relation between the predicate 
and the subject, cannot be perceived by a being 
composed of parts. Under such a supposition this 
idea would be, as we have demonstrated in the 
case of sensations, either entire in the single parts, 
or only in one of the parts, or divided among 
them all. If it were entire in the single parts, 
the result would be, not one idea, but as many 
as there are parts. If it were in only one of the 
parts, this part alone would think or perceive, and 
the rest of the composition would be inactive. If 
it were divided among the parts, then there is no 
possibility of one idea. Besides, who could think 
of a part of a simple idea, divide the notion of 
the true and the good, or the relation between 
predicate and subject % 

The conception of a composed object is just as 
impossible, since, as before, either the single parts 
1 conceive the whole object, or one part alone per- 
ceives it, or the object is divided and no part re- 
ceives the knowledge of the whole. Here again we 
are forced to admit the necessity of simplicity for 



184 



Fourth Lecture. 



our perceptions. It is possible to divide the vari- 
ous dimensions of a composite object, but they 
cannot be brought into one conception without 
unity in the principle thinking and perceiving. 
He who sees part of an object sees not the whole. 

To reason and judge requires comparison, by 
which one idea is compared with another, and 
often through the medium of a third. The same 
subject must then possess these various ideas in 
order to the operations of reason. But a com- 
posed substance cannot entertain this comparison, 
since the same demonstration returns. Either every 
part of the reasoning principle possesses all the 
ideas involved, and then there are as many judg- 
ments as there are such parts ; or all the parts 
have a portion of the argument, and no judgment 
is possible ; or one alone judges and compares, and 
hence it is not the composite object which rea- 
sons, but only one part of it. Simplicity is abso- 
lutely necessary for any intellectual act, and the 
soul which thinks, and wills, and reasons cannot 
be material. 

But, on the hj'pothesis that the soul is material 
and still has its undeniable power of thought, 
whence could it derive this faculty ? There is no 
conceivable way in which this power could be im- 
parted to it. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



195 



Matter, as such, does not think or perceive. We 
know of nothing material which possesses this 
faculty. A material soul, if such could be con- 
ceived, could not have the power of thinking, from 
its own nature, else all the things material would 
think. 

There is nothing in the form of matter which 
could be the source of thought. Change matter 
as you will, you will never produce perception or 
sensation. There is no form to thought, which 
equally perceives all and even contrary forms. 

Nor would any motion given to a material thing 
convey to it the gift of intelligence. You may 
move it in every conceivable way and modify it 
at your will , you may bring the force of electric 
action to bear upon it with all the effect of mod- 
ern discoveries — you will never succeed in eliciting 
one sensation or one sign of perception. 

It is not necessary to know all the properties of 
matter ; we know some of them, and know that all 
material things are composed of parts, and that 
thought must be the property of a simple sub- 
stance. 

Again, matter is always extended, and a being 
with extension is incapable of reflection. For the 
act of reflection is an introversion of the think- 
ing principle upon itself, with the comparison of 



196 Fourth Lecture. 

past impressions and the application of the judg- 
ment ; but matter cannot turn upon itself except 
as part turns upon part, in which case there is 
no unity of perception or judgment. And every 
one is conscious that the mind returns entire upon 
itself and clearly sees its own modifications, which 
not only do not pass away during the exercise of 
reflection, but even become more vivid and con- 
stant. "The exclusion of extension is evidently 
inferred from the unity and identity of the think- 
ing principle ; for that which is composed of parts 
acts, according to its nature, by parts, which, as 
they are distinct from each other, have, each in its 
place, their own action, and never act as one prin- 
ciple. And every one is certain that it is by one 
and the same faculty that he apprehends any 
object, however great it may be, and that all its 
parts are the term of the one power of apprehen- 
sion." * 

A little reflection will, then, convince any rea- 
sonable mind that the intellectual phenomena can- 
not belong to a subject divisible and extended, 
nor find their principle in matter. Thought and 
judgment are voluntary acts, as we have seen — 
simple, immaterial modifications which present no 
sensible form, and absolutely have nothing in com- 

* Liberatore, "Comp. Logicae," p, 225. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 197 

mon with the properties of bodies. Their distinct 
characteristic is absolute unity. Our conscious- 
ness seizes them and embraces them in their whole 
by a perception indecomposable which excludes 
all idea of parts or extension. "It is evident that 
modifications of this nature are incompatible with 
a composed or material subject ; for every modi- 
fication is only a manner of being of the sub- 
stance in which it appears. How, then, can one 
attempt to unite or identify two things of a dif- 
ferent nature which mutually exclude each other? 
When materialists speak of thought as a product 
of the brain or the effect of an organic action, 
they are forced to regard it as an abstraction 
without reality, or an unknown result subsisting 
by itself after the manner of the vital actions. 
But it is not thus that consciousness and obser- 
vation represent to us thought and intellectual 
acts. Let the intelligence perceive, compare, judge, 
and will by itself, or by the aid of the external 
organs, the phenomenon is appreciated by the one 
thinking principle in which resides our individu- 
ality, and belongs to the soul, which has the con- 
sciousness of it, and of which it is only a form or 
particular modification. If this form of which we 
are immediately conscious bears no resemblance to 
the forms of matter, if it has no quality of ex- 



198 



Fourth Lecture. 



tension or composition, how can the soul which 
it modifies be divisible or extended ? 

In one word, thought is not only an effect ; it is 
a mode of being of the principle which produces 
it, which perceives and preserves it ; it is the 
soul thinking, judging, and willing. Either this 
state of the soul should manifest itself to the 
consciousness under the form of material pheno- 
mena, or we must admit that it has no relation 
to matter, and that the thinking principle cannot 
be confounded with it. If the subject of thought 
be material it can only receive modifications of the 
same nature, and then the intellectual facts could 
only reveal themselves to the intimate sense under 
the forms of matter." * 

3. The human soul is spiritual. 

Having now seen that the soul is not a material 
substance, we are prepared to demonstrate its spi- 
rituality. 

"By spirituality we understand something more 
than simplicity. Simplicity only excludes the com- 
position of parts, while spirituality, in addition to 
this, excludes any dependence upon matter. That 
this belongs to the human soul can be inferred 
from the fact that the intellect is not an organic 
faculty ; and a faculty cannot exceed the perfec- 

* " Encyclopedie du XlXe. Steele," Vol. II. p. 330. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



199 



tion of the principle from which it flows." * Sim- 
plicity may be attributed to- the elements of mat- 
ter, and therefore it is not sufficient to know that 
the soul is immaterial. By a spiritual substance 
we understand one intrinsically active and endow- 
ed with the power of knowing and willing. "An 
absolutely inactive being is one without intelligence 
and will, without sensibility, without any kind of 
consciousness, containing in itself nothing which 
can change its own state or that of anything else. 
A being of this nature, regarded in general, pre- 
sents only the idea of an existing thing. We may 
also consider it as a substance, supposing it not to 
adhere as a modification in another, or rather sup- 
posing it as a substratum capable of receiving 
modifications by the action of other bodies. When 
the ideas of inertness and inaction are explained, 
their opposites, the ideas of activity and action, are 
clearly understood. When we conceive of a being 
which has the reason of its changes within itself, 
we conceive of an active being. When we con- 
ceive of a being which knows, wills, perceives, or 
has consciousness in any way, we conceive of an 
active being." + 

The human soul is thus intrinsically active, and 

* Liberator©, p. 226. 

f Balmes, " Fundamental Philosophy ," Vol. II. p. 486. 



200 



FOVBTH LeCTUBE. 



therefore spiritual. By its own power, without the 
concurrence of any extrinsic principle whatever, it 
can apply itself with the advertence of reason to 
the term of its choice ; and this is sufficient evi- 
dence of its spirituality, since in this action it is 
distinct from any element of matter or from any 
action or reaction of atoms. Possessing an intrin- 
sic activity entirely independent of any material 
thing, it is essentially spiritual. That the human 
soul possesses the power of thus knowing and will- 
ing has been amply demonstrated. But such an ac- 
tive principle is entirely distinct from the elements 
of matter. These elements are by nature inert, 
and are incapable of any intrinsic determination 
by which they can change their condition. That 
they may be modified, the application of an ex- 
trinsic force is necessary. Thus the attributes of 
matter and those of the soul are contradictory, and 
cannot exist together in the same subject. And as 
attributes flow from the essence of a thing, the 
distinction between material elements and the soul 
is complete. 

If the operations of the mind depended in any 
sense upon the action or reaction of the elements 
of matter, they would be the effects of matter, and 
as such should be in proportion with their cause. 
But this is not the case, since often the slighter ac- 



The Immortality of the Soul. 201 

tion of the elements will more violently excite the 
mind than the greatest material movements. A 
slight sound which strikes the senses will often 
produce greater effects upon the soul than the 
loudest reverberation. Operations so essentially di- 
verse require an essentially distinct principle. 

The impressions produced upon the mind are 
not only not in proportion with material action, 
but we are able to correct several impressions 
which would often deceive us. This correction con- 
stantly takes place with the use of reason, which 
we instinctively apply, that our senses may not 
under certain circumstances mislead us. Thus we 
properly estimate distances, and subject sound, and 
sight, and feeling to the test of judgment. 

Words which are totally different in their sound 
have in various languages the same signification, 
and produce, therefore, upon the mind the same 
effect. If mental operations were only the effect 
of some organic motion or affection of the brain, 
this could not be the case. The intelligent prin- 
ciple in man is, then, independent of all material 
action in its own intrinsic life. It rises far above 
mere sensation, which may be attributed to the 
brute creation, and in its operations goes beyond 
the sphere of sensible things ; considers truths 
which have no connection with the impressions of 



202 



Fourth Lecture. 



sense, and is able to see the abstract relations of 
beings and to admire the true, the beautiful, and 
the good. It can even discern the illimitable at- 
tributes which belong to the necessary Being, the 
Infinite. By its free-will it can turn from the at- 
tractions of the senses and despise the pleasures of 
earth, while it seeks for intellectual and spiritual 
joys. Such a principle, which rises above all mere 
material action, which is the master at will of the 
senses, must be totally distinct from matter. 4 'The 
will is not limited to the good which the sensitive 
organs affect, the animal life ; but has a certain im- 
mensity of capacity and desire. It can seek that 
which exceeds all conditions of bodies or matter, 
and for this higher good contemn all things cor- 
poreal and sensible. In this action it cannot be 
moved by any organic power, for by such objects 
as truth, virtue, and honor the bodily organs can- 
not be affected. It possesses the true liberty of in- 
difference to act or not to act ; but a faculty de- 
pendent upon bodily organs is necessarily deter- 
mined to act by the presence of the object. Not 
even the divine power could endow a material sub- 
stance with the intellectual faculty, since there is 
between the qualities of matter and thought an in- 
trinsic repugnance. Matter by itself is not even 
capable of sensitive perception, although the soul, 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



203 



which informs the body, can in it and by it exer- 
cise its intrinsic activity.'** If there be anything 
incontestable in human science, it is that proper- 
ties which are contradictory and mutually destroy 
each other cannot subsist together in the same sub- 
ject. But the attributes of matter and those which 
belong to the thinking principle are thus, as we 
have seen, contradictory. " The attributes of mat- 
ter or of bodies are a quantitative individuation, 
distinction of parts, a certain measure of place and 
time, figurability, inertia as to motion, and the like. 
Wherefore, as the operation can never exceed the 
perfection of the subject operating, every opera- 
tion of bodies is bound by these conditions just 
mentioned, nor can it ever be employed upon an 
object which is not affected by them. But thought 
respects things universal and incorporeal, is referred 
to the same indivisible agent, is perfected by reflec- 
tion, distinguishes from all figure, place, or time, 
and enjoys both constancy and vitality. Therefore 
it demands a principle and subject free from mat- 
ter, composed of no parts, circumscribed by no^ 
space or time, and endowed with native activity 
and spontaneity." f 

We gather the spirituality of the soul not only 

* Tongiorgi, "Inst. Phil.," L. II. Cap. I. 
f Liberatore, p. 228. 



204 



Fourth Lecture. 



from its intellectual powers, which surpass all the 
possible attributes of matter, but also from its 
mode of perceiving and knowing, in which organic 
action cannot enter. This is seen not only in the 
perception of spiritual truths which matter can 
neither touch nor explain, but even in the know- 
ledge of material things. The mind considers bod- 
ies not merely as they represent themselves to 
the senses, but it removes all the circumstances of 
time and place, and other adjuncts which are indi- 
vidual to them. As St. Thomas says, " it has cog- 
nition of bodies by an immaterial, universal, and 
necessary knowledge." It passes from the particu- 
lar to the universal, from the species to the genus. 
Activity dependent upon the organs of the body 
must be closed within the narrow confines of the 
material world, remain alwavs under the dominion 
of the present organic impression, and can never 
reach the abstract or the universal. Everything in 
nature rejoices in its like and receives new vigor 
therefrom, while by its contrary it is saddened and 
weakened. But the human soul seeks after the 
goods which are wholly spiritual, and in these it 
has its highest joy, as in these it becomes more 
noble, more bright, and more powerful in its ac- 
tivity ; while, on the contrary, it sinks in its life 
beneath the weight of bodily pleasures, becomes 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



205 



weak and vile. So it vindicates its dignity, as 
neither of earth nor of matter, as a spirit with 
its mighty gifts. 

As a substance immaterial and spiritual, the hu- 
man soul is not produced, nor can it derive its ex- 
istence from anything pre-existing. It is created 
from nothing by the power of God. 

It is not, as some false philosophers have assert- 
ed, an emanation of the divine substance, which is 
perfect and immutable, and incapable either of di- 
vision or modification. Such a theory contradicts 
the essential notes of deity, and is therefore im- 
possible. The human soul is finite and subject to 
continual mutations, and cannot exist of itself. 

Neither can it be produced by the law of genera- 
tion. The souls of the parents are simple and spi- 
ritual, and cannot be resolved into parts or commu- 
nicated. The bodies of the parents are material 
and extended, and could never of their substance 
produce a spirit. For, as we have plainly seen, the 
attributes of a spirit and those of matter are con- 
tradictory. No substance can impart that which 
it does not possess. 

The soul, therefore, must come from nothing, 
from no pre-existing object, by the creating act of 
God. And this act is in the power of the Infinite 
alone. It supposes an omnipotence which belongs 



206 



Fourth Lecture. 



solely to God, which can be shared by Him with 
no other being. Tims the sonl comes from Him, 
and in this sense vindicates its high origin. Its 
end is the knowledge of God in a true love and ser- 
vice, that it may attain beatitude. So, as its end 
is God, He is its principle by the divine act of 
creation. At the moment of the existence of each 
individual man the soul is created by the divine 
hand, with power to inform the body ; and thus 
man begins to be. To the being of man is re- 
quired this union of body and soul, and there is 
a physical and substantial union of both, so that 
from two distinct substances one subject and one 
nature shall arise. From this relation there re- 
sult in man operations and properties different 
from the properties and operations of either body 
or soul ; hence there is a physical and substantial 
union. Thus man realizes his own unity and iden- 
tity with the double properties of spirit and mat- 
ter. "Man perceives himself to be extended, and 
distinguishes in himself various parts with affec- 
tions which are proper to them. The body, which 
is material, could of itself have no sensation ; and 
the soul, which is immaterial, could be conscious of 
no extension. It could not of itself receive the im- 
pressions of material objects, having no surface 
which they could touch. There is also in man 



The Immortality of the Soul. 207 

spontaneous motion which could not come from 
the body alone, nor from the soul alone, as mat- 
ter cannot determine itself to motion, nor can spi- 
rit be moved locally after the manner of bodies. 
Again, the sensitive appetites do not pertain to 
the soul alone, because they include in their con- 
ception a corporeal modification ; nor to the body 
alone, which is incapable of appetite. The human 
person is not the soul alone, much less the body 
alone : it is composed of soul and body. And this 
substantial union of the soul with, the body is seen 
in this, that it pervades and penetrates the body, 
and associates and mingles its own vitality with the 
faculties of the body." * Thus arises the identi- 
ty of the human person, which is the composed 
substance of the individual man. And, this indi- 
vidual substance remaining, the same human per- 
son remains. The same soul remains identical and 
as to its substance immutable ; the same body re- 
mains, and none of its modifications destroy its 
identity ; and there abides also the same mode of 
union by which they are one. This union is not 
only personal ; it is also natural, and such that 
there results not only one person, but also one na- 
ture. 

It follows, then, from the principles of reason 

*Tongiorgi, "Inst. Phil.," L. III. Cap. II. 



208 



Fourth Lecture. 



that the intellectual soul is united to the body as 
a substantial form. It is not an accident of the 
corporeal organization. It makes, by its presence 
or union, the body to be a human body. " Ac- 
cording to St. Thomas, two things are required 
that one thing should be the substantial form of 
another. First, that it be a principle communi- 
cating to it a substantial actuality, not by any 
action upon it, but by an intimate union. Sec- 
ondly, that both elements shall unite in the par- 
ticipation of the same being, which, communicated 
by one, is received by another. Now, both these 
things take place in the union of the soul and 
body. By it there arises in man one substance 
which lives and thinks, whose parts — namely, the 
soul and body — participate in the same operation 
and hence in the same being. 

" Again, the body is surely living in man. It is 
a living substance. But whence is it living ? Surely 
not by itself, but by the soul. Therefore the soul 
is the principle which, by the communication of 
itself, determines the body as to its essence, that it 
may have life. So is it the substantial form." * 

The General Councils of Vienna and of the Late- 
ran condemn the proposition which denies that the 
rational or intellectual soul is the form of the hu- 

* Liberatore, u Comp. Metaphysics," Pars II. Cap. II. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 209 

man body. And the language of Pius IX. , in a 
dogmatic letter to the Archbishop of Cologne, de- 
clares that it is the Catholic opinion and doctrine 
that "the rational soul is by itself the true and 
immediate form of the body." 

Hence it follows that the soul, as to its essence, 
is entire in the whole body and in every part of it. 
It gives life and subsistence to the whole subject 
and to all its parts. Thus St. Thomas says: "If 
the soul were united to the body only as a princi- 
ple of movement, it could be said that it might 
be only in one part, by means of which the other 
parts might be moved. But because it is united 
as a form it is necessary that it should be in the 
whole body and in every part thereof, since it is 
not an accidental but a substantial form. For the 
substantial form is not only the perfection of the 
whole, but also of all its parts." * That it may 
truly be the principle of life its substance must 
be present wherever life is manifested. There is no 
life in the body where it is not. And being a sim- 
ple and unextended substance, wherever it is pre- 
sent it is present entire. Thus it is the life of all 
the organs, according to their different ends. It 
feels in all the parts of the organism ; it hears with 
the ear and sees with the eye. So is it, as a spi- 
* "Summa," Pars L Qua3s. 76, A. 3. 



210 



Fourth Lecture. 



rit created by God for this special purpose, in the 
whole body, penetrating and pervading in its sim- 
plicity the whole organism. These conclusions to 
which reason guides us are in perfect accordance 
with the inspired narrative of man's creation. "The 
Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth," 
and from pre-created matter shaped the human 
body. But it had no life, no more than the rocks 
or earth of the primeval day. It was an animal 
form more noble than that of any living thing 
which He had made. The marks of superiority 
and dominion were stamped upon it ; but it was 
inert and motionless. Then the Creator "breathed 
into his face the breath of life, and man became a 
living soul/' So is it at every production according 
to the laws of nature, which are only the mode of 
the divine administration, giving to matter powers 
which by nature it has not, and making it concur 
to the development of created life. The body is not 
the man, nor is it of itself living. The Lord God 
breathes the living, spiritual soul into the organism, 
and man exists, the reasoning, intellectual man in 
the unity of two substances, corporeal and spiritual, 
one human person. So from the spirit which in- 
forms the body comes activity with intrinsic life 
and mental power. "Man becomes a living soul." 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



211 



III. 

THE HUMAN SOUL IS IMMORTAL. 

Having demonstrated the immateriality and spiri- 
tuality of the soul, we are prepared to establish, on 
the testimony of reason, its immortality. 

By immortality we mean not simply existence 
such as belongs to the elements of matter, but 
the perpetual continuation of the life, which con- 
sists in intrinsic activity, in the power of thinking, 
perceiving, and willing. The human soul, created 
by Almighty God and endowed with this power, 
is naturally immortal. It does not possess life by 
its essence, as God, who is essentially eternal ; but 
its nature is such that once in being it will natu- 
rally live, since there is no created thing which can 
deprive it of its life, and there is no possibility of 
decay or corruption within itself. 

The arguments to prove its immortality are drawn 
from the nature of the soul, from the common sense 
of: mankind, and from the end which is manifest 
in its creation. 

1. The soul is by nature simple and spiritual. 
It cannot be essentially modified so as to lose in 
any way its reality of being. There is no such 



212 



Fourth Lecture. 



thing as a dissolution or corruption of parts, which 
may occur in substances composed. If it perish at 
all it must perish instantly and by annihilation. 
And there is no created thing, matter or spirit, 
which has the power to annihilate it. That power 
only can annihilate a spirit which was able to 
create it. It will live for ever, always intrinsically 
active, always possessing the power of knowing 
and willing. And this power, which is essential to 
its being, cannot be impeded by any created exist- 
ence, as there is always present the object of its 
activity. The soul is always conscious of itself, of 
its affections and experiences, and can never cease 
to act, unless the almighty hand which drew it 
from nothing be pleased to strike it from being 
and annihilate it. There is no reason to think 
that God, who gave it a life which would natu- 
rally endure for ever, will thus interfere and defeat 
the ends of its nature, and spoil the spirit which 
He has so richly endowed. It would argue a con- 
tradiction in the infinite mind thus to create a 
naturally immortal soul, and then without reason, 
and as if in contradiction to His purpose, to an- 
nihilate it. The purpose of God is shown in the 
high faculties of the human spirit, in its posses- 
sion naturally of interminable life. Why did He 
thus endow it, but that it might live for ever? 



The Immortality of the Soul. 213 

Why did He place its being beyond the reach of 
all possible change or dissolution, and make it an 
image of His own eternity? To imagine the creat- 
ing hand stretched out in the work of destruction, 
to put out one by one the spirits which rejoice in 
their life, is to make infinite power contradict 
itself. It cannot be that creation and annihilation 
shall come from the same omnipotent source. 

Nor does the death of the body in any way 
militate against our argument. The body is ma- 
terial and naturally is subject to decay. There 
are many causes which work its dissolution. It is 
not naturally immortal. It is naturally mortal. 
But there is no reason why the soul should perish 
because the body sickens and dies. It is not, like 
the souls of the beasts, intrinsically dependent 
upon the bodily organism. It is not a merely sen- 
sitive soul. Its operations are, like its essence, spi- 
ritual. Its life is in the intelligible, and when the 
body falls the prey of death it can act with all 
its vital force. The knowledge of things intellec- 
tual does not require the concurrence of the body. 
Nay, w r hen separate from the body it may be more 
free to know,, more wholly spiritual in its intelli- 
gent life. The soul is the substantial form of the 
body. The body is not the form of the soul. The 
soul will not perish when the separation of death 



214 



Fourth Lecture. 



comes, unless at that fatal moment God be supposed 
to annihilate it. No argument against the im- 
mortality of the soul can be drawn from the death 
of the body, since the spirit is essentially inde- 
pendent of it, operating, indeed, in and by the 
organs which it informs, but not the creature of 
the body. When the living soul departs from its 
physical frame which it animated, the man is dis- 
solved and dies, but the blow of death strikes not 
the immaterial. The life which God once breathed 
into that mortal clay still lives, and cannot die. It 
is credibly asserted by scientists that among the 
many vicissitudes and changes of bodies no par- 
ticle of matter will be annihilated, There even 
seems in this opinion a fitness which suits our 
notion of the grand creative act. If in the disso- 
lution of the human body its primitive elements 
shall not perish, how can the Creator be supposed 
to strike from life and being that more noble sub- 
stance, the human soul? 

And if the infinite wisdom were to annihilate 
anything which He has made, surely there must 
be a motive worthy of the divine mind. Bufc 
there is no conceivable motive why the spirit of 
man after death should be reduced to nothing- 
ness. Rather, while reason shows us no such mo- 
tive, it tells us that God owes it to His own attri- 



The Immortality of the Soul. 215 



butes to keep in existence the wonderful life which 
He has made naturally immortal. 

2. The common sense of mankind gives a testi- 
mony in favor of the immortality of the soul 
which must have its foundation in truth. We 
may say that among men the conviction that there 
is a future life has been constant and universal. 
This conviction so general is founded upon the in- 
spirations of nature. It is indestructible in the 
conscience, and no effort of false philosophy can 
eradicate it. Even those who pretend to deny it 
are reasoning against their own convictions and 
are not honest in their disbelief. It is doubtful if 
any one ever really believed that the soul perishes 
with the death of the body. "One of the most 
striking proofs of the immortality of the soul," 
says Cicero, "is that nature herself instinctively 
believes it, and that all men are keenly solici- 
tous as to that which shall happen after death." 
"When we reason upon the immortality of the 
soul," says Seneca, "it is no feeble argument 
that all peoples consent in the fears and hopes of 
another life." Man has always and everywhere 
had the sentiment of this truth ; and among bar- 
barous nations as well as among cultivated tribes 
we find this belief under various forms in the 
hopes of future happiness for the good* and JliQ 



216 



Fourth Lecture. 



fear of coming misery for the evil. All the re- 
ligions of the earth, however depraved and gross 
they may be, are disposed to prepare men for this 
life after death. Religion, which is natural to the 
human heart, would have no sanctions on earth, 
if men were not convinced of their own accounta- 
bility in the scene beyond the grave. The con- 
viction of the soul's immortality is one of those 
imperishable traditions which has its roots in the 
nature of man. It is stronger than the passions 
which it restrains, or the appetites which it calls 
to account. It is not an invention of philosophers, 
who, with all their reasoning, could never make 
the knowledge of a truth universal or touch the 
structure of the human conscience. Like the sense 
of right and wrong which is implanted in our 
nature, it testifies to our dignity and to our hopes. 
We know that we are not of the clods of the earth. 
We know that we are far above the brute crea- 
tion. We are conscious that we are the lords of 
this terrestrial sphere, where mind rules matter, 
and physical strength is unequal to the power of 
intellect. No specious sophism can take from us 
this sense of our greatness, or extinguish in us the 
light of hope. The dignity of our nature speaks 
out in tones that cannot be misunderstood, and 
tells us of our immortality. Who but the Author 



The Immortality of the Soul. 217 

of nature could so impress tlie great heart of 
humanity ? Men have denied in words every prin- 
ciple of morality. They have sought to attack the 
attributes of God and His moral government ; they 
have made of the future a scene of animal plea- 
sure ; they have even refused to believe in a Deity. 
They have not been able to make popular the 
theory of their own annihilation. Nowhere has 
man been able to force the conviction of his own 
entire destruction by the dissolution of death. 
Whence, then, this unanimity in the confession of 
a life beyond the tomb, if it be not founded in 
the inspirations of nature itself? This strong 
foundation of truth could alone give it its sta- 
bility and its universality. We indeed hear in 
our own day the loud assertions of the infidel 
and materialist. They are more bold than the 
heathen. They tell us that there is no substance 
but matter, and that all forms of matter are perish- 
able. We have sufficiently answered these false 
and contradictory theories. The soul is not and 
cannot be material. But even science cannot indi- 
cate to us that any of the elements of matter will 
' ever totally perish. Reason refutes the supposition 
of the death of the spiritual. And in their insane 
ravings they are the witnesses of the truth they 
deny : they prove that they know the soul within 



218 



Fourth Lecture. 



them to be above matter ; they confess to some 
kind of morality, which could not be if there were 
no intellectual soul ; and they cannot divest them- 
selves of the fears of the future. They cannot die 
like the beasts. They cannot live in peace the life 
of the Epicure, and eat and drink as if on the 
morrow the possibility of sensuous pleasure would 
die in the annihilation of all. 'No ; the infidel' s 
creed will not be his support in the hour when 
nature fails and dissolution approaches. Then 
comes, in spite of theories, the fear of a coming 
account, the terrible truth of immortality; and in 
the wreck of physical strength nature vindicates 
her right to teach and to command. The voice 
that speaks with power to sting the conscience or 
light the torch of hope is the voice of reason. 
And when right reason speaks it is the voice of 
God. 

3. The Infinite wisdom, as all must confess, never 
w r orks without an end ; and man, one of His 
greatest creations, has his place in the universe ; 
and, with his rights and duties, the means to glo- 
rify his Maker in the attainment of his end. No 
other view can be consistent with the first princi- 
ples of reason. Everything which God has made 
has its place in the grand whole of creation, its 
part to play in the harmony of the varied forms 



The Immortality of the Soul. 219 

of being and life. Man stands above all living 
or inanimate things in our world, with higher fac- 
ulties and therefore with a higher destiny. God 
has implanted within him the unquenchable de- 
sire for felicity which cannot be attained in this 
scene of trial and probation, which can only come 
in the knowledge and possession of the infinite 
Good, from which his high endowments flow. This 
felicity for which he aspires, and without the at- 
tainment of which he will not be at rest, cannot 
be reached in this life ; therefore there must be 
another life in which he may accomplish his end 
and acquire that beatitude for which nature longs. 
Beatitude, to be complete, requires the possession 
of all good as far as the subject is capable of 
it. It is an abiding state of true joy arising from 
the clear vision of the true good which w T e pos- 
sess. To this beatitude we turn by the invincible 
propensity of nature. This propensity is instinc- 
tive ; it is acquired by no labor or repeated acts ; 
it comes from our Creator. We cannot cease to 
seek this beatitude, and we are not satisfied until 
it be attained. 

Now, this beatitude to which nature turns can- 
not be ours in this life. The goods of this world 
will never fill up the great desire of our hearts. 
Riches, honors, pleasures, are neither permanent 



220 



Fourth Lecture. 



nor do they satisfy us. They are not held in se- 
curity, and there is always the fear of losing any 
earthly treasure. They do not fill up the want 
in our souls. When gained they either disappoint 
us or leave behind them the sense of remorse. 
They are for the moment, and are not what the 
soul craves. And even moral goods, such as the 
pleasures of virtue or the knowledge of the true 
and the beautiful, are imperfect and insufficient to 
give us bliss. Only imperfectly in this life can 
we know and love God, and even this insufficient 
knowledge is clouded with many obscurities and 
beset by many obstacles. The term of human ex- 
istence here does not satisfy the instincts of the 
soul nor meet the end which the Creator has set 
before us. There is, therefore, another life after 
death, or man is unblest and never reaches the 
goal of his hopes. Such would be an unfinished 
work, repugnant to the perfection of the divine 
attributes. God would really be cheating His crea- 
tures, leading them by the desires He has implant- 
ed to seek for a happiness they never could 
reach. He would contradict His own veracity, if 
the soul, without any voluntary fault, should thus 
be prevented from the attainment of its end. 
With one hand, as it were, He would irresistibly 
draw the soul toward Himself, and with the other 



The Immortality of the Soul. 221 

throw it back wrecked and unhappy, the victim 
of an illusion. The beasts of the field in their 
various ranks seek only the end of sensible grati- 
fication, and are at rest when their appetites are 
appeased. They have no thought of a higher life, 
no hopes beyond this visible scene. When, then, 
the Supreme Wisdom has given to man a loftier 
purpose and a more noble nature, it would be re- 
pugnant to the divine truth to leave him in a 
worse condition than the brute. All his high gifts 
would be only the occasion of illusion and the 
fruitful cause of misery. This misery would be in- 
evitable ; for in this life alone man could never be 
fully blest. Innumerable evils torment both body 
and soul, and cannot be averted by any care or 
labor. There is a contradiction in the thought that 
the infinitely good God created men to be miser- 
able without any fault of their wills. u If in this 
life only," says St. Paul, " we have hope in Christ, 
we are of all men most miserable." * The higher 
one rises in the scale of morality, often the more 
is he the subject of suffering; and if there be no 
future where the bright morrow shall dawn, his 
wisdom and self-denial are foolish, as they will 
win no reward. 
Here, too, the beneficent Author of all is made 

* 1 Cor. xv. 19. 



222 



Fourth Lecture. 



to excite in man contrary inclinations wliicli in 
this life can never be reconciled. There is the in- 
clination to virtue and to the obedience of the 
natural law of which our consciences testify. But 
the way of virtue is beset with difficulties. It is 
a hard path of self denial and renunciation of 
earthly pleasure. If, then, all our happiness were 
found in the enjoyment of present good, virtue, 
as leading to the rejection of such pleasure, would 
be an evil and the enemy of our happiness. "Let 
us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," would be 
our just rule of action. 

Again, man is drawn by nature to society, and 
there is a kind of natural necessity which binds 
him in the communion of his fellows. Yet if so- 
ciety is to be preserved, it must be by the prefer- 
ence of the private good to the public. The indi- 
vidual must endure many evils and dangers, and 
sometimes give up his life, for the benefit of others. 
Such a principle, which indeed lies at the founda- 
tion of the social fabric, leads to the renuncia- 
tion of present and private good, which would be 
insane if there were no sphere beyond the grave 
where such seeming contraries could be reconciled. 

And, indeed, this desire of felicity which the 
Creator has implanted within our souls not only 
proves the certainty of another life wherein it 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



223 



may be attained, but also shows that that life 
lias no end. This bliss for which w r e seek ex- 
cludes immortality, since we not only have the 
desire of interminable existence, but w r e could en- 
joy no good if there were the apprehension of 
its loss. To what end could the human intelli- 
gence enter upon the beatitude which it seeks, 
only in time to lose it and all reality, even being 
itself ? There could be no joy w r here there 
was the possibility of its end. The greater the 
bliss, the greater would be the loss, the more 
terrible the wreck of all in the blow of annihi- 
lation. Then for man there would be no possi- 
bility of beatitude, no means of reaching the blessed 
end of all his high faculties. The soul, in its in- 
satiable desire for good, is conscious of the truth 
of its Maker and of its own immortality. 

But we pass to another application of the same 
argument. God is of necessity a moral governor. 
His being, essential holiness, is the law of His in- 
telligent creatures. He must hate evil and love 
good. The gift of free-will, which is a necessary 
part of our being, without which the human soul 
cannot be conceived, leaves us free to obey or dis- 
obey the natural law of right and wrong which is 
engraven on our consciences. We know that such 
a law exists, and w r e know that it must have the 



224 



Fourth Lecture. 



sanction of rewards and punishments. On this just 
principle all men and all nations act. They reward 
the good and punish the evil. All our just ideas of 
government are drawn from the eternal principles 
of truth, and are an imitation of the vast dominion 
which the Infinite administers in the unlimited 
power and sanctity of His own being. He, too, will 
reward the obedient and punish the disobedient. 
He cannot reward the unjust for their crimes, for 
that would overthrow His own law and Himself. 
Yet Low often do we see in this life the good 
to suffer and the wicked to flourish ! How often 
are the monsters of vice exalted, to the destruction 
of the pure and tlie sorrow of the upright ! How 
unequally are the rewards of Providence meted 
out, as if before God the patient, just man were 
forgotten ! How have the great benefactors of the 
human race been made to tread the path of unex- 
ampled suffering ! How often is the cause of truth 
and holiness beaten down, as if there were no God 
to see and judge ! If there be no life after this 
brief space of trial, where is the place to extol the 
justice or wisdom of the Almighty? If there be no 
future scene where all shall be made clear, where 
suffering virtue tried in the fire shall shine with 
splendor for ever, where iniquity shall bow down 
beneath the anger of God, then indeed may we say 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



225 



that the infinite justice is found wanting. Says 
Rousseau: " If I saw no other proof of the soul's 
immortality but the triumph of the wicked and the 
oppression of the just in this world, this alone 
would prevent me from doubting it. A contradic- 
tion so manifest, a dissonance so shocking in the 
universal harmony, would make me declare: 'All 
ends not with this life ; order shall be established 
after death.' " * 

So, on the supposition that all ends with the 
hour of death, God has not only not provided 
means for the end of man, but he has failed to be 
a just moral governor. Beyond the grave there 
must be an endless life where the free creature 
shall reap the fruit of his own acts, where obedi- 
ence shall receive its eternal crown, where vice shall 
meet its unending pain, where the soul which seeks 
beatitude, and has been true to its instincts and to 
the higher law, shall find bliss to the full, the 
permanent possession of the true and the good. 
There, on the shores of infinity, the finite shall be 
at the goal of its most ardent hopes. There can no- 
thing be wanting, where the created meets the life 
and splendor of the Uncreated. Then true are the 
words of the inspired song: "Oh! how beautiful 
is the chaste generation with glory, for the memory 

* Confer. Bergier, "Examen du Materialisme. " 



226 



Fourth Lecture. 



thereof is immortal: because it is known both with 
God and with men." "Then shall the just stand 
with great constancy against those that have afflict- 
ed them and taken away their labors. These, see- 
ing it, shall be troubled with terrible fear, saying 
within themselves : These are they whom we had 
some time in derision and for a parable of reproach. 
We fools esteemed their life madness, and their 
end without honor. Behold how they are num- 
bered among the children of God, and their lot is 
among the saints. Therefore shall they receive a 
kingdom of glory and a crown of beauty at the 
hand of the Lord ; for with His right hand He will 
cover them, and with His holy arm He shall de- 
fend them. And His zeal will take armor, and He 
will arm the creature for the revenge of His ene- 
mies. He will put on justice as a breastplate, and 
will take true judgment instead of a helmet. He 
will take equity for an invincible shield." * 

Reason asks for the crown of the just and the 
felicity which they have sought in true obedience. 
It also asks for the vindication of the divine jus- 
tice against the evil which, here often triumphing 
over right, must beyond the grave meet the arm of 
the Omnipotent and pay tribute to the might which 
cannot be contradicted. It is the eternal law of 

* Wisdom, chap, iv.-v. 



The Immortality of tee Soul. 



227 



justice that one shall reap that which he has 
sown, and face the consequences of his own use of 
free-will. And as eternal life is the portion of the 
good, life in the possession of the Infinite ; so eter- 
nal life is the portion of the evil. But it is for 
them the life which they have merited — a life cut 
off from the joy of the Supreme Good, a pain which 
sin has earned, and which no finite mind can mea- 
sure, for it is an infinite loss. And reason, while 
it demands this just punishment, can give no hope 
that it shall ever end during the ceaseless cycles 
of eternity. There can be in that region of dark- 
ness no turning of the rebellious will to God, no 
good work by which the reward of bliss might be 
merited, no conceivable means by which the trans- 
gressor in the years of life, can change his state or 
lift himself from his exile to the home of the just 
intelligence. 

Reason declares with all its force against anni- 
hilation. It also demands the reconciliation of all 
the seeming inequalities in God's moral govern- 
ment. It demands the punishment of the unjust, 
of the obstinate sinner against the law engraven 
upon his conscience. And as this principle of jus- 
tice is admitted by all mankind and by all nations, 
it must stand in the future life. Then there shall 
be no possibility of mistake, no chance of injustice. 



228 



Fourth Lecture. 



To every one shall be rendered his due. It is an 
axiom in all law that the more noble the person 
offended, the greater is the offence. And there is 
no term of comparison between the Infinite and 
the finite, no capacity in human minds to measure 
the sin when the created will rises against the 
Creator, when the dependent turns against the 
bounteous Source of all good. Every possible re- 
lation is here to increase the guilt ; every claim of 
beneficence and gratitude to heighten the crime. 
There is, therefore, justice in the eternal pain 
which thus vindicates the rights and attributes of 
the Almighty. And the divine providence is here 
justified for the patience so long exercised with 
the ungodly, for the gifts of physical strength and 
mental power which the free agent made subser- 
vient to the moral ruin of himself and the dishonor 
of his Maker. Punishment takes effect when pro- 
bation ceases, and there is no hope of changing 
the will of the transgressor. Then the end of re- 
tribution is answered, and the sufficient warning 
is given to all rebellious intelligences. Fear of 
coming judgment when the arm of the Omnipo- 
tent shall be stretched out comes to the wicked in 
the days when hope is not extinguished. It is a 
warning of that which shall surely come when the 
great Judge shall take account of His creatures. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 229 

" There is a certain dreadful expectation of judg- 
ment, and the rage of a fire which shall consume 
the adversaries."* No less warning would "be suffi- 
cient to deter the sinner from the paths of sinful 
pleasure, from the gratifications of passion, from 
preferring time to eternity. While reason presents 
no argument against the endless punishment of the 
unjust, it bears witness to the agreement of such 
terrible retribution with the attributes of God, and 
the necessities of man's probation. Great is the 
gift of human liberty ; stupendous are the rewards 
of its proper use ; and alike great and worthy of 
the Infinite must be the consequences of its abuse. 
Sin is an evil of its own nature irreparable and 
eternal. Man can never by himself worthily satisfy 
for this infinite injury to his Creator. The life 
given to us here on earth is the probation of our 
wills, that by obedience to order and law we may 
gain the goal of our hopes, the end of our being, 
the felicity which our souls desire. The life be- 
yond the grave is the scene of just retribution. 
There he that has reached the goal has reached it 
eternally. There he who has through his own wil- 
ful fault lost the end of his being shall never find 
another sphere of trial. His loss is also endless. 
In all God will be magnified, His government on 

* Hebrews x, 27. 



230 



Fourth Lecture. 



earth will be vindicated, and His reign, as among 
the things inanimate, so among the beings intelli- 
gent, shall be supreme. 

Thus have we finished our brief task by a simple 
appeal to the principles of reason, and have given 
the testimony of that inward voice which our in- 
telligence speaks, which our conscience re-echoes. 
Hso one can be deaf to this voice, and no one can 
be sincere in the denial of these primary truths. 
They claim our belief, and their rejection is the 
exile of reason from her throne, and the welcome 
of universal doubt and barren scepticism. There 
is a God, whose infinite perfections are the cause of 
our being and the light of our perceptions. We 
cannot ignore the great First Cause, by whose 
creating power all the universe came from no- 
thing. Materialism is the mockery of the intellect, 
and pantheism is the unreasonable delusion which 
strips the Deity of His necessary perfections. The 
human soul bears the marks of its high origin, and, 
though united to the body which it animates and 
informs, it is a spirit among the higher ranks of 
creation, and deathless in its life. We are here 
for the world beyond the dissolution of the grave, 
for the Eternity that shall follow time. What 
senseless folly would rob us of our high place 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



231 



among the ways of God, and degrade lis to the 
level of even inanimate matter? 

The infidelity of our day is not only irrational ; 
it is also dishonest. Beginning by extolling the 
powers of reason, as if they were its only votaries, 
modern atheists are blind to every truth it estab- 
lishes. Boasting of the field of science, as if no 
one but themselves had ever explored its riches, 
they take conjecture and unproved opinion to con- 
found the plainest principles of human knowledge. 
That which they must know, which they cannot 
rationally deny, they set aside for conclusions 
which they cannot prove, which they confess to be 
merely unsolved problems. In this they deny the 
whole sphere and testimony of reason ; but in 
this, too, they are dishonest. For they are not sure 
of the ground on which they stand ; they admit 
that they know nothing when they dare to assail 
the grand truths of God's being and the soul's im- 
mortality. They teach a materialism which robs 
man of all liberty and destroys the possibility of 
moral action. Yet they act as if there w^ere such a 
thing as morality and as if man were responsible. 
They boast of reasoning powers, and then use them 
to demonstrate that there is no such thing as rea- 
son. They talk of truth, and then profess a doc- 
trine of universal negation which renders truth im- 



232 



Fourth Lecture. 



possible. Conscience stings tliem with its remorse 
for transgression of tlie law of God, and fear of 
coming retribution hangs over their heads and 
throws its shadow upon the agonies of death. 
All this they call the phenomena of materialism, 
the chance movement of molecules, the supersti- 
tions of humanity which the new ethical science 
must labor to explode. They dare not, before 
God or before man, practise the theories they 
preach. Society would fall in ruins, and the 
sacredness of their own homes be violated. It is 
easy to talk, to ridicule truth, to wrap up folly 
in unskilful words. In all this there is the con- 
fession of weakness, the open acknowledgment that 
they have discarded the weapons of logic. 

A few words upon the cause of prevalent infi- 
delity and upon the only remedy for this great 
evil, which threatens not only the salvation of 
the individual, but the peace and happiness of 
nations, w r ill close our present task. 

The cause of all unbelief lies in the rebellion 
of human pride, which seeks to free itself from 
all restraints, even from the dominion of the 
Creator. But the rejection of revealed religion 
has prepared the way for the denial of truths 
manifest to the natural reason. God, in His in- 



The Immortality of the Soul. 233 

finite mercy, lias been pleased to make known to 
man in an extraordinary manner many truths 
which are not evident by the light of nature. 
These verities concern His being, and His gra- 
cious interposition to save the human race and 
guide it from its dangers to its end. The reason 
could never gain this knowledge by its own un- 
aided strength. Even the natural religion lan- 
guishes through the weakness of the human 
heart and the power of passion. And when the 
God of nature was pleased thus to draw near the 
race which He had created after His own image, 
and to add to the light of reason the beams of a 
supernatural day, He was true to His own attri- 
butes and to the intellect of the creature He came 
to illumine. There is and can be no contradic- 
tion between the voice of revelation and the voice 
of nature. In both God speaks, and the one 
Supreme Intelligence cannot contradict Himself. 
Rather the added light of faith gives new splen- 
dor and clearness to all the truths taught by 
reason. 

It is necessary only that the words of revela- 
tion be authenticated by indubitable proofs, and 
that the evidence of God's presence and power be 
incontestable. Such an evidence are miracles, 
which, being an exception to the ordinary law of 



234 



Fourth Lecture. 



nature, must come from the same hand which 
created all things and gave to all things their 
order. No one but the Author of nature can 
make exceptions to His laws. When, therefore, 
miracles are manifestly wrought, miracles which 
are above all possibility of deception, there is no 
room for doubt that God is speaking. And no 
sane man can refuse obedience to the words of 
Him who is essential truth, who can neither de- 
ceive nor be deceived. 

Such miracles have authenticated the revelation 
of God under every dispensation in w T hich He has 
been x>leased to speak to mankind. Specially and 
much more abundantly have mighty and constant 
miracles vindicated the Christian faith as taught 
in the Catholic Church. This Church was founded 
by the Lord Jesus Christ at His coming upon 
earth, and endowed with all the divine power 
which He Himself possessed. "All power is given 
unto Me in heaven and upon earth ; go, there- 
fore, and teacli all nations." * Perfect man, He 
professed to be God, and proved Himself to be 
divine by His many and wonderful miracles, and 
chiefly by His resurrection from the grave and as- 
cension into heaven. These miracles were wrought 
in the sight of multitudes, even of His enemies. 

*St.JSdatthew.xxviii. 18, 19. 



The Immortality of the Soul. 235 

They are uncontested upon the page of history as 
important acts in the life of our race. All His 
power and divinity were pledged to the Church 
which He founded, which He made one, and 
which He established upon the Apostle Peter as 
the supreme pastor and centre of unity. Miracles 
have never ceased in the ages all along to authen- 
ticate this Church. In the days of persecution, 
in the hour of suffering from false and apostate 
children, in the revolt of princes or of society, 
the witness of the divine power has been manifest 
and constant. Above all, to the right reason, is the 
miracle of the existence of the Church itself, with 
its unity of faith and its perseverance in a life 
which God alone could give, in the midst of 
great evils and many influences tending to decay 
and dissolution. And the fact remains that reve- 
lation and Christianity are identical with this 
Church, that all other organizations of whatever 
name are useless for the maintenance of faith. 
They neither profess to be infallible teachers nor 
do they possess the power to impress the know- 
ledge of truth upon any intellect. The infidel 
laughs at their pretensions, and rightly judges 
them to be his allies in the work of demolishing 
the truth revealed. 

When, then, the adversary of man succeeded 



236 



Fourth Lecture. 



in leading men to an attack upon this Church, 
"the pillar and ground of the truth," he led 
them to the logical denial of all revelation. Surely 
any tyro in logic must know that the overthrow 
of the Catholic Church is the direct accusation of 
imposture against the Lord, who founded her and 
promised her perpetuity. If this Church failed, 
then the Founder failed ; and if He failed, He was 
not even a prophet sent of God, much less the 
Eternal Son of the Father. We pause not here to 
say that there is a fact which no one can honestly 
deny — that beyond the Catholic Church there is no 
semblance of unity of doctrine, and therefore no 
representation of Christianity. 

The revolt from the Church in the sixteenth 
century has been the widespread destruction of 
all essential doctrine taught by Christ and His 
apostles. One by one, in the unrestrained use of 
private judgment, the truths revealed have gone 
down. The evidence of miracles is ignored or re- 
jected, and the relics of faith which are left are 
still preserved in spite of logic, in spite of the 
guiding principles which open the way to every 
species of infidelity. The revolt of Protestantism is 
deadly to all truth, and it is also suicidal. It 
takes away any possibility of hearing the divine 
voice ; and it cannot limit the unbelief of its ad- 



The Immortality of the Soul. 237 

herents, who in their separate spheres are inde- 
pendent of any authority. 

So, naturally, when God in revelation is re- 
jected, the way is clear to the denial of the same 
God in nature. Men pass by easy stages in the 
road of negation and infidelity. If revelation, 
which throws around our race its dearest and holi- 
est associations, hallowed from the morning of 
creation, has failed and been admitted a delusion, 
what are men to believe ? If Jesus Christ and His 
many miracles be rejected, who will ever be able 
to speak to the distracted soul of man? If the 
Catholic Church, which is the only living teacher 
of Christianity, be called the masterpiece of de- 
ception, where can there be place for the apolo- 
gist who would defend the Lord Christ or the 
God who sent Him \ And men will pass logically 
from all this negation, from the rejection of in- 
dubitable miracles, to the rejection of the laws of 
evidence and the principles of natural reason. 
Thus the foundations of all truth are subverted, 
and human pride shakes off its fear of the Su- 
preme and cries out with the fool that there is 
no God. There is nothing, indeed, to those who, 
untrue to the law of nature, deny first the au- 
thority of revelation, and then, having disowned 
the principles of reason, turn to the darkness of 



238 



Fourth Lecture. 



universal scepticism. To them there is no truth. 
They have sought to put out the light which 
comes to our finite minds, in its varied beams, 
only from the Sovereign Truth, the centre and 
fountain of all illumination. His wondrous ways 
are all in harmony. Reason leads the true intel- 
lect to the obedience of faith. And when faith 
is cast away with its far-seeing vision of the su- 
pernatural, reason will also fall beneath the ruin 
of all true knowledge. So are men, who have 
been led from the safe shelter of the Church of 
God, the prey of every error and the sport of in- 
fidelity. They wander in a deeper gloom than 
did the heathen in the early day before "the 
Orient from on high had visited the region of 
darkness and of the shadow of death." They 
had not the guilt of a redeemer rejected, of 
Christianity denied ; while our modern pagans are 
bearing the burden of this unpardonable sin. 
There will come no other redemption, no other 
salvation, no other revelation, no dawn of another 
day. 4 'The people that walked in darkness have 
seen a great light." " While all things were in 
quiet silence, and the night was in the midst of 
its course, Thy almighty Word leapt down from 
heaven, from Thy Royal throne." 4 4 For a Child 
is born to us, and a Son is given to us, and the 



The Immortality of the Soul. 239 

government shall be upon His shoulder, and His 
name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, God 
the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the 
Prince of peace." * 

There is only one remedy for this evil of infi- 
delity, so great in itself, so vast in its results. It 
is to retrace the steps of error, to return by the 
light of reason and faith, and accept Christianity 
as it comes to the world in the power and pre- 
sence of Jesus Christ. The Catholic Church is 
the only representative of the Christian faith, 
inheriting the promises of the Lord as the only 
heir to all His graces. It is revealed religion in 
the concrete. Its rejection leads logically to the 
denial of all truth, even to the rejection of the 
natural light. For it alone possesses the power 
to teach man the way to the beatitude for which 
his soul longs. It alone preserves the axioms of 
reason, and shows the divine harmony which sub- 
sists between nature and grace, the dawn of the 
morning and the splendor of the noonday. 

Protestantism, in all its varied and contradic- 
tory forms, has no voice to teach, no one gospel 
to promulgate, no logic by which to meet the wea- 
pons of a false philosophy. Atheists and mate- 
rialists are in no fear from any arguments they 

*Isaias ix. 2, 6; Wisdom xviii. 14, 15. 



240 



Fourth Lecture. 



can bring. Rather they point out their hapless 
divisions and endless contradictions as tlie mock- 
ery of a truth which is, and must be everlast- 
ingly, one. They declare with an unanswerable 
force that these divisions are not only ruinous to 
all dogmatic power, but that they imply and pro- 
fess the failure of the Christian revelation. A 
scheme of religion which has ended in such con- 
tradictions is a gigantic failure before God and 
man. Either there is something else sure and 
stable which is not the creature of men's wills or 
fancies, or there is nothing left. Infidelity has no 
better friends than those who have broken the 
unity of Christ and are the enemies of His one 
Body. 

Here in the Church of God, the home of light, 
is peace. Here is the unfailing voice of authority. 
Here every light of reason is hallowed and obeyed, 
while the day grows brighter and the sun of truth 
ascends to its meridian. Here no law of our na- 
ture is broken. Here, when our natural strength 
is proved insufficient for our grand and glorious 
destiny, the strength of deity is interposed, and 
God Himself leads His true children to their end, 
the blissful enjoyment of the Infinite. Earth ceases 
to be the mere world of matter ; it becomes the 
footstool of heaven, and the emancipated intellect 



The Immortality of the Soul. 



241 



bathes itself in the beams of the uncreated light 
and grows strong for its eternity. 

The day of trial for our race has come. Men 
are beguiled by false theories and led in search 
of a false liberty. The rejection of the divine 
authority is the logical rejection of all govern- 
ment and all obedience. There is no barrier left 
against the tide which will sweep away justice, 
order, morality, and all that men hold dear. There 
is only one beacon of light to the nations. The 
rock of Peter, on which the great Master built 
His Church, is the corner-stone of order to the 
whole earth. The Vicar of the Lord most high, 
who feeds the flock in the safe pastures of the 
Good Shepherd, is the one never failing defender 
of the truth j the right arm on earth of God and 
reason. 

u O heavenly Wisdom, coming from the mouth 
of the Highest, reaching from end to end, firmly 
and sweetly disposing all things, come to teach 
us the way of prudence." 

"O Emmanuel, our King and Lawgiver, the ex- 
pectation and the Saviour of the nations, come and 
save us, O Lord our God." 



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